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Many survey questions ask respondents to provide responses that contain 
quantitative information. These questions are often asked requiring open ended numeric 
responses, while others have been asked using vague quantifier scales. How these 
questions are asked, particularly in terms of the response format, can have an important 
impact on the data. Therefore, the response format is of particular importance for 
ensuring that any use of the data contains the best possible information. Generally, survey 
researchers have argued against the use of vague quantifier scales. This dissertation 
compares various measurement properties between numeric open ended and vague 
quantifier responses, using three studies containing questions with both formats. The first 
study examines uses new experimental data to compare accuracy between the measures; 
the second and third use existing data to compare predictive validity of the two formats, 
with one examining behavioral reports, the other examining subjective probabilities. All 
three studies examine the logical consistency between measures, and the potential 
correlates related to improved measurement properties. Importantly, these studies 
examine the influence of numeracy, a potentially important but rarely examined variable.  
The results of the three studies indicate that vague quantifiers may have better 
 measurement properties than numeric open ended responses, contrary to many 
researchers’ arguments. Studies 2 and 3 are most clear about this increased strength; in 
both of the studies, using a number of tests, the predictive validity of vague quantifiers 
was consistently greater than that of numeric open ended responses, regardless of 
numeracy level. Study 1 shows that at that generally, vague quantifiers result in more 
accurate data than numeric, but this finding depends on other factors, such as numeracy. 
Therefore, numeracy was infrequently found to be important, but at times did have an 
impact on accuracy. Further, in the three studies, it was found that the two formats were 
logically consistent when translations between the questions were directly asked for, but 
inconsistency occurred when there was not a direct translation.  
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1 
Introduction 
Surveys collect data on a wide range of information that is important for not only 
academic research but a range of other areas, such as marketing and policy decisions. For 
example, questions about television use may affect the decisions a business makes and 
how to invest money. Asking about how many times a person takes pain medication may 
affect drug policy. Questions about subjective beliefs, such as the risks of smoking can be 
used to make decisions about public health campaigns. Importantly, all of these questions 
ask respondents to provide responses that contain numeric information. Responses to 
these queries can be affected by the way the question design allows an answer. How these 
questions are asked, particularly in terms of the response format, can have an important 
impact on the data, including the response distribution and the overall quality of the 
responses. This quality can be expressed in different ways, most importantly as the level 
of measurement error in each response format (Biemer and Lyberg 2003, Groves 1989, 
Lessler and Kalsbeek 1992). As such, the response format is of particular importance for 
ensuring that any use of the data contains the best possible information on which to make 
decisions.  
 Survey questions provide methods for respondents to give their answers, either in 
their own words (open ended questions) or through response alternatives provided by the 
researcher (closed ended questions) (Converse and Presser 1986). The choice between 
open and closed ended and the choice of which alternatives to offer in a closed ended 
question can have distinct effects on the response distributions (Schuman and Presser 
1981). That there is an impact of question format on response distributions is likely true 
for all survey questions and question types, including questions about quantities 
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regardless of whether the questions ask about frequencies, such as for behaviors, or for 
expressions of subjective probabilities, such as those for level of perceived risk.  
 Three main response options have been developed and used in requesting 
quantitative information from respondents: open ended, numeric scales, or vague 
quantifier scales (Tourangeau et al. 2000). The open ended approach, which has been 
used most frequently by survey designers, leaves the response formulation and reporting 
to the respondent, whereby, for numeric questions, the respondent generally responds 
with one number. For scale responses, respondents choose a scale point most closely 
associated with their formulated answer. For objective measures, such as frequencies, the 
response options can include scale points for distinct, individual values, (e.g. 1 time) or 
for ranges of values (e.g. 1 to 5 times). Subjective probabilities may also be elicited using 
open ended questions, in which the expected probability is directly asked for (e.g. Viscusi 
1990). Both open ended and numeric scale options presume that the respondent has some 
numeric understanding and representations of the requested information in numeric form 
in order to respond (Schwarz et al. 1985).  However, some have argued against the use of 
numeric scales, as it may bias respondent answers as the scale provides not only a 
measurement device but also an informative component as well (Schwarz et al. 1985).  
 The last response format frequently used is vague quantifier scales.  These scales 
use no numeric values directly, but rather use verbal phrases frequently used in natural 
language to describe numeric data (Sanford et al. 1994, 1996). These scales provide 
options that are, as the name suggests, inherently vague. For example, scale options may 
include words and phrases such as very often, somewhat often, and not very often. As 
such, there is often a large variation in the numeric meaning assigned to vague quantifiers 
3 
(e.g. Wallsten et al. 1985). The scales also have relative meaning, such as where on the 
scale a respondent believes they are in comparison to similar others (Schaeffer 1991). As 
such, it has been argued against the usage of such scales when it is possible to use 
numeric response options (especially open ended) instead (Beyth-Marom 1982, Schaeffer 
1991, Tourangeau et al. 2000).  
 In considering the formatting of questions that ask for numeric information, an 
issue that deserves additional research is to better determine how quantitative information 
is represented cognitively. Matching response options to cognitive structure appears to be 
a possible best practice in survey methodology (Tourangeau et al. 2000). Included in this 
cognitive structure is the way that quantitative information is used when judging the 
frequency of the occurrence of events and in providing subjective probabilities such as 
assessing risks. Hence, if people think about quantitative information in vague ways, 
asking them to quantify using vague quantifier scales may be more appropriate in 
comparison to other formats. For example, given that the risk of death for a surgery is 1 
in 1000, what may matter more than the numeric representation is the vague 
representation of whether this risk is “a little” or “a lot”.  Similar vague representations 
may also underlie judgments of behavioral frequencies.  
 As presented in the literature review below, there are reasons to believe that vague 
quantifiers are indeed better measures than numeric indicators. First, it is not clear that 
people are able to think numerically in a range of instances. In general, there is a lack of 
numeracy (numeric literacy) in the population (e.g. Galesic and Garcia-Retamero 2010). 
Theories such as “fuzzy-trace” and other dual-process theories suggest that people 
frequently rely on vague, intuitive representations of numeric information rather than on 
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the verbatim representation of the numbers (Reyna and Brainerd 2008). Correlations 
between subjective beliefs and behaviors have been found to be higher when using vague 
quantifier scales than numeric responses (Windschitl and Wells 1996). Further, it has 
been noted it is more cognitively burdensome to ask about numeric information than 
vague quantifiers (Bradburn and Miles 1979).  
 Still, there is a dearth of research on whether vague quantifiers or numeric 
responses perform better in regards to validity. Studies examining frequencies have 
focused on the meanings and variations in these meanings people have placed on vague 
quantifiers, rather than which format performs better in predicting accuracy. Further, 
these studies have not examined which format is more strongly related to other variables 
of interest, i.e. predictive validity. In regards to subjective probabilities, there has been 
some work on the predictive validity of the different measures, but these studies have 
been limited to bivariate measures of association, and have been conducted on 
nonrandom and small samples (i.e. college students in a class).  
 The goal of the research described in this dissertation is directed to filling some of 
these gaps in the research on vague quantifiers and numeric responses. In particular, the 
ultimate goal is to provide evidence as to which format of response to quantitative 
queries, numeric open-ended versus vague quantifier, provides better data and in which 
circumstances. I will use three different data sets, all of which contain responses to 
similar questions using both response formats, numeric open ended responses and vague 
quantifier responses. Two of these data sets are related to frequencies; one is related to 
subjective probabilities. Two of the data sets come from national samples, while one is an 
experiment that has been designed specifically for this dissertation.  
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Dissertation Structure 
This dissertation is organized into six sections. The first section briefly lists the 
four major research objectives of this investigation. The objectives are followed by the 
problem statement and significance of the research, including a brief overview of the 
gaps in the literature, and a brief description of problems and significance of each of the 
four objectives. The second section is a review of the existing literature regarding the 
areas of numeracy, frequency estimation, and the subjective probability estimation, 
concluding with a summary and a more extended discussion of the gaps in the literature 
in regards to the current research. Following the review, there are three separate sections 
outlining three studies. Three data sets are needed to look at the various aspects of 
numeric estimation and facets of data quality, and each section describes the data and 
methods, the hypotheses, the results from the analyses, and the discussion and conclusion 
for the respective study.  The first two data sets examine frequency estimation and 
response formats, while the third data set examines subjective probability estimation. The 
final section presents a summary of the research including recommendations for survey 
research. 
Research Objective 
The main objective of this research is to examine which type of response formats, 
numeric open ended or vague quantifier scales, have better measurement properties for 
questions requesting numeric data, that is, which has the least measurement error. 
Numeric scales are not examined by the three studies for several reasons. First, both 
numeric scales and numeric open ended responses require some numeric understanding 
and cognitive representation of the information requested by the survey question. 
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However, only one of these response forms is needed to compare responses requiring a 
numeric representation versus those that do not. Second, previous research has found 
numeric scales to introduce systematic biases in respondents’ behavioral reports.  
Specifically, Schwarz et al. (1985) suggest that numeric open ended response formats are 
preferable to numeric scales, as numeric scales “may introduce systematic bias in 
respondents' behavioral reports and related judgments, because response scales are not 
only measurement devices but serve informative functions as well” (Schwarz et al. 1985 
p. 394). Third, of practical importance, much of the data available that allow comparisons 
to be made only have data on numeric open ended responses and vague quantifier 
responses, barring comparison with numeric scales. For these reasons, all of the data 
examined will compare only numeric open ended and vague quantifier responses.  
This main objective entails first, which format, numeric open ended or vague 
quantifier scales, is more accurate, and second, which has higher predictive validity. A 
third objective is to see if the semantic representations of numbers and the actual numeric 
translation of these are logically consistent. Finally, these objectives include an 
examination of generalizability, that is, in which circumstances these findings hold. 
These objectives are divided across frequency and subjective probability data. The 
research objectives are presented more expressly below: 
Objective 1:  Accuracy of Different Response Formats 
The aim of objective 1 is to examine whether one response format, numeric open 
ended or vague quantifier scales, is more accurate than the other in relation to verifiable 
data. Since by definition vague quantifiers do not convey an exact meaning, numeric 
values must be assigned to gauge accuracy, as in Lu et al. (2008). If one is more accurate 
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than the other this possibly suggests the cognitive structure of quantitative data and 
measurement properties of the different response formats. That is, more accurate data 
may suggest that the quantitative information is stored in a way more closely resembling 
one response format (numeric versus vague), and in addition, accuracy is suggestive of 
which response format has better measurement properties. Since accuracy needs factual 
supportive data, accuracy data relies on frequency data. 
Objective 2:  Predictive Validity of Different Response Formats 
The aim of objective 2 is to determine which response format, numeric open 
ended or vague quantifier scales, if either, is stronger in terms of predictive validity, i.e. 
the relationship of the target response to other theoretically related variables. In many 
instances it is the relationships between variables that may be of interest rather than the 
simple univariate statistics, and different question formulations have found differential 
predictive validity (e.g. Chang and Krosnick 2003). In comparison to accuracy measures, 
assigning numeric values when examining predictive validity is less necessary, and 
predictive validity can be tested using both frequency and subjective probability data.  
Objective 3:  Logical Consistency Between Measures 
The aim of objective 3 is to inspect the numeric translations of vague quantifiers 
and identify whether the numeric responses and vague quantifiers given are consistent. It 
may be that there is a logical incoherence in the translated numeric meaning and the 
vague quantifier given. In such cases it is necessary to posit whether one measure rather 
than the other is more likely to be more consistent with cognitive-semantic processes. 
The examination of logical consistency is closely related to determining face validity.  
8 
Objective 4:  Circumstances of Differential Performance of Different Response 
Formats 
The aim of objective 4 is to investigate in what cases the accuracy and predictive 
validity differs for the varying response formats, and in which direction. It is likely that in 
some cases the accuracy and/or predictive validity is stronger for one measure, but that 
the other response format has better measurement properties for a different measure.  
Problem Statement and Significance 
The reporting of a response to a survey question, given different response formats, 
is an issue mainly of measurement. As such, in the Total Survey Error paradigm, the 
source of error mainly of interest when dealing with response formats is measurement 
error (Biemer and Lyberg 2003, Groves 1989, Lessler and Kalsbeek 1992). Measurement 
error refers to the difference between the true value and the survey estimate (Lessler and 
Kalsbeek 1992). This measurement error can arise from a number of sources, including 
the interviewer, the questionnaire mode, the questionnaire, and the respondent. Although 
all may interact with response formats, only the questionnaire and the respondent are of 
interest in the current dissertation (although it will be noted when other sources may be a 
cause of error).  
 Measurement error due to the questionnaire in this case would be due to the 
provision of inadequate or difficult response options, in which the response options do 
not match the information stored in memory or is difficult for the respondents to match to 
the information requested. This measurement error can occur due to a mismatch in the 
format and the natural way that respondents’ store information, or if asking a question in 
one form or the other increases cognitive difficulty.  From the respondent side of the 
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equation, the error occurs due to several different sources, which arise from the response 
process taken during survey response. The response process includes the steps of 
encoding of the requested information, comprehension of the question, retrieval of the 
requested information, judgment of the relevance and completeness of memories, and 
giving a response, which may require editing (Biemer and Lyberg 2003, Tourangeau et 
al. 2000).  
 The first step of the response process is how the respondent initially encodes the 
information that will be requested by the questionnaire. For quantitative information, 
initially the information may not be encoded at all, only some of the information is 
encoded, some estimate is used, all information is encoded, or only vague notions are 
stored (see below in literature review). At the second stage, respondents need to 
understand the question and how to respond given the response format, but may not, 
including the meaning of vague terms (Groves 1989). At the third stage, numeric 
information must be recalled in some format, generally based on the way the information 
was encoded. However, it may not be the case that information is recalled as it was 
initially stored, as information may be forgotten or only vague representations remain 
(see literature review). The fourth stage, judgment, requires assessment of the recalled 
information for completeness. An error can occur, for example, when the recalled 
information is judged complete when it is not. The response step requires that the 
numeric information recalled and judged complete is reported given the response format. 
However, if the response format is not matched to how the information is encoded or 
recalled, then the mismatch can create error. Finally, respondents may skip some of these 
steps entirely (i.e. satisficing), which can increase error as well (Krosnick 1991).  
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 Given all of these potential sources of error, it is important to identify response 
formats that lead to the least amount of error as possible. Numeric open ended responses 
or vague quantifiers are two alternatives which are often used in measuring information. 
As noted above and more fully below in the literature review, both response formats have 
theory and findings suggesting one may be preferable, and are important in the 
measurement properties the question, especially in terms of validity. Further, although 
there is evidence people may naturally store quantitative information as vague 
quantifiers, practitioners at times recommend against using vague quantifier response 
options in questions. This avoidance may be in part due to a lack of research showing the 
comparative measurement properties of the numeric and vague quantifier response 
formats. As of now, there are few, if any, studies that examine the comparative 
measurement properties of the two response formats. The goal of this dissertation is to fill 
this gap in the literature, and assess the validity of the different response formats via 
accuracy and predictive validity, and the instances that the different response formats 
perform better on these assessments. By examining different forms of validity and the 
contexts in which the measures display better or worse measurement properties, the 
results are hoped to triangulate to some conclusions about which measures should be 
used and when.  
Logical consistency of responses to the different formats has been studied more 
than other aspects of the measurement properties of response formats, such as accuracy 
and predictive validity; however, some important gaps still exist in the literature, 
particularly in the survey methodology literature. First, is the examination of whether 
numeric translations of vague quantifier are linguistically logical. For example, it should 
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be examined if the response to the vague quantifier response option “never” is always 
equal to zero. In addition, it follows that respondents should always give a translation for 
quantifiers at higher points on the scales significantly greater than points lower on the 
scale. However, this logical ordering has not been studied completely, and is another gap 
in the literature that this research proposes to address.  
 There are a number of other gaps in the literature that exist, in particular regarding 
the respondent and other characteristics that may interact with response formats to affect 
the differences in measurement properties. Most prominently is a lack of the examination 
of numeracy on responses to questions about quantitative information, and how numeracy 
interacts with the different response formats to affect measurement properties, including 
accuracy, predictive validity, and logical consistency of responses. Another gap in the 
literature is the examination of how aspects of memory for frequency interact with the 
response formats used in the question. These aspects of memory include the actual 
frequency of the event, and the context memory. For subjective probability estimation in 
particular, there has been a lack of studies examining diverse and representative 
populations, which limit examination of some important contrasts, in particular the 
possible effect of maturity (age) on estimation in terms of its predictive validity. Adults 
and youths may perceive risks in different ways, such that adults use vague, intuitive 
information, while youths rely more on numeric, objective data (Reyna and Farley 2006). 
The difference in what information is used in risk perceptions in turn may affect the 
measurement properties of the different response formats. However, the difference 
between ages has not been examined systematically, and is another gap in the literature 
the research discussed in this dissertation attempts to address.  
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Objective 1:  Accuracy of Different Response Formats 
Accuracy is an aspect of validity in that both are concerned with the differences 
between the true value and the estimated value (although validity entails other aspects as 
well) (Groves 1989, Lessler and Kalsbeek 1992). It is also one of the main components of 
the quality of a survey (Biemer and Lyberg 2003). The expected value of the survey 
estimate can be put into equation format as follows: 
 y  
where y is the survey estimate,  is the true value, and  is the error. Accuracy can be 
defined most simply where 0 , and the survey estimate is equal to the true value. More 
broadly, it can be defined as to where the value of  is minimized. Therefore the goal is 
to choose measures, including response formats, in which the value of  is minimized. As 
of now, few studies have examined accuracy in this way.  
Objective 2:  Predictive Validity of Different Response Formats 
Predictive validity, as the name suggests, is another form of validity on which to 
assess the different measurement formats. Unlike accuracy, which compares the measure 
to the true value, i.e. a gold standard, predictive validity is concerned with the 
relationship of the target measure with some other variable it should theoretically be 
related to, a criterion (Kumar 2005). A high level of relationship (e.g. correlation) 
between the target and the criterion suggests a higher level of validity, as the variable is 
able to predict what it should theoretically predict. As such, the stronger the relationship 
between one target and the criterion compared to other target variables suggests better 
measurement properties for the target with the higher relationship. Predictive validity 
tests have been used to examine measurement properties of competing question formats 
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(Chang and Krosnick 2003). However, few studies have made comparisons between 
numeric measures and vague quantifiers in terms of predictive validity, and in most 
studies in which predictive validity has been examined, the sample is small and not 
randomly selected from the wider population.  
Objective 3:  Logical Consistency Between Measures 
If one is asked similar questions with different response formats that map onto the 
same underlying dimension, it should follow that there is a natural consistency between 
the two responses. That is, higher responses on one response scale should be related to 
higher responses on the other; similarly, lower responses on one should relate to lower 
response on the other response scale. Thus the numeric open-ended response should be 
greater for responses in which the highest point on the vague quantifier scale was given 
than all other numeric open ended responses in which lower vague quantifier scale points 
were selected.  
Further, responses should be related in a semantic-logical format. Vague 
quantifiers are natural part of everyday language (Sanford et al. 1996). Conversely, a 
large number of people have problems with numeric responses (Galesic and Garcia-
Retamero 2010, Reyna and Brainerd 2008). As such, it may be that numeric answers are 
not consistent with the natural language usage of quantifiers. For example, if the response 
“never” is given on a vague quantifier scale and the answer “5” given on the numeric 
open ended response, there is an apparent inconsistency on the common understanding of 
what “never” means.  A lack of consistency suggests that it is possible that one measure 
has better measurement properties than the other.  
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Objective 4:  Circumstances of Differential Performance of Different Response 
Formats 
It may be that either numeric open ended measures or vague quantifiers have 
better measurement properties overall, or that there are different circumstances when one 
performs better than the other. First, one measure may be more accurate, but, however 
unlikely, have lower predictive validity. Second, it may be the case that one measure has 
better measurement properties for frequency data than subjective probabilities. Third, it 
may depend on the actual level of frequency that affects cognition of the numeric 
information and hence the measurement properties of the two response formats. For 
example, greater frequencies may be more likely to be stored as vague quantifiers relative 
to smaller frequencies (Conrad et al. 1998).   
Fourth, greater context of encoding and memory may lead respondents to be more 
likely to have numeric information stored in one format versus another. For instance, 
Brown (1997) found that those with greater context memory (i.e., memory based on 
greater distinctiveness among target events) were more likely to use a strategy of 
enumeration to answer numeric open ended questions than when context memory was 
low (i.e., memory based on greater similarity among target events).  Fifth, the way 
information is stored and preferred to be recalled and reported may depend on the level of 
the individual’s numeracy. More numerate individuals may be more likely to have 
numeric information stored as numbers, and more comfortable recalling and reporting 
numbers, which may lead to differential measurement properties for the different 
response formats across numeracy levels. Similarly, characteristics that may be related to 
numeracy or other individuating factors may lead to different outcomes of the response 
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formats. These characteristics include demographic variables such as age, gender, race, 
and education. Further, it is possible that the adults are more likely to rely on the vague, 
gist-based information compared to adolescents, who rely more on verbatim information 
(Reyna and Farley 2006). As such, there may be even greater differential functioning of 
the response formats across age, and when possible, will also be examined.  
Literature Review 
Outline of the Literature Review 
 As noted, responses to queries can be affected by the response formats that are 
given as answer choices. Most studies of frequencies use numeric responses as the 
outcome, as do many studies of subjective probabilities. The literature review examines 
the pertinent areas related to the way people think about quantitative information (in both 
numeric and vague terms), how this information is recalled, and how response formats 
can affect responses.  As such, the literature review is divided into three main sections: 
numeracy, frequency estimation, and subjective probability estimation (risk perceptions). 
Within each, the topics are divided according to different aspects of the literature. Each of 
these three sections begins with a short introduction on the topic. Numeracy, underlying 
the way people understand numbers, and hence both frequency estimation and subjective 
probabilities begins, followed by the literature review on frequency estimation and 
concluding with the literature on subjective probabilities. Studies 1 and 2 (see below) 
deal with frequency estimation and more related to the frequency estimation literature, 
while Study 3 deals with subjective probabilities, and is linked more closely to the 
subjective probability literature. All three studies examine numeracy’s impact on 
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response validity. The literature review concludes with a summary and a discussion of the 
current gaps in the literature as it relates to these topics.  
Numeracy Introduction 
People use and encounter numbers on a regular basis. Numbers are part of our 
general information environment, that they include such aspects as prices for goods, 
speed limits, and instructions (e.g. for baking, construction), to name just a few instances. 
This numeric information is important for understanding the environment and in decision 
making. The decisions made using numeric information can be of paramount importance, 
including financial management and health care. Researchers studying these and other 
areas, including most, if not all, social sciences, often ask subjects for numeric 
information on a variety of topics, including frequency estimation, risk estimation, and 
monetary decisions and information. Even the response scales respondents are required to 
respond to are often anchored and labeled using numeric information, e.g. 0 to 10, -5 to 
+5.  
 People’s ability to think numerically is assumed when such data is requested and 
frequently when decision making is involved. Data from surveys can impact important 
policy decisions (e.g. public education initiatives), marketing strategies, or social 
research. Similarly, numeric information is frequently presented for people to make 
financial, public policy, and health care decisions. As such, it is important to examine the 
basic assumption of capability for numerical thinking, and if this assumption does not 
hold, then the decisions made and data from surveys will be suboptimal at best. 
Understanding how numerical data is understood, produced and reported is needed to 
potentially increase the efficacy of decision-making and data coming from surveys.  
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 Generally, numerical thinking is related to both cognitive understanding and 
memory (Brown and Siegler 1993). Numbers must be understood in the proper metric 
and meaning for useful processing of the information. Memory is important in both 
understanding the numbers presented, as it often provides the metric needed, but also 
frequently in recall of personal numeric data. How such data is encoded, stored, and its 
accessibility and availability at later points are important issues in understanding memory 
broadly. Further, when the data requested from subjects is numeric (e.g. behavior 
frequency), the tabulation of the memories is also of interest. As such, the focus of this 
work is the cognition and memory aspects of numeric information. Although previous 
research on cognition of numeric information is expansive, a basic summary of major 
points can be suggestive of numeric thinking.  
Cognition of numeric information 
fMRI studies have shown a link between exact arithmetic to language centers of 
the brain (Dehaene et al. 1999). As such, it is necessarily a human-based structure, 
incompatible with infants and not completely compatible for youths, who have less 
language (and memory) ability. Conversely, this same study found that approximate 
mathematics shows language independence, relying more on numerical magnitudes and 
spatial processes. The authors suggest that mathematical intuition may rely on an 
interaction of these cognitive systems.  
 Once a basic understanding of numbers is obtained, it is reasonable to question 
how these numbers are mentally represented. It has been posited that numbers are 
represented on a mental number line (Dehaene 1997, Nuerk et al. 2004). Differentiation 
of numbers on this line can be made using several identified processes. The first is 
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magnitude differences (Moyer and Landauer 1967, Nuerk et al. 2004, Turconi et al.  
2006). As such, as the magnitude of the difference between the compared numbers 
increases, the ease of differentiation increases. An additional differentiation process is 
that of serial-search, in which serial position is accessed in judgments (Turconi et al. 
2006). 
 In processing and producing numeric information, additional information is also 
used. Estimation of numeric information first requires knowledge of the metric and 
information about the distribution of the domain of interest (Brown and Siegler 1993). 
For example, estimating driving speed requires information of both the metric (e.g. miles 
per hour) and the distribution of normal speeds (e.g. 35 M.P.H. in cities, 70 on 
highways). These sources of information are obviously related, but are conceptually 
distinct. Further, error can arise from either one source of information separately, or from 
both. In addition, lacking information from either necessary source increases the reliance 
on heuristics in judgments; when greater domain-specific information is available from 
both sources, such information is emphasized over heuristics in making judgments 
(Brown and Siegler 1993). 
Understanding of numeric information 
 The above research only indicates that people do in fact have some cognitive 
processes for numbers. This research, however, does not indicate that people in general 
are able to understand numbers is a meaningful way. Indeed, much research suggests that 
people do not fully understand numeric information. The National Literacy Survey 
indicates that children lack minimum math skills needed to use numbers in printed 
materials (Kirsch et al. 2002). Even among highly educated samples, only 32% correctly 
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answered eight numeracy skill questions (Lipkus et al. 2001). Nearly 20% of these 
samples answered the most direct risk question incorrectly (i.e. “Which represents the 
largest risk? 1%, 5% or 10%?”). Studies using similar numeracy scales have found 
similar results (Schwartz et al. 1997, Peters et al. 2006, Galesic et al. 2009). In the largest 
identified study of numeracy, Galesic and Garcia-Retamero (2010) conducted surveys 
using nine questions for objective numeracy (also used in this dissertation in Study 1). 
This research found that people could answer only about two-thirds of the questions 
correctly. Importantly, the findings also show a strong correlation with education, with 
more educated people being more highly numerate.    
Studies in survey research also indicate the inability of people to use numbers as 
expected. A number of respondents do not answer with logically consistent responses to 
subjective probability measures using numeric scales, particularly among those with 
lower cognitive abilities (Belli et al. 1999). People have also been found to incorrectly 
select greater magnitude probabilities when frequency and base rates differed (e.g. 24.14 
out of 100 versus 2414 out of 10000) by choosing cases where the higher total frequency 
was greater, neglecting the base rate (Yamagishi 1997). Similarly, when asking about 
equivalent risks, but in a different manner (e.g. frequencies vs. percentages), people have 
been found to give different answers (Windschitl 2002).  
Another finding in the survey literature is the influence that numeric labels placed 
on scales has on response (e.g. varying levels of number of hours of television watched at 
the end points of the scale). Studies have found that using different values produces 
differing estimates of frequency or duration (Schwarz et al. 1985; Wright et al. 1994).  
People use the information conveyed in the numeric scale points to infer an “average” for 
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the population, and to place themselves on the scale accordingly. The authors of these 
studies suggest that numeric scales possibly be avoided; instead, numeric open ended 
responses should be used.  
 In addition, asking a belief question using differing end points of the scale 
produces different results. For example, asking the same attitude question using a 1 - 7 
scale consistently produces different results when using a -3 to 3 scale (Tourangeau et al. 
2000). The difference in results is evidently due to people’s aversion to negative 
numbers. Further, Schwarz et al (1991) found that the choice of numeric labels can 
facilitate or dilute polarity implications of endpoints provided to respondents. For 
example, negative values may emphasize the differences more on a bipolar scale, 
whereas the lack of negative numbers provides the impression that the underlying scale is 
unipolar. The authors examined the polarity issue in a number of studies in which 
respondents were randomly assigned to different conditions; both were asked the same 
questions, but one group was asked to respond on a 0-10 scale while the other was asked 
to answer on a -5 to +5 scale. Since each scale contained the same number of points, the 
differences suggest that people infer scale polarity based on the numeric end-points added 
to the scale.  
 If people do not understand numbers, how then do they understand the numeric 
information that they consistently encounter? It appears that individuals understand, and 
prefer to communicate, numeric information in vague and intuitive ways, rather than the 
concrete manner numbers entail (Peters et al. 2006, Reyna and Brainerd 2008). This 
understanding and preference does not mean that people do not use rational (i.e. numeric) 
reasoning when making decisions; rather these are made using dual-processes, relying on 
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both intuitive and/or rational processes. One prominent dual-process model is fuzzy-trace 
theory (Reyna and Brainerd 1991). This theory assumes that people rely on their 
memories for the vague “gist” of information they have stored in making decisions, even 
when they can recall verbatim (e.g. numeric) information. Unlike similar dual-process 
theories (e.g. Peters et al. 2006), use of vague gist information is a more advanced form 
of information processing, rather than inferior to relying on verbatim information (Reyna 
and Brainerd 2008). Given that the theory argues gist processing is an advanced process, 
fuzzy trace theory suggests that gist processing develops into adulthood, whereas youth 
attempt to rely more on numeric information (Reyna and Farley 2006).  
Frequency Estimation Introduction 
Survey researchers are frequently interested in asking questions about behavioral 
frequencies, such as how many times someone went to the doctor or how many hours of 
television has been watched. These questions require that respondents not only access 
autobiographical memory but also to make decisions on how to process these memories 
and how to report them. The outcomes of these responses can have impact on important 
policy decisions (e.g. public education initiatives), marketing strategies, or social 
research. Understanding how this information is produced and reported is needed to 
potentially increase accuracy.  
 More generally, estimating frequencies of any kind, including those for behavior, 
is partly an issue of memory. How such data is encoded, stored, and this information’s 
accessibility and availability at later points are important issues in understanding memory 
broadly. Further, since the data requested is numeric, the tabulation of the memories is 
also of interest. At issue is whether people recall and count individual episodes of the 
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event of interest, keep a running tally of events as they occur, or some other process is 
involved in memory recall. An additional issue is the impact that the requested memory 
task has on processes and outcomes. This request includes a number of factors, including 
how the question is asked as well as the frequency to be recalled. In some cases accuracy 
of the report can be assessed, giving a measure to the strength of such memories.  
Strategies for Recall of Frequencies 
 Until relatively recently, frequency estimation was conceptualized by researchers 
as the respondent recalling and enumerating individual events of the target (Blair and 
Burton 1987, Bradburn et al. 1987). Enumeration strategies potentially led to errors of 
two kinds only – omission and commission (Bradburn et al. 1987). However, later studies 
examined different strategies that may be used. In one of the earliest works on the topic, 
Blair and Burton (1987) found a more diverse set of strategies than originally proposed. 
Although some use of episodic enumeration did occur, the most frequently used strategy 
was that of rate estimations. People would recall some rate of occurrence (e.g. “I 
purchase gasoline twice a week”) and then convert it into a frequency for the time frame 
requested (e.g. “so I purchased gasoline 8 times this month”). They also found a 
substantial number of uses of what they termed “other processes”. These other processes 
included combinations of both rates and enumerations and adjustments to 
rates/enumerations. For example, some people used enumeration within subdomains, 
such as rate of going out for lunch or dinner in estimating the frequency that one ate at a 
restaurant.  
Others may have used a rate and adjusted using an enumeration. Thus, someone 
may have enumerated for a shorter time frame, e.g. a week, and then created a rate for a 
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longer, inclusive, time frame, e.g. a month. The opposite, using a rate and then adjusting 
with enumeration also occurs.  Finally, several people reported using direct estimates of 
frequencies, i.e. guesses or statements with no knowledge how they arrived at such a 
number. Interestingly, Blair and Burton (1987) found no evidence that people used an 
availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), whereby the ease that events could 
be recalled would be the basis for frequency estimation.  
 Following this early work, additional research refined the understanding of the 
strategies used by individuals in frequency estimation. Enumeration of events continued 
to be found as an often used strategy, as did rate-based estimation (Brown 1995, 2008, 
Brown and Sinclair 1998, Burton and Blair 1991, Conrad et al. 1993, 1998, Menon 1993, 
Tourangeau et al. 2000). Episode enumeration generally was used about one-quarter to 
less than one-half of the time, with other strategies being used the majority of the time 
(Blair and Burton 1987, Brown and Sinclair 1998, Burton and Blair 1991, Conrad et al. 
1993, 1998, Tourangeau et al. 2000). Greater understanding of potential strategies was 
also gained with these studies, including differences in types and in information used for 
these.  
Conrad et al. (1998) provide a taxonomy of strategies which encompass the 
majority and most used strategies identified to date.1 In this study, respondents were 
asked about ten behavioral frequencies occurring in daily life, and were told to think 
about it quietly until an answer was decided upon. Then respondents were asked to 
explain how they came up with the answer, i.e. a retrospective recall. Responses to the 
                                                            
1 See Conrad et al. (1998) Fig  3 p. 361 for a diagram of the taxonomy 
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survey were tape-recorded. The retrospectively recalled strategies were categorized into a 
taxonomy developed on the different techniques described, and recalled strategies coded 
by two groups of two coders.  
Based on the findings, a number of strategies were identified. First, strategies are 
divided along enumeration and non-enumeration lines. Enumeration strategies entail 
either the recall of individual episodes (episodic enumeration) or the use of a few recalled 
events to estimate a rate for rate-based frequencies (rate estimation). Enumeration 
strategies are cognitively more difficult, as individual episodes are recalled. This 
increased difficulty is evidenced by the greater time required to respond using an 
enumeration strategy (Brown 1995, Conrad et al. 1998).  Consistent with the finding that 
enumeration strategies were used less often than others, in part due to the increased 
cognitive burden, there are more different types of non-enumeration strategies in the 
taxonomy than enumeration strategies.  
 Within non-enumeration strategies, an individual could use either memory 
assessment or a form of direct retrieval. Memory assessment is essentially usage of the 
availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). The ease that events are recalled 
would be the basis for frequency estimation. Direct retrieval relies on either quantitative 
or qualitative information. Using quantitative information, a respondent can either 
retrieve a stored rate or retrieve the stored rate and adjust it based on some additional 
understandings (e.g. “I go to the store every week, plus twice more this month for 
extras”). Finally, using qualitative information, what the authors termed a “general 
impression” could be formed. These general impressions are mostly conversions of 
information stored as vague quantities into acceptable numeric reports.  
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These vague quantities are interesting in that they are not numeric and must be 
converted into a numeric response. Questioning about activities done in the past month, 
18% of responses were formed based on strategies relying on vague quantities to infer a 
specific frequency report (Conrad et al. 1993, 1998). This percentage is also likely low 
compared to the actual percentage of those relying on vague quantifiers for several 
reasons. First, the coding strategy used in the study contributed to an undercount. For 
example, “filling my gas tank several times a week” is coded as rate retrieval in the study, 
although “several” is a vague quantity.  
Second, some respondents may also have inferred what would be an “optimal” 
strategy according to the researcher, and reported on more quantitative processes to come 
to a response. While providing a retrospective justification for their response, individuals 
may have wanted to appear as though they made a high level of effort, rather than just 
relying on some vague quantity. Even so, 18% is a substantial percent, and was the 
second largest category coded, indicating that at least some information is naturally 
stored as vague quantities. 
If numeric data is stored as vague quantifiers, as suggested by Conrad et al. 
(1998), differences found in response distribution to response scales with different values 
attached to the end points of the scales would be explained. A respondent would map 
their vague quantity data on to the scale provided. The necessary conversion from the 
general impression to an acceptable numeric response is aided by the response options. 
For example, someone who has the information requested stored as “a lot” may select the 
highest scale point, regardless of its value, which is also consistent with the theory put 
forth that the middle option being the typical population value (Schwarz and Bienias 
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1990). Although response scales may be mainly a task related variable (see below), one 
could conceptualize reliance on the form of the question itself as a strategy, and is 
evidence that strategies and tasks are closely interrelated.  
 A recent theory that has been put forth is that people at times use a metastrategy 
in frequency estimation (Brown 2008). A metastrategy is where a set of strategies is 
selected prior to the set of tasks and employed throughout the entire set. Therefore, a 
respondent may use non-enumeration strategies on some questions even when 
enumeration is possible on them all. Enumeration strategies are more concrete and 
deliver numeric responses consistent with the task. However, they are more cognitively 
taxing than non-enumeration strategies, and so a mixed strategy may be possible. People 
will try to balance accuracy and ease at the aggregate level, rather than considering each 
individual information request.  
Impact of Task on Strategy Selection and Frequency Estimation 
 There are two classes of task related variables to be considered. The first is related 
to the content of the task. That is, variables relating to the frequency itself. A second is 
related to issues of the structure of the request. Generally this structure involves how a 
question is asked or other manipulations in data collection. Although largely based on 
memory, frequency requests are also based on other important methodological 
considerations. Studies examining these facets have used differing methodologies, 
including laboratory and survey research. Still, the findings provide generally consistent 
results indicating the impacts these task variables have on strategy selection and 
frequency estimation.   
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Content of the Frequency 
 Given the limitations of memory, it may not be surprising to find that the 
accessibility of episodic details impact strategy selection. Several studies have found that 
increases in frequency (number of episodes) reduce the likelihood one uses episodic 
enumeration (Blair and Burton 1987, Brown 1995, Burton and Blair 1991, Conrad et al. 
1993, 1998, Means and Loftus 1991). Brown (1995) conducted an experiment in which 
respondents were given lists of target words to study. The number of times each target 
word appeared on the word list was varied, appearing 2, 4, 8, 12 or 16 times, and was a 
within subjects factor. In addition, each target word was coupled with a “context” word, 
an event instance for each of the target word. For example, Chicago would be an event 
instance, i.e. context word, for the target word City. Since the experiment was in part to 
examine the effect of context memory, two experimental groups of respondents were 
created. In one, each target word was paired with the same context word at every 
presentation (e.g. City-Chicago, City-Chicago, etc.). In the other, each presentation of the 
target word was coupled with a different context word (e.g. City-Chicago, City-Paris, 
City-London, etc.). The different context word was assigned randomly to each 
presentation of the target word. The presentation of same or different context words was 
a between subjects factor. During the frequency test, which asked about how frequently 
each target word occurred (using an open ended numeric response option), respondents 
described their process concurrently about how they came to their answer about the 
frequency. Brown (1995) found that enumeration decreased when the actual frequency 
increased, and was near non-existent when the context word was the same for each target 
word. In addition, general impressions, similar to Conrad et al.’s (1998) finding, 
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increased as the actual frequency increased. When the context word was always the same, 
Brown (1995) found that most responses among those in the same context condition were 
made using uninformative strategies, that is, no rationale could be given.  
In addition, the reference period (although partly under the control of the 
researcher) also has been found to impact strategy selection, with longer periods leading 
to less enumeration strategies (Blair and Burton 1987, Burton and Blair 1991). Although 
number of events and time frame will be related, Blair and Burton (1987) found 
independent effects for each. As the number of events moves to the highest levels of 
frequency within a sample, or the time of an event increases in duration, this data is more 
likely to be stored as vague quantities. In the Conrad et al. (1998) study, the highest 
behavioral frequency responses were reported to be inferred from these vague quantities, 
which were labeled as “general impressions”. Similarly, Brown (1995) found in a 
laboratory study of word frequencies that higher frequencies led subjects to select general 
impressions as their strategy of choice. Although not coded in the exact same manner, 
two studies by Blair and Burton (1987, Burton and Blair 1991) found that the greatest 
reported frequencies corresponded to strategies they labeled as “other”. This other 
category included several strategies, including what other studies have labeled as general 
impressions.   
One final noteworthy aspect regarding the frequency itself that affects strategy 
and estimating is whether the event relates to oneself or to another person (or group). An 
individual should have more information about events that they are personally involved 
in, including greater episodic detail. Therefore, when the requested frequency relates to 
the individual, enumeration will be used more than when requesting information about 
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some other person (Bickart et al. 1990, Menon et al. 1995, Schwarz and Bienias 1990). 
Further, these studies show that when answering as a proxy for other people, individuals 
first estimate the frequency for themselves, and then adjust their responses based on 
additional knowledge of the other person. The information provided by their personal 
frequency estimates are also weighted more heavily when making estimates about 
another who is more similar than more personally distant (Menon et al. 1995).  
Content of the Request 
The manner in which information is requested frequently affects the cognitive 
processes that produce a response to this request (Tourangeau et al. 2000). One type of 
request that is also not immune to the influence of the presentation and content of the 
request are those for frequency estimates. As noted earlier, closed-ended responses with 
frequency categories can impact the frequency estimate provided by the respondent 
(Gaskell et al. 1994, Schwarz et al. 1985).  
Theoretically, if respondents gave their actual frequency accurately, then no 
difference should occur between low and high frequency conditions. The percentage 
saying “more than two and one half hours” in the low frequency condition should equal 
those saying any amount more than the smallest option in the high frequency condition. 
Similarly, the percentage responding “up to two and one half hours” in the high 
frequency condition should equal that of those choosing any except the greatest option in 
the low frequency condition. This expected equality is far from the case, however. 
Although no one selected “more than two and one half hours” in the low frequency 
condition, nearly thirty-percent chose some value greater than this in the high frequency 
condition. Clearly, the high frequency condition led people to state higher frequency 
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estimates, and the low frequency condition led to lower frequency estimates. 
Interestingly, the open ended responses led to a distribution that fell between these two.  
If frequencies are recalled using vague quantifiers or other general impressions, 
the recollection as vague quantities also helps explain differences in numeric response 
scales with different values attached to the points of the scales. A respondent would map 
their vague quantity data on to the scale provided. If people do select scale points based 
on this stored vague quantity, it is also consistent with the theory put forth that the 
respondents infer the average population frequency (Schwarz et al. 1985, Schwarz and 
Bienias 1990). Using the middle response option as an anchor of the average, people can 
then say they are comparatively more or less than average, consistent with 
understandings of how people use vague quantifiers (Schaeffer 1991).  
Measurement of Frequencies 
 The measurement of numeric responses has been generally done by asking for 
some numerical answer, in one of two ways. First, the request is made by a question with 
an open-ended response in which a numeric answer is provided (e.g. Blair and Burton 
1989, Brown 1995, 1997, 2008, Burton and Blair 1991 Conrad et al. 1997, Hasher and 
Zacks 1984). The second way has been to ask for frequencies using a scale labeled with 
numeric quantities, generally involving ranges (e.g. Knauper et al. 2004, Menon et al. 
1995, Schwarz et al. 1985, Schwarz and Bienas 1990). However, it has been noted there 
are difficulties with using a numeric scale, with suggestions for avoidance in favor of 
using numeric open ended responses (Schwarz et al. 1985). In addition, some have 
instead used vague quantifiers, which place verbal labels onto scale points meant to 
represent some number (Bradburn and Miles 1979, Lu et al. 2008, Schaeffer 1991, 
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Wanke 2002). The general lack of use of vague quantifiers may be due in part to the 
complexities of their use and the potential problems associated with vague quantifier 
response scales, as identified in research on the topic.  
 For example, vague quantifiers have linguistic meaning beyond simply the 
numeric quantity these are conveying. First, as the name suggests, the quantity expressed 
is done so in a vague manner, which may lead to a range of numeric values that is 
possibly expressed by the verbal label (Budescu and Wallsten 1985). Indeed, a number of 
studies examining the numeric translation of vague quantifiers find large between-subject 
variation (Beyth-Marom 1982, Biehl and Halpern-Felsher 2001, Budescu and Wallsten 
1985, Clarke et al. 1992, Lichtenstein and Newman 1967). Biehl and Halpern-
Felsher(2001) find that this variability tends to be greater among younger respondents 
compared to older respondents. Although many studies suggest strong internal 
consistency of vague quantifier use within individuals (e.g. Budescu and Wallsten 1985, 
Lichtenstein and Newman 1967), one study suggests that there is also possible within-
subject variation, with people giving inconsistent numeric translations of vague quantities 
(Clarke et al 1992). However, it should be noted that many of these translations were 
context independent, and that vague quantifiers are naturally used in context (Windschitl 
and Wells 1996). Still, at least in one case, when the vague quantifiers are placed in 
context, there is greater between subject variation (Beyth-Marom 1982). It should be 
noted however, that in this instance, the context was asking about subjective probabilities 
rather than behavioral frequencies.  
Further, quantifiers focus attention on the reference set or complement set of the 
quantity (e.g. the subject vs. other) (Sanford et al. 1994, 1996, Teigen and Brun 2003). 
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The reference set is focused on by positive quantifiers (e.g. a few, some), while the 
complement set is focused by negative quantifiers (e.g. few, not many) (Sanford et al. 
1996). This attention focusing of vague quantifiers occurs in both understanding and 
production of sentences. Similarly, optimism for an outcome is greater when the vague 
quantifier used is positive and there is greater surprise when the outcome occurred (did 
not occur) when a negative (positive) quantifier is used to described the chance of 
outcome, even when numeric translations of the quantifier are the same (Teigen and Brun 
2003).  
Studies examining the use of vague quantifiers in survey questions regarding 
behavioral frequencies have also identified several potential issues. One is the differential 
use of the vague quantifier scale, i.e. different interpretation of meanings (Bradburn and 
Miles 1979). This different interpretation of meanings is consistent with the large 
between-subject variation that has been noted previously. The Bradburn and Miles (1979) 
study first asked respondents about the frequency that they felt excited and bored using a 
vague quantifier scale, and then later asked how many times the respondent meant by the 
vague quantifier they responded with. For example, if the respondents said they were 
excited about things “very often”, they were asked how many times “very often” meant.  
This study also found that the differences in numeric translation between scale points are 
not equidistant, as would be expected (e.g. very often vs. not very often were not 
equidistant). Recent research, however, has shown that differences between subjects 
(students) in numeric translation are relatively small (Nelson-Laird et al. 2008).   
Reanalyzing this same data as Bradburn and Miles (1979), Schaeffer (1991) 
argues that use of vague quantifiers is based on not only actual frequency but the relative 
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frequency of similar people, such as those with similar demographics. That is, when 
responding that a behavior occurred “often”, this response is based not only on whether 
the event occurred often, but also if it did so compared to what is expected of similar 
individuals. For example, more educated respondents gave higher value meanings for 
“pretty often” and “very often” than did those with less education (Schaeffer 1991). 
Additional studies further show the importance of referent groups (Wanke 2002).In 
addition, the type of behavior asked about is also compared to similar behaviors, such as 
to other leisure or cultural activities (Wanke 2002). This comparison may be in large part 
due to the respondent following conversational norms and being a cooperative 
communicator, altering responses based on information provided by the survey (Wanke 
2002).  
An additional finding suggests that the context of the vague quantifier matters; 
what “often” means for one behavior is different than another behavior (Bradburn and 
Miles 1979, Nelson-Laird et al. 2008). For example, Bradburn and Miles (1979) find that 
being bored receives a lower numeric meaning of “not too often” compared to that of 
being excited. It should be pointed out that the Bradburn and Miles (1979) data, also used 
by Schaeffer (1991), asks about emotional states, which may be different in terms of 
recall strategies (Brown et al. 2007). As such, this differential use of recall strategies may 
also affect the numeric translations of the vague quantifiers. However, studies examining 
vague quantifier responses to questions about other activities produce findings consistent 
with these (e.g. Nelson-Laird et al. 2008, Wanke 2002), suggesting that asking questions 
using vague quantifiers may be found in both emotional state and activity frequency 
settings.  
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Based on such results, it is often suggested to avoid vague quantifiers when 
possible (Beyth-Marom 1982, Schaeffer 1991, Tourangeau et al. 2000). Tourangeau et al. 
(2000) suggest that the only meaning that may be derived from vague quantifiers, given 
these issues, is the ordinal position of the response, i.e. sometimes is more than never and 
less than always. However, the potential difficulty in answering numerically is also 
recognized. Numeric data are affected by ease the events are remembered, how often 
people think of it, how well instances are imagined, the spacing of events, recall 
techniques used, the feelings at time of occurrence, response scale used, and true 
frequency (Schaeffer 1991).  Bradburn and Miles (1979) suggest that it may not always 
be possible to ask for exact estimates of many behaviors and subjective states due to the 
cognitive burden. Indeed, in the Bradburn and Miles (1979) study, interviewers said that 
many respondents had difficulty translating vague quantifiers into numeric values. 
Further, numeric information may be more difficult to think about and recall, and 
possibly stored inaccurately, although vague quantifiers may entail more error due to its 
comparative nature (Schaeffer 1991). In a study using behavior coding, numeric 
responses produced significantly more problems than did vague quantifiers (Johnson et 
al. 2006). It is also possible that people use vague notions plus some set of heuristics to 
compute numeric data, which is consistent with more missing data for numeric 
frequencies (Schaeffer 1991). In addition, studies on subjective probabilities suggest that 
like vague quantifiers, numeric data may be affected by the context of the question, 
contrary to general understandings (Windschitl and Weber 1999).  
In a recent dissertation, Marincic (2011) examined vague quantifiers and numeric 
open ended responses (translations) using the National Survey of Student Engagement 
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(NSSE) (see Study 2). She examined how vague quantifiers were quantified and whether 
there were differences in interpretation; whether any individual differences in 
interpretation was due to individual characteristics; and whether latent models used for 
numeric data also fit for those when vague quantifiers are used. The author used a 
number of multilevel and latent variable models to assess these questions. Using a 
reduced set of the items available, significant differences in regards to interpretation were 
found at the individual level, and some evidence of differences in items (when items were 
analyzed simultaneously). Additionally, the analysis found that unit of time for the vague 
quantifier (e.g. daily, weekly, etc.) significantly influenced interpretation.  
In terms of what caused the differences in interpretation, the largest contributing 
factor was that of respondent level engagement in a behavior, with more engaged 
respondents giving larger estimates for higher frequency vague quantifiers than less 
engaged respondents. Other variable had an effect, such gender, race, and school size, but 
all of these led to much smaller differences. Further, using numeric responses as the 
“gold standard” model, Marincic (2011) found some support (depending on the scenario 
used) that latent factors extracted from the different measures were different models. 
Finally, the author applied a number of factor mixture models, with the hypothesis that 
that model would best reflect the numeric data. However, limitations in the data did not 
allow for full examination of this hypothesis. 
Accuracy 
 Of course, much of the research on frequency estimation is conducted by 
behavioral researchers who are interested in the accuracy of frequency estimates, 
especially given the implications noted in the introduction. Assessing the accuracy of 
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such frequency estimates, however, is quite difficult. There must be some knowledge of 
what the actual frequency is, which limits studies of accuracy to laboratory settings, 
where the researcher controls the actual frequency, or in instances where other sources 
are available to obtain actual frequency. 
 In terms of strategy selection, in experiments examining frequency estimates of 
words presented, individuals tended to overestimate frequencies when using a rate-based 
strategy and underestimate when enumerating (Brown 1995). Absolute error tended to be 
smaller in this study for those using enumeration. This difference was more pronounced 
as actual frequency increased. The finding that enumeration led to smaller error is 
consistent with findings of a study regarding frequency using bank services, which was 
confirmed through bank records (Burton and Blair 1991). However, several other studies 
have found that rate-based strategies have led to more accurate frequency estimates 
(Menon 1993, 1997).  
These differences can be explained by the type of frequency requested. When the 
event is regular and similar, then accuracy is increased by using rate-based strategies 
(Menon 1993, 1997). When the event is irregular and dissimilar, then enumeration will 
likely lead to greater accuracy compared to rate-based strategies. Still, the errors are 
greater than when rate-based strategies are used for regular and similar behaviors. When 
events are regular or similar (but not both), respondents at times try to enumerate, leading 
to increased errors.  
How the question is asked may also affect accuracy. Asking about the behavior 
during the typical week led to higher predictive validity for theoretically related 
constructs than did asking about behaviors during the past week (Chang and Krosnick 
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2003). Recent research indicates that eliciting vague quantities or general impressions 
may be at least as accurate as asking for numeric scale responses (Lu et al. 2008). The 
authors obtained data on medication adherence through an electronic system that 
monitored the number of times the medication bottle was opened, using this opening as 
an indicator that the medication was taken. They then asked those using this system about 
their medication adherence over three days, seven days, and one month. For the one 
month time frame, they asked respondents about adherence using three different scales, a 
six-point vague quantifier scale (from “none of the time” to “all of the time”, an eleven-
point percent scale (0, 10, 20 …100), and a six-point scale rating adherence (from “very 
poor” to “excellent”). The authors then assigned values to the six-point rating and vague 
quantifier scales based on a percentage scale, i.e. 0, 20, 40, 60, 80, and 100.   
They found that self-reported adherence to HIV medication treatment conformed 
to actual adherence when general impressions were obtained on a vague quantifier and a 
rating scale. The vague quantifier scale performed as well compared to recorded data as 
did the numeric percentage scale response, with the rating scale performing better than 
the numeric scale. These findings conform to the finding that larger frequencies are 
estimated from general impressions (Conrad et al. 1998). The better performance of the 
rating scale and similar performance of the vague quantifier scale with the numeric 
response options may also be due to the respondents’ limited numeric capabilities (Lu et 
al. 2008). Further, this study examined the predictive validity of the different response 
scales, by correlating the responses to the observed HIV RNA in the respondent. The 
results show that there are no significant differences between response scales in terms of 
predictive validity.  
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Psychology of Subjective Probabilities and Risk Perception Introduction 
 People are confronted with subjective probabilities on a regular basis. These 
probabilities are most often conceptualized as the risk an event will (or will not) occur 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1981, Tourangeau et al. 2000). How people perceive and 
understand this risk has been studied in various ways, with varying conclusions. Studies 
have concluded that experts in the topical areas understand risk differently than lay 
people (Slovic 1987). Unlike experts of risk, who base risk levels on actual probabilities 
of occurrence or annual fatalities (when dealing with health risks), lay people base their 
risk perceptions not only on actual risk but also on the catastrophic potential (i.e. the 
possible outcomes) and the future threat (Slovic 1987, 1998). Further, some studies 
suggest that people are accurate about some risks while quite wrong about others 
(Dominitz and Manski 1997, Benjamin et al. 1997). Importantly, several theories have 
developed on the ways people perceive risks and make decisions about these risks.  
 Early in the study of risks it was noted that people did not always make rational or 
error free decisions regarding risks (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Three heuristics were 
identified that made complex numeric problems, such as those dealing with risks, easier 
but that often led to these irrational and erroneous decisions. These heuristics are that of 
representativeness, in which probabilities are evaluated by the degree which the recalled 
information is representative of the target outcome; availability, in which judgments are 
made on the ease of recall; and anchor and adjust, by which an initial value (which may 
come from suggestion or recall) is anchored upon and adjusted this initial value for 
judgment (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Kahneman and Tversky later also posited that 
decisions diverge from expected utility due to both the weighting of prospects and frames 
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(whether decisions framed as gains or losses, or status quo) (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979, Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Called Prospect Theory, the theory states that there 
are decision weights which are combined with values (utilities) to judge between 
decisions.   
 As noted by this research, at some level, people rely on their intuitions when 
making decisions. Later theories of processing risk also reflect the notion that people rely 
on intuition, with a number of theories positing dual processes to understand and make 
decisions on risk (e.g. Peters et al. 2006, Reyna 2004, Reyna and Farley 2006, Reyna and 
Brainerd 2008, Windschitl and Weber 1999). Although these theories differ slightly, all 
suggest that one of the processes relies more on numeric, rational and rule based thinking, 
while the other relies on affective, experiential, associative and intuitive based thinking. 
Much research suggests people rely on intuitive decision processes in regards to risk 
(Reyna and Brainerd 2008, Slovic 1987, Yamagishi 1997). Even so, some of this research 
suggests that flawed and incorrect decisions are made when the relying on the affective-
experiential (intuitive) based process rather than the rational and rule based process (e.g. 
Peters et al. 2006). Still, it is also noted that the individual, in order to make sound 
decisions on numeric information, must have accurate information, then make 
calculations and inferences, remember the information, and finally be able to weigh 
factors to make a decision (Peters et al. 2007). 
  Rule based reasoning, however, depends on retrieval cues that elicit principals 
stored in long term memory. Fuzzy trace theory also suggests that in addition to verbatim 
and gist based memories (encoded and processed in parallel), people retrieve what they 
know about ratios when the knowledge is cued, but applying that knowledge is interfered 
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with when classes of objects/events overlap or are nested in one another (Reyna and 
Brainerd 2008). As a result of this confusion, people often focus on salient gist, i.e. 
comparisons between numerators at expense of denominators. Denominator neglect 
explains overestimation of some risks and underestimation of others, because people 
neglect the base rates, focusing only on numerator (Reyna 2004). Generally, intuition has 
important place in fuzzy trace theory, and is considered an advanced form of reasoning 
because of developmental evidence. As such, adults, who are more likely to rely on gist 
based information, are better prepared to make decisions about risks compared to 
adolescents, who rely more on verbatim information (Reyna and Farley 2006).   
 Another, although not necessarily contradictory process, that has been suggested is 
that people process risk through a Bayesian updating process (Viscusi 1990, 1992, 2002). 
As such, people have preconceived stored beliefs about a perceived risk. New 
information about the risk is often encountered, such as through personal experience or 
through coverage in the media or informational environment. This new information is 
used to update the individuals’ risk beliefs, weighting the new information and stored 
beliefs according to the strength of each. Thus, beliefs that have long been held and have 
been developed on a large number of information points are less likely to be shifted much 
in the face of new information. In comparison, newly formed beliefs based on a small 
number of information points are more likely to be altered by new information obtained.    
 These different theories suggest potential ways to measure risk, either through 
numeric or vague quantifier measures. Indeed, some of the theorists have argued for use 
of one measure over the other. Specifically, Viscusi (2002) argues for the use of numeric 
measures instead of vague quantifier measures. However, if risk is represented in gist 
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manner, then risk may be better measured using vague quantifier scales. A number of 
studies have examined risk numerically and through vague quantifier measures, and are 
described in more detail in the following sections.  
Numeric Estimates of Risk Perception 
 Much of the work on numeric estimates of subjective probabilities, i.e. risk 
perceptions, has been conducted on health issues, and in particular the risks of smoking. 
Due to the focus on health issues, and the fact that the data to be used in the current 
research focuses on smoking risk beliefs, much of the focus of this section will focus on 
smoking risk perceptions. However, it is important to note several other studies that have 
used numeric estimation of risk perceptions. Among the earliest was the seminal work by 
Lichtenstein and colleagues. Importantly, the authors find evidence that estimation of 
subjective probabilities relies on somewhat different processes than frequency estimation 
(Lichtenstein et al. 1978). Also, they found that respondents tended to overestimate small 
risks and underestimate large risks, a finding that has been found similarly in other 
studies (Slovic 1987). These findings suggest the possible use of the availability heuristic 
for subjective risks (e.g. direct experience, news), that people avoid extremity in 
response, or the anchoring and adjusting of answers (e.g. on low/high anchors). These 
biases possibly are due to a number of sources, including disproportionate media 
exposure, memorability, or imaginability (Lichtenstein et al. 1978).   
Much of the early research on smoking focused on people’s knowledge and 
beliefs about smoking as harmful to health rather than subjective estimation of the risks 
(e.g. Salber et al. 1963, Kelson et al. 1975). National polls focused on whether people 
were aware of and believed smoking was harmful rather than asking the amount of risk 
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perceived. For example, in a 1949 Gallup poll, 60% said that they believed that smoking 
was harmful to health (questions used in this section can be found in Appendix 1). In 
1954, Gallup asked questions in January and June national surveys about the awareness 
of the link between cancer and smoking. In the January and June surveys, 83% and 90%, 
respectively, said they had recently heard or read smoking had been linked to lung 
cancer. Beliefs about smoking causing cancer in those surveys were significantly lower. 
In January, 41% said they believed smoking causes lung cancer, with 42% agreeing to the 
same in June. This number grew steadily, with 83% expressing the belief that smoking 
causes lung cancer in a 1981 Gallup survey. 
The first published work including data on numeric subjective probability 
estimates appears in Lee (1989).2 Australian respondents gave the chances of an average 
smoker developing lung cancer (along with other questions about other diseases) on an 
11-point scale, with each point numbered between 0 and 100 in intervals of 10. 
Respondents were also asked about their own chances using the same scale. Although the 
purpose of the paper is not to present subjective probability estimates, it is clear that both 
smokers and non-smokers gave high chances for lung cancer, with smokers giving an 
average response of about 50 and non-smokers a response of about 60. Chances for 
personal risk for both smokers and non-smokers were significantly less than population 
risks. However, smokers’ perceived personal chances were higher than that of non-
smokers indicating smokers understand they have a higher risk (Lee 1989).  
                                                            
2 Kristiansen et al. (1983) implement magnitude estimation using line drawing, but is not considered here 
to be the same as asking directly for an X out of 100 (or other base) subjective probability 
estimate.  
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The shift of focus to numeric risk estimates of smoking was mainly precipitated 
by the work of Viscusi (1990). Data collected in 1985 through a survey funded by the 
tobacco industry allowed individuals’ numeric estimates of subjective risk from smoking 
to be analyzable. The target question asked, “Among 100 smokers, how many of them do 
you think will get lung cancer because they smoke?” Variations of this question have 
been asked repeatedly over time and are now the standard measures in numeric subjective 
risk estimates for smoking. The mean response to this question in 1985 was 42.6, 
significantly greater than the expected lung cancer rate among smokers of 6 - 13 out of 
100.3 This finding has been consistently found in other research (Krosnick 2001; Romer 
and Jamieson 2001; Viscusi 1992, 2002; Viscusi and Hakes 2008). Table 1 presents the 
mean number of smokers expected to get lung cancer based on similar absolute risk 
questions over time, denoting the source of the data. The youth and adult 1999 data are 
those employed in this study, and will be discussed further. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
3 The estimate of 6 – 13 out of 100 comes from Viscusi (2002), derived from data contained in scientific 
reports in various Surgeon General Reports. Earlier estimates of this number were 5-10 out of 100 
(Viscusi 1991).  
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Table 1 
Mean Absolute Risk Estimates of Lung Cancer Risk for Smokers 
Year Source Mean 
1964 Industry 16.4* 
1977 Industry 45.6 
1980 Industry 26.3* 
1985 Viscusi 1990 42.6 
1991 Viscusi 1992 38.0 
19954 Sutton 1998 19.0* 
1997 Viscusi & Hakes 2008 47.2 
1998 Viscusi & Hakes 2008 47.6 
1999 Annenberg 2 Youth 60.4 
1999 Annenberg 2 Adult 48.5 
2000 Krosnick 2001 43.4 
 
*denotes data collected via face-to-face personal interview 
 
Although these data first appeared in published accounts beginning with Viscusi 
(1990), similar data has been of interest to the tobacco industry for some time. The 
tobacco industry regularly hired polling companies such as Gallup and Roper to collect 
data on various topics of interest. These data were found in the various online tobacco 
document databases. A question on subjective smoking risk measured numerically was 
first asked in 1964, shortly after the seminal first United States’ Surgeon General’s report 
on smoking and health. Although the wording was slightly different from the standard 
measures used in later research, the item asked about the same construct requesting a 
                                                            
4 This study was conducted in the United Kingdom. 
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numeric subjective probability. Unlike the later published data, the mean was 
significantly lower, estimated at 16.4 out of 100 smokers.5 
Later industry-funded surveys switched to wording consistent with the above 
standard absolute risk question. The next instance not in the published literature came 
from data collected in 1977. The mean for this year was more in line with later findings at 
45.6 out of 100. In 1980, the next time the question was asked, the mean was 26.3. This 
decrease is an unexpected shift downward in the mean, especially given that the next time 
the question was asked, in 1985, the mean was the 42.6 reported by Viscusi (1990). There 
is no reason to expect that risk perceptions should have fluctuated in such a manner; the 
only major change from one survey to another was the data collection methodology. Both 
the 1977 and 1985 surveys were collected by telephone surveys, while the 1980 survey 
was collected using face-to-face personal interviews. Strikingly, the lowest means in 
Table 1 come from data collected using face-to-face personal interview surveys. 
Although other differences exist among the surveys, the only difference consistent for all 
three (Roper 1964, 1977, Sutton 1998) was that they were face-to-face surveys. In spite 
of other differences, such as denominator (e.g. Krosnick (2001) uses a denominator of 
1000 smokers instead of the usual 100), the means for all the telephone surveys are 
similarly high from 1977 through the present day. 
As alternatives to the standard absolute risk measures, other numeric measures 
have been suggested to better capture risk perception. These arise from the possibility 
that numeric estimates to the standard absolute risk question are feasible measures, but 
                                                            
5 The mean was not presented directly in the report, but was estimated using the midpoint of the ranges for 
the frequency estimates weighted by the proportion of respondents in that range.  
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that individuals perceive risk in a more comparable rather than absolute manner. 
Specifically, it is not the risk of a smoker alone that matters; rather it is the risk of 
smoking compared to not smoking. Krosnick (2001) explores this idea and suggests two 
additional measures: the risk difference and the relative risk. The risk difference is the 
difference between the absolute risk of the smoker and the absolute risk of the non-
smoker. That is, the risk to smokers above and beyond the risk of lung cancer to non-
smokers. Relative risk compares the magnitude of the difference between these two 
absolute risk measures as the ratio of the two estimates. Comparing the measure of 
absolute risk to smokers to these two new measures, Krosnick (2001) finds that the 
relative risk measure predicts smoking status best, while the absolute risk to smokers 
predicts the worst. Further, although the mean of absolute risk to smokers, like prior 
studies, indicates an overestimate of risk, the measure for relative risk indicates people 
underestimate the risk of smoking.  
Vague Quantifier Measures of Risk Perceptions 
Another possibility is that numeric responses used in any manner are suboptimal 
in measuring risk perceptions. An alternative way to measure risk perceptions is by a 
more qualitative scale, providing vaguely quantified risk options, similar to a study on 
smoking risk perceptions conducted by Slovic (1998). Numeric responses require that 
individuals understand and estimate numeric responses properly given the scale. 
Although some have argued that people can use numbers to make subjective probabilities 
(Krosnick 2001), this assumption seems to be tenuous. First, numeric literacy among the 
general public is quite low (Peters et al. 2007). Studies have also shown that a number of 
respondents do not answer with logically consistent responses to subjective probability 
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measures using numeric scales, particularly among those with lower cognitive abilities 
(Belli et al. 1999). Further, the use of numeric scales led to a number of respondents 
satisficing, again particularly among those with low cognitive abilities. People have also 
been found to incorrectly select greater magnitude probabilities when frequency and 
denominators differed (e.g. 24.14 out of 100 versus 2414 out of 10000) by choosing cases 
where the higher total frequency was greater, neglecting the denominator (Yamagishi 
1997). 
Other findings in the survey literature concern the impact of numeric labels placed 
on scales (e.g. varying levels of number of hours of television watched at the end points 
of the scale). Studies have found that using different values produces differing estimates 
of frequency or duration (Schwarz et al. 1985; Wright et al. 1994). This result has also 
been found in measures of smoking risk perceptions (Borland 1997). Differing scale 
anchors and response options led to differing percentages of the population over- and 
underestimating the risk of smoking, contrary to expectations. Assuming respondents are 
cognitively able to assess risk numerically, one should expect similar responses 
regardless of the scale values. Borland (1997) suggests that in the case of the standard 
absolute risk measure used for smoking, some respondents may perceive the response 
scale as a danger analogue scale. That is, given inability to process the task as 
constructed, the interpretation is for a scale indicating levels of danger, possibly 0 for “no 
danger” to 100 for “great danger”. 
However, Viscusi (2002) argues that vague quantifiers are not suited for 
measuring smoking risk perceptions because these cannot be compared to an objective 
estimate, and there is not a “correct answer”. It is not possible to know what “a little bit 
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risky” means in objective terms and thus not ascertainable if smoking risk is over- or 
underestimated. Still, there are number of reasons why the survey designer should not 
rule out the use of vague quantifiers completely, as suggested by many practitioners, 
especially for measurement of subjective probabilities. The most important and 
overriding factor is whether the respondents naturally think about and encode numeric 
information as vague quantifiers.  Respondents must map their answers to survey 
questions onto the response options given (Tourangeau et al. 2000). Survey designers 
must provide response options that best represent the respondent’s answer; not doing so 
produces error-prone data, even if respondents did provide an “acceptable” answer.  
Studies suggest that subjective probabilities are internally represented as verbal 
information (Zimmer 1984). Supporting this view, several studies have found most 
people prefer to convey probability information as vague quantities (Olson and Budescu 
1997, Wallsten et al. 1993). In a study of students, 65% preferred to convey uncertainty 
information through vague quantities (Wallsten et al. 1993). This number is likely low 
compared to the general public as half of the sample studied were MBA students who 
took the survey in a statistics class. Similarly, American college students rated scales 
with vague quantifiers as easier to use and more representative of their feelings towards 
risk assessment than numeric-based scales (Diefenbach et al. 1993).  These studies have 
also found that subjective probabilities measured by vague quantifiers predicted 
respondents’ behaviors and preferences at least as well, and frequently better than, 
numeric scales (Diefenbach et al. 1993, Windschitl and Wells 1996; Weinstein and 
Diefenbach 1997). These findings may be stronger in the general population, as it seems 
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reasonable to assume that a college student may be more proficient and comfortable with 
numeric scales. 
The increased validity vague quantifier scales (e.g. Windschitl and Wells 1996) 
exhibit in these studies is likely due in part to the processes involved. Numeric responses 
to subjective probability estimates elicit more rule-based thinking, whereas vague 
quantifier scales result in more associative processing (Windschitl and Wells 1996, 
Windschitl and Weber 1999). Many human behaviors are not dictated by rule-based 
processes but are related to associative processes, resulting in the better prediction of 
behavioral outcomes. Vague quantifiers may therefore also be better measures of risk 
perceptions, particularly when relationships between behaviors and other variables are of 
interest. An additional benefit is that since vague quantifiers are simpler to use and map 
responses to, the cognitive effort required is reduced. Although not possible to test here, 
this reduction in cognitive effort needed indicates that responses may be less affected by 
mode of data collection, which apparently influences numeric estimates. 
Summary and Gaps in the Literature 
Based on the above literature review, a number of factors are important in the 
measurement properties of questions about quantitative information, as well as a number 
of important gaps in the literature that should be filled to better understand these factors. 
Of most importance for this dissertation is the response format used. As the literature 
shows, quantitative information may naturally be stored as vague quantities, for both 
frequency information and subjective probabilities (Conrad et al. 1998, Reyna and 
Brainerd 2008, Windschitl and Wells 1996). However, some of the literature in survey 
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research and risk perceptions suggests that vague quantifiers are to be avoided 
(Tourangeau et al. 2000, Schaeffer 1991, Viscusi 2002). 
 Not recognizing that people may more naturally think about quantitative 
information in vague terms, it has been suggested that recommendations to avoid vague 
quantifiers may in part be due to researcher bias (Windschitl and Wells 1996). In 
addition, there have been relatively few studies that have been published on vague 
quantifiers in survey research, and fewer yet that have examined the measurement error 
properties of these measures. Findings do show vague quantifiers mean different things to 
different respondents (Bradburn and Miles 1979, Schaeffer 1991). However, none of 
these studies examine the accuracy of vague quantifier responses. This lack of accuracy 
measures is due in part to the lack of verifiable information available in most survey 
situations.  
One survey that had such verifiable information was Lu et al. (2008), which found 
that vague quantifiers performed as well as numeric response scales. However, these 
researchers set the questions up such that the response was about the percentage of time 
completing an activity, and numeric translations were based on percentages, rather than 
the more standard way to ask about frequency in surveys, i.e. the number of times an 
activity was conducted (Tourangeau et al. 2000).  That is, the one study that has 
examined the accuracy of vague quantifiers did so for a question format that is not 
commonly used in survey research in the collection of behavioral frequency data. Further, 
the numeric response format was an eleven point scale, rather than the open ended 
response formats often used for frequency estimation. Overall, this research leaves a 
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significant gap in the literature as to which, if any, response format is more accurate for 
standard frequency-type questions.  
  For similar reasons, there is a gap in the literature examining the predictive 
validity of vague quantifier and numeric response options for frequency questions. 
Predictive validity has been shown to be important in understanding measurement 
properties for other question formats for frequency questions (Chang and Krosnick 2003). 
For response options for questions about frequency information, the only study that 
examined this issue is Lu et al. (2008), who found no differences between response scales 
in terms of their predictive validity. Again, the results of Lu et al. are based on 
percentage-completed scales, with transformations of the vague quantifier scale based on 
a percentage, rather than on the frequency an event occurred or numeric open ended 
responses. Additionally, for both the accuracy and predictive validity of response scales, 
the results of Lu et al. (2008) are the only available evidence, and thus, even absent the 
problems with using a percentage scale, more studies are need to provide converging 
evidence about the comparative measurement properties of the  response formats.   
 For subjective probabilities, accuracy is not necessarily appropriate for assessing 
measurement properties, given the subjective nature. However, some researchers have 
examined subjective probabilities compared to actual risk estimates to ascertain over or 
underestimation of risks (e.g. Viscusi 1990, 2002, Krosnick 2002, Benjamin et al. 1997). 
Instead, in order to assess the measurement properties of subjective probabilities using 
different response formats, predictive validity has been used between responses and 
theoretically related variables (Krosnick 2002, Windschitl and Wells 1996, Diefenbach et 
al. 1993). However, several gaps exist in these studies. First, these studies have not 
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examined all of the numeric responses and vague quantifier scales simultaneously. 
Krosnick (2002) examined absolute risk, relative risk, and risk difference measures, but 
not vague quantifier measures. Other studies (e.g.  Windschitl and Wells 1996, 
Diefenbach et al. 1993) included vague quantifier and absolute risk responses, but not 
relative risk or risk difference measures. Second, all of these studies except Krosnick 
(2002) were conducted using small, non-representative samples, and Krosnick did not 
include the vague quantifier response option for comparison. Taken together, this 
research does not allow for important comparisons in respondent characteristics that 
possibly differentially affect the measurement properties of the different response 
formats.  
Indeed, as the above literature review suggests, there are possible respondent 
characteristics that may affect the accuracy and predictive validity for different frequency 
and subjective probability response formats. First are the numeric capabilities (numeracy) 
of respondents. As noted, many people in the population have low levels of numeracy 
(Peters et al. 2007, Galesic and Garcia-Retamero 2010). Numeric ability has also been 
found to affect understanding of new quantitative information (Schwartz et al. 1997) and 
the ability to make decisions regarding quantitative information (Peters et al. 2006). 
However, there has been no examination of the effect of numeracy on the measurement 
error of quantitative information requested by questions like those in surveys, such as 
frequency and subjective probability estimation. This measurement error includes both 
the accuracy and predictive validity discussed above.  
If respondents lack basic numeracy it follows that the ability to carry out the steps 
needed to answer a question about quantitative information is also likely lacking. Most 
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pertinent, they may be less likely to encode quantitative information as actual numbers, 
and/or unable to recall numeric information sufficiently, in part because the information 
is stored as different format, such as vague quantities. Indeed, it is suggested that many 
people store numeric information in a vague, “fuzzy” way rather than verbatim numeric 
information (Reyna and Brainerd 1991, Reyna and Brainerd 2008). Therefore, it may be 
that for many respondents, especially those with low numeracy, asking questions with 
vague quantifier response options are more in line with the natural way they think about 
quantitative information. As such, providing vague quantifier response options may 
improve the measurement properties of questions about quantitative information, 
especially among those with the lowest numeracy. Indeed, Lu et al. (2008) suggest, but 
do not test, that the similar results between numeric and vague scales, with rating scales 
more accurate than either of vague or numeric scales, may be due to the low numeracy of 
their sample. However, there is a significant gap in the literature examining the 
relationship between numeracy and the response formats. As of this dissertation, no such 
research has been found examining these two factors.  
Similarly, as the literature has shown, at least in the frequency domain, actual 
frequency is related to accuracy, in that lower actual frequency tends to be reported more 
accurately than when the actual frequency is greater (Brown 1995, 1997). However, in 
Brown’s (1995, 1997) research all responses were collected via open-ended numeric 
responses. Further, it has been suggested that as actual frequency increases, it is more 
likely that the quantitative information is stored as vague quantities (Conrad et al. 1998). 
It follows from this finding, then, that as actual frequency increases, if these are more 
likely stored as vague quantities, the accuracy may be increased by asking for responses 
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using vague quantifier responses. No research that has been identified has examined the 
relationship between actual frequency, response formats, and accuracy. 
 In addition, the numeracy of the individual may also affect the relationship 
between actual frequency, response formats, and accuracy. The threshold of when 
quantitative information becomes stored naturally as vague quantifiers may differ based 
on numeric ability, such that those with lower numeracy are more likely to store 
quantitative information as vague quantifiers at lowers levels of actual frequency. Thus, 
for those with lower numeric ability, it may be that vague quantifier response options 
provide greater accuracy even at lower levels of actual frequency, while for those with 
higher numeracy, the improvement in accuracy with vague quantifier response formats 
are only at higher levels of actual frequency. At lower levels of actual frequency, those 
with higher numeracy may provide more accurate answers with numeric response 
formats. As of now, however, no study has examined these possible interactions.  
An additional possible interaction with the response format provided (the main 
concern of the study) is the strength of the context memory for the target of the frequency 
estimation question. That is, how varied instances of the target event are, whether the 
target events are all the same or are different and unique in some way. Brown (1995) has 
shown the importance of different context memory in terms of accuracy and recall 
strategy, with more varied context memory leading to greater accuracy and more use of 
enumeration strategies. This increased accuracy is largely due to the increased ability to 
discriminate target instances with increased variation in context memory. It may then be 
that decreased variability in context memory leads to storage in more vague and “fuzzy” 
ways as suggested by Reyna and Brainerd (1991). If this vague storage is the case, then 
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there is an interaction between response format and context memory, where increased 
context memory (more variable) lends itself to greater accuracy with numeric response 
formats, while decreased context variability leads to greater accuracy when asked using 
vague quantifier response formats. As of now, there is no study found that examines this 
possible interaction.  
As noted, numeracy also likely affects subjective probability estimation in ways 
similar to that of frequency estimation relating to response formats. That is, people with 
lower numeracy ability may be less likely to encode quantitative information as numbers, 
or they are unable to recall numbers correctly, in part because the information is stored as 
different format, such as vague quantifiers.  However, as with frequency estimation, there 
has been no research on the effect of numeracy on the predictive validity of different 
response formats, either numeric open ended responses or vague quantifiers. This lack of 
research on numeracy, especially in regards to response formats, is considered another 
significant gap in the literature.  
Beyond numeracy, there are also other possible factors that affect subjective 
probability estimation in regards to response formats, which have not yet been examined 
in the literature in a systematic fashion. Specifically, the potential impact of age has not 
been researched in terms of the measurement properties of different response formats in 
regards to subjective probabilities. The need for the research on age difference is 
important because it has been suggested that youth perceive risks in a different way than 
adults (Reyna and Farley 2006). Specifically, youth may perceive risks more through 
numeric, objective information when deciding on whether to partake in a risky behavior. 
Conversely, adults rely more on vague, “fuzzy” notions of risks in making risk behavior 
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decisions. However, these potential differences have not been studied empirically, and 
are a source of further research that will be examined, as discussed below.  
In addition to accuracy and predictive validity, another potentially important 
source for the measurement properties of the different response formats is the logical 
consistency between numeric and vague quantifier responses. As the above literature 
review notes, several studies have examined the consistency of numeric translation of 
vague quantifiers. A number of studies have shown that there is large between-subject 
variation in the meaning of vague quantifiers, as defined by numeric translations (Beyth-
Marom 1982, Biehl and Halpern-Felsher 2001, Budescu and Wallsten 1985, Clarke et al. 
1992, Lichtenstein and Newman 1967). Age has also been shown to be an important 
factor in this variability (Biehl and Halpern-Felsher 2001). Within-subject variation may 
also exist (Clarke et al. 1992). Further, numeric meanings of vague quantifiers also seem 
to be partly defined by group comparisons (Schaeffer 1991). 
 Although logical consistency of response formats has been studied more than 
other sources of measurement properties of response formats (accuracy, predictive 
validity), there are some aspects that have not been completely examined. First, is the 
importance of whether vague quantifier translations are logical, for example, that the 
response “never” is equal to zero. Further, it should also follow that respondents, for 
example, should always give a translation for the quantifier “very risky” that is 
significantly greater than “somewhat risky”. However, this logical ordering has not been 
studied in an adequate manner.   
Similarly, the effect of numeracy has not been examined in regards to the logical 
consistency between numeric and vague quantifier response options. Given the effect of 
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numeracy on other areas of cognition, it follows that this logical consistency may be 
affected as well. For example, Schwartz et al. (1997) found that more numerate 
individuals were able to understand changes in risk information, while Peters et al (2006) 
found numeracy generally improved decision making. It may be that these are due to the 
ability of more numerate individuals to manipulate as well as understand numbers. Given 
this increased ability, it follows that more numerate individuals are more able to 
understand the logical relation between numeric and vague quantifier response options, 
and are better able to have logically consistent translation between the two. Although the 
non-numerate may be able to think in vague ways, it may be numerate individuals are 
better at the translation of vague quantifiers into numeric terms.  However, as of this 
dissertation, no research has examined the effect of numeracy on logical consistency of 
translation between these response formats.  
This dissertation presents several studies to examine the important factors and 
gaps, based on the above literature review and the identified gaps in the literature 
provided in this summary. Most important, and of central concern, is the measurement 
properties of the different response formats of numeric and vague quantifier response 
options for both frequency and subjective probability estimation. In addition, there are 
several other effects, which may interact with response formats, which are of importance. 
First is the impact of numeracy, for both frequency and subjective probability estimation. 
For frequency estimation, context memory is another potentially important factor which 
may interact with response format as well. For subjective probability estimation, age may 
also have an important interactive effect. Finally, it is important to look at the logical 
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consistency between the two response formats, and as well as examine the effect of 
numeracy on logical consistency of translation.  
Study 1 
Data and Methods 
 The first data set comes from an experiment conducted at the University of 
Nebraska-Lincoln. The experiment is a factorial design, with two between-subjects 
factors and one within subjects. The purpose of the experiment is to determine which 
factors are related to accuracy of response, in particular the effects of those with the 
different response formats of vague quantifiers and numeric open ended responses. Each 
of the factors is related to the encoding, recalling, and reporting of frequency data. All 
124 participants studied word lists, with word pairings of a target word and a context 
word. Subjects studied these words lists in groups, ranging from 5-20,  in a classroom on 
a screen at the front of the room. All participants were given the instructions that word 
pairs would be shown, which word was to be recalled, and that a memory test for the 
frequency of some of the words would be given after the presentation of the list.6 The 
instructions were similar to those used in Brown’s (1995) Experiment 1, in which 
respondents were also told that a memory test would be given after a being presented a 
set of word pairs. However, the instruction differed from Brown (1995) in that the nature 
                                                            
6 The exact instructions given were “This experiment is about memory, and will ask you to recall a number 
of words that will be presented to you on the screen at the front of the room. A pair of words will be 
presented. The first word is in all capital letters and is the words you will be asked to recall at the end of the 
experiment. The second word is to provide an example of the word you are to recall, in order to help your 
memory. You will be asked to recall how many times the capital words occurred in the list. If there are no 
questions, I will begin the word list presentation, which will take about 10 minutes. Afterward, I will give 
you a set of questions to answer.” 
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of the memory test was not specified, whereas in this study the nature of the test was 
specified. After the presentation of the word list, there was a task to test numeracy, which 
completes the purpose of a filler task as well as collect numeracy information, prior to the 
asking about word frequencies. The numeracy test and word frequency test were 
conducted on paper forms. The main outcome variable is the accuracy of the response to 
the question how many times a target word was presented in the list.  
The experiment employed a 2 (context: same; different) x 6 (frequency: 0, 2, 4, 8, 
12, 16) x 2 (response form: open-ended numeric; vague scale) factorial design, with the 
context and form factors manipulated between subjects, and the frequency factor 
manipulated within subjects.  The within subjects factor is the number of times the target 
word is presented in a list, i.e. the actual frequency. Target words were presented 2, 4, 8, 
12, or 16 times, for six seconds each as was done in Brown (1995). Further, respondents 
were asked about target words that have not been presented, i.e. have a zero actual 
frequency. Studies have shown that different levels of the actual frequency lead to 
different recall strategies (Brown 1995, 1997, Conrad et al. 1998). At times, some 
strategies appear to require numeric translation to answer the given numeric open ended 
response option. As such, these strategies may not only directly affect the accuracy of the 
answer, but also may interact with other question format options, such as the response 
option given.  
 One between-subject factor manipulated the type of context word used along with 
the target word. There are two conditions for this factor: same-context condition and 
different-context condition. This format follows the conditions used in Brown (1995) 
which has been shown to affect recall strategy selection. In the same-context condition, 
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the target word is presented with the same context word at every presentation. This 
context word is an exemplar for the target word. For example, for the target word CITY, 
it would be presented with the only one context word, such as the exemplar Miami at 
every presentation of the word CITY. Conversely, for the different-context condition, the 
target word is presented in combination with a different context word at every 
presentation, again with each context word an exemplar of the target word. For example, 
for the target word CITY, for one presentation the exemplar Miami would be presented, 
for the next, New York, for the third, Chicago, etc. (i.e. CITY-Miami, CITY-New York, 
CITY-Chicago, etc.).   
 Target words and exemplars come from Van Overschelde et al. (2004) and 
McEvoy and Nelson (1982), studies of categories (targets) and category instances/norms 
(exemplars). A total of fifteen target words are used, and are selected based on similar 
criteria as in Brown (1995): first, the target word had to be clearly identified by a single 
noun, and second, each target word had to have a substantial number of category 
instances (norms). Specifically, each word had to have at least sixteen category instances 
so that each could be presented to have any actual frequency in the different context 
condition. Target words and exemplars selected for use are located in Appendix 2. In 
each list, all fifteen target words will be presented according to one of the five actual 
presentation frequencies, i.e. 2, 4, 8, 12, or 16 times.  
 Given the five levels of actual frequency and the fifteen words, three words are 
presented at each of the five actual frequencies. This presentation strategy leads to 126 
presentations of target words in the study list. In order to create lists where each word is 
presented at each level of frequency, groups of three target words (from the fifteen) were 
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created, and these groups were varied at the five levels of frequency. This grouping leads 
to five groups of three words, requiring five lists to ensure that each target word would be 
presented at each level of actual frequency (i.e. CITY presented twice on one list, four 
times on another, and so on through CITY being presented 16 times on one list). There 
were five lists for the same context condition and five lists for the different context 
condition.  
 Target words were randomized in presentation throughout the lists. A random 
number was generated and assigned to each target word in each of the ten lists (five for 
each of the context conditions). The lists were then sorted by the random number, with 
the word with the smallest random number assigned appearing first, and the largest 
random number appearing last. Thus, the position of any given word was completely 
random. For the same-context condition, each target word in this list was paired with the 
selected context word. The same exemplar word was randomly selected and used for 
every presentation of the target word across all presentations of the target word in the 
same-context condition. For the different-context condition, the same lists were used with 
the difference being in that for each target word, a different exemplar is used. The 
exemplars for each target were selected at random, without replacement. Again, this 
randomization technique is the same as used in Brown (1995).  
 The second between subject factor, and of focal interest, is the different response 
options offered, focusing on numeric open response and vague quantifier response 
options, for reasons noted above. In one condition, respondents responded to the query 
for the frequency of a given target word, which has been presented 0, 2, 4, 8, 12, or 16 
times, using an numeric open ended response. The question asked, “How often did 
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WORD appear in the presented list? ______times”, where the blank was filled in by the 
respondent using any number. In the vague quantifier condition, respondents were asked 
the same question, but instead of a blank to fill in a number, they were presented vague 
quantifier response options. The vague quantifier options chosen come from Pohl (1981), 
with a desire to find words thought to be naturally ordered and creating a balanced scale. 
These options are “Never, Not Often, Somewhat Often, Fairly Often, Quite Often, Very 
Often”.  Six vague quantifier scale points were chosen in order to match the number of 
actual values used. The test for both conditions included questions about the fifteen 
presented words as well three additional words that were not presented at all, for a test of 
zero presented frequencies. For this test phase of the experiment, target words questioned 
about were randomized, with the targets asked about in a random order.  
Following answering all of the questions about frequency of the target words, 
respondents in the vague quantifier condition were asked for a numeric translation of the 
response options. Specifically, participants were asked to give a numeric translation to 
each of the six vague quantifiers used in the above question. They were asked to translate 
each of the six vague quantifiers answering the question, “In the past test, how many 
times did you think the word WORD meant?”, where WORD replaced each of the six 
vague quantifiers.  
 All respondents were also asked to complete a numeracy questionnaire in between 
presentation of the word lists and frequency questions. This questionnaire served both as 
a filler task between the presentation and testing of word lists and as an instrument to 
collect participants’ level of numeracy information. The numeracy questionnaire consists 
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of nine test questions that had been earlier administered by Galesic and Garcia-Retamero 
(2010), and is presented in Appendix 3.  
 Subjects were selected from the University of Nebraska – Lincoln experimental 
subject pool, through the university’s psychology department. An advertisement was 
placed to obtain participation in exchange for completion of course requirements. The 
total number of respondents selected is based in part on findings in a study of somewhat 
similar design, Brown (1995), which also used the variation of actual frequency and the 
same-different context factor (see below). In a test of the difference of absolute error 
between respondents in the same and different context (discussed above in the literature 
review), the statistical tests based on and an analysis of variance (ANOVA) included 
F(1,38) = 14.0, indicating greater absolute error for the same context condition (Brown 
1995, p. 1543). When the degrees of the numerator for the F-score is one, as it is in this 
test, this F-score can be translated to an effect size (i.e. correlation, r) using the formula, 
ݎ ൌ ඥܨ/ሺܨ ൅ ݀ ஽݂ሻ where F is the value of the statistical test (in this case, 14.0) and ݀ ஽݂ 
is the degrees of the freedom from the denominator of the test, in this case, 38 (Friedman 
1982). The F-score from Brown (1995) (F(1,38) = 14.0) translates to an effect size of r = 
0.5188. Another test of mean difference between rank-order correlations between 
estimated and actual frequency for the same and different context conditions led to the 
test results of t(38)  = 3.8, indicating a larger mean correlation for different conditions, 
suggesting greater relative accuracy in the different context condition (Brown 1995, p. 
1543). A t-score, like an F-score, can be translated into an effect size, in a similar 
manner. In this case, the r is calculated using the equation ݎ ൌ 	ටݐଶ/ሺ௧మௗ௙ሻ, where t equals 
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the test score and df is the degrees of freedom of the test. The equation for the t-score 
translation to effect size is essentially the same equation as the translation of the F-score 
into effect size, since ܨ ൌ ݐଶ.	Using the test t(38)  = 3.8 translates to an effect size of r = 
0.5247.   
Using these effect sizes as a basis for the expected effect sizes to be found in this 
study, based on the table in Friedman (1982), the sample size needed for each 
combination of the between subjects factors is between 20 and 26, for r = .55 and r = .50, 
respectively. Since the effect sizes found in Brown (1995) fall between these values, the 
sample size selected for each combination of the between-subject factors is the midpoint 
is sample size values, 23. For a 2 x 2 between subjects design, 23 subjects per each factor 
combination leads to a total sample size required of 92. Using a simpler design, with only 
one between subjects factor, Brown (1995) used 40 respondents, so this increase of more 
than double the subjects appears reasonable with the addition of the additional two-level 
between-subjects factor.  
Using this power analysis as a guideline, 124 subjects participated. These subjects 
were randomly assigned to one of the four between-subjects combinations. More subjects 
were tested to ensure greater power than was required as indicated by the power analysis. 
Of these 124, 63 completed the numeric open ended response form and 61 completed the 
vague quantifier response form. For the presentation context manipulation, 67 were 
presented the different context, with different context words presented with each target 
word. The remaining 57 were presented the same presentation context condition.  
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Hypotheses 
H1: People, in general, will be more accurate when responding to frequency questions 
when using vague quantifiers rather than numeric open ended responses  
H2: When asked for a direct numeric translation of vague quantifiers, there should be 
a logical consistency between numeric and vague quantifier measures.  
H3: As actual frequency increases, accuracy will decrease  
H4: Greater context memory will improve accuracy  
H5: In general, more numerate individuals will provide more accurate responses  
H6: More numerate individuals will show greater logical consistency in numeric open 
ended and vague quantifier responses than less numerate individuals  
H7: More numerate individuals will be more accurate using numeric open ended 
responses than less numerate individuals 
H8: More numerate individuals will be more accurate using numeric open ended 
responses than when using vague quantifiers  
H9: As the actual frequency increases, vague quantifier responses will become more 
accurate. 
H10: As the actual frequency decreases, the accuracy of numeric open ended responses 
will increase.  
H11: At lower levels of actual frequency, numeric open ended responses will be more 
accurate than vague quantifier responses.  
H12: There will be no discernible effect of context memory on the accuracy of vague 
quantifier responses.   
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H13: There will be an interaction effect between context memory and actual frequency 
in regards to accuracy, whereby greater context memory will lead to better 
accuracy at higher levels of actual frequency, but not at lower levels of actual 
frequency.  
H14: There will be an interaction between numeracy and actual frequency in regards to 
accuracy, whereby greater numeracy increases accuracy at higher levels of actual 
frequency but not at lower levels.  
H15: A three way interaction will arise between response format, actual frequency and 
numeracy, whereby the most numerate will show higher accuracy at higher levels 
of actual frequency using numeric open ended responses, but no effect at lower 
levels of actual frequency. 
Results 
Numeracy 
 Overall, the 124 respondents displayed a high level of numeracy. Out of the nine 
numeracy questions used from Galesic and Garcia-Retamero (2010), the mean number of 
correct responses is 7.27 (S.E. = 0.14). The median number of correct responses was 8 
out of 9. Thirty respondents (24.2% of the total) answered all nine correctly, another 37 
(29.84%) answered eight correctly, and 26 (20.97%) got seven correct. The minimum 
number correct was 3, accomplished by 3 respondents (2.42%). Since there were none 
that scored zero, giving no true zero point for use in interpretation in analysis, all further 
analyses using numeracy uses a grand-mean centered measure of numeracy. That is, the 
mean (7.27) was subtracted from each respondent’s numeracy score in order to have a 
numeracy measure with mean zero.   
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Logical Consistency 
 Of the 61 respondents that answered the frequency questions using the vague 
quantifier scales, and thus provided numeric translations for each of the vague terms used 
in the scales, 58 provided whole number translations, as intended. The remaining three 
respondents gave translations in terms of percentiles. Since percentiles are not the correct 
metric, these responses were not used in the logical consistency assessment. These three 
respondents, however, all gave the translation of “never” as meaning zero, and so this 
value was used for their numeric translation for this term. For the other five vague terms, 
for use in assessing accuracy, the mean translated value of the total sample was imputed 
for these three respondents for the value their numeric translations of these terms.  
 The means for all six vague terms, as well as the standard error, and the minimum 
and maximum for each are presented in Table 1.1. All respondents except one translated 
“never” as meaning zero, with this one respondent translating “never” as meaning three 
times. In all cases, there was complete consistency within respondents. That is, each 
respondent gave larger numeric translations along each point of the vague quantifier scale 
such that all translations followed the pattern: never < not often < somewhat often < 
fairly often < quite often < very often. This is mirrored by the means of the total sample 
in the below table. This same ordering of the vague quantifier scale translation occurs at 
the aggregate level as well, with never being the smallest and very often the largest. This 
may be in part due to the way that the questions were asked. All respondents in the vague 
quantifier condition were asked at the end of the frequency estimation task to translate 
each of the scale points, in the same order they appeared in the frequency estimation task. 
As such, the practice of responding to each of the frequency estimations questions and 
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the ordering of the translation questions may have indicated to the respondent that there 
was a correct ordering, with each ascending point meaning a larger value.  
 
Table 1.1 
Numeric Translations for Vague Quantifier Scale 
  Mean (S.E.) Minimum Maximum 
Never  0.05 (0.05) 0 3 
Not Often  2.67 (0.16) 1 5 
Somewhat Often  5.57 (0.30) 3 13 
Fairly Often  8.74 (0.44) 4 15 
Quite Often  12.10 (0.64) 5 25 
Very Often  15.48 (0.87) 7 37 
 
 All of the differences between the mean translations seen in the above table are 
significant at the p<0.01 level, further suggesting the logical consistency within the 
sample for the translation of vague quantifiers. Given the strong level of logical 
consistency, there does not appear to be any discordance between numeric and vague 
quantifier responses. As such, Hypothesis 2 appears to be supported. Since all 
respondents were completely logically consistent, with everyone giving the same 
ordering of vague quantifier numeric translations, it is clear that numeracy did not have 
an impact on logical consistency. Therefore, there is no support for Hypothesis 6.7  
                                                            
7 As an alternative test, actual differences between estimated values of each vague quantifier and the 
intended value were examined for each individual. For example, the difference between the assigned value 
for “very often” and 16, the intended value for that quantifier, was estimated for each individual. These 
differences were then summed and correlated with numeracy score, which was found to not be significantly 
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 Finally, it is worth noting that the mean values in Table 1.1 fall remarkably close 
to the six possible values for the actual values of the words presented in the word lists. 
There is still a significant amount of variation, in part indicated by the minimum and 
maximum values given for each translation, with greater dispersion at the higher end of 
the vague quantifier scale. Even with this variation, though, the mean values of the 
translations for the sample are similar to the actual values of 0, 2, 4, 8, 12, and 16 used. 
The reason that six vague quantifier scale points were chosen was in order to match the 
number of actual values used, and this shows the similarity between the two, possibly 
indicating an overall high level of accuracy (see below).  
Accuracy 
Accuracy may be measured in a number of ways, but it is first necessary to place 
numeric values onto the vague quantifiers, that in essence conform to the distribution of 
the actual frequency. It is necessary to assume some distribution of values to be assigned 
to the vague quantifiers, or else accuracy cannot be tested with these values. Standard 
assignment of values to such scales where there is only a unit difference between scale 
points, such as 1, 2, 3, 4, for a four point scale, will obviously be unsatisfactory for 
assessing many measures of accuracy, which is usually defined as the difference between 
the estimated value (the response) and the actual value (the actual frequency). Assigning 
values to vague quantifier scales has been used in past research to assess accuracy based 
on percentage of time a behavior was completed (Lu et al. 2008).  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
different from zero (r = -0.17, p = 0.19). This finding further suggests there was no effect on numeracy on 
logical consistency.  
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 In this analysis, following the suggestion of Bradburn and Miles (1979) values are 
assigned to vague quantifier responses based on the individual respondents’ translation of 
these quantifiers to numeric values. As part of the experimental procedure used, subjects 
gave one translation of what the vague quantifiers meant at the end of the frequency 
recall test, and the values are used for each instance that quantifier was used. For 
example, a respondent who said that “very often” translated to 17 times, has the value 17 
used for each time they selected that a word had occurred very often. For three 
respondents, as noted above, the translations given were in the form of percentiles rather 
than in terms of whole numbers, except for the translation of “never”, which was given 
for all three as zero. For these respondents, the mean translations of the sample are used 
as their values for the remaining five vague quantifiers (zero is used for never 
translation).  
Accuracy can be measured several different ways. Four are used in this analysis. 
First, the absolute difference between the reported frequency and the actual frequency 
can be used (i.e. |actual frequency – estimated frequency|). This difference estimates the 
total accuracy (error) in the measure, but fails to capture whether a measure is more or 
less error-prone in a particular direction, such as over- or underestimation of actual 
frequency. As such, another measure of accuracy is the signed difference (i.e. actual 
frequency – estimated frequency).  
Two additional previously used measures that are to be used here include the 
rank-order correlations between the actual frequency and the estimated frequency, and 
the regression slope fitting estimated frequency to actual frequency (Brown 1995). The 
correlation tests the relative accuracy of a participant, while the regression slope tests the 
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degree to which there is a bias overestimating or underestimating actual frequency. These 
two measures have to be estimated over all responses that a respondent gives, whereas 
the absolute and signed differences are calculated at the response level, with each 
response having a particular level of error. Therefore, the effect of actual frequency is 
only examinable when looking at absolute and signed differences.   
 Examining the regression slopes, overall, respondents underestimated actual 
frequencies, as indicated by the overall mean of 0.72 (S.E. = 0.03). The mean did not 
differ significantly for those responding using vague quantifier (M = 0.71) or numeric 
open ended responses (M = 0.73) as tested by a pairwise t-test t(122) = 0.32, p = 0.75. 
Similarly, contrary to Brown’s (1995) findings, there was no difference between those in 
the same context (M = 0.73) and different context (M =  0.71), t(122) = 0.23, p =  0.81 
conditions. Finally, the correlation between the slopes and numeracy (mean centered) 
was -0.05, and not significantly different from zero, p =  0.55.  
 To control for all of these effects simultaneously, and to test for possible 
interactions between these potentially important variables, a linear regression model was 
estimated, with slope of the participants as the dependent variable. The independent 
variables are the response form used (vague quantifier form = 1, numeric open ended 
form = 0), the context words used with the target words (same context = 1, different 
context = 0), numeracy (mean centered), and all of the possible interactions between 
these three variables. Results are presented in Table 1.2. None of the independent 
variables are estimated to be significantly different from zero. Mirroring this fact is that 
the omnibus F-test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the addition of any of the 
independent variables has an effect over the intercept. In other words, the expected value 
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of the dependent variables, the slopes, is constant over all independent variables, 
including all of the interactions. 
 
Table 1.2 
Regression on Respondents’ Slopes 
Variable  Coefficient (s.e.) 
Same Context  0.002 (0.10) 
Vague Quantifier Form  -0.03 (0.09) 
Numeracy  -0.00005 (0.04) 
Context*Numeracy  0.05 (0.06) 
Context*Form  0.04 (0.14) 
Numeracy*Form  -0.05 (0.06) 
Context*Form*Numeracy  -0.05 (0.09) 
Intercept  0.73* (0.07) 
 
n = 124, F = 0.46, p = 0.86, R2 = 0.03, *p < 0.05 
 
The results examining the rank-order correlations are the nearly the same as that 
for the slopes. Overall, there tends to be a high correlation between estimated frequency 
and actual frequency, r = 0.75. This suggests that overall, there was a high level of 
relative accuracy. For analysis of correlations, such as differences in means and 
regressions, correlations were transformed to Fisher z-scores. Using these, it is found that 
there is no difference between vague quantifier (M = 1.06) or numeric open ended 
responses (M = 1.08) as tested by a pairwise t-test t(122) = 0.46, p = 0.64. There is also 
no difference between same and different context in terms of the correlations, t(122) = 
0.42, p = 0.68 (same context M = 1.06, different context M =  1.09). There was also not a 
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significant correlation between numeracy and the Fisher z-score transformations, r = 
0.09, p = 0.35.  
 Again, to control for all of the effects and all of the possible interactions 
simultaneously, linear regression was employed. The dependent variable is the 
transformed correlations to Fisher’s z-scores, with the independent variables again being 
the response form, context words used, numeracy, and all of the interactions of these 
three. Results are presented in Table 1.3. As with the regression on the slopes, none of the 
coefficients for any of the independent variables reached the standard level of 
significance of p<0.05. The main effect of numeracy, however, did reach significance at 
p<0.10. If the higher level of alpha is accepted, this suggests that those with higher levels 
of numeracy also display somewhat higher correlations, and thus higher relative 
accuracy, in the cases when the response form and context used both equal zero. That is, 
numeracy increases correlations when numeric open ended responses are used in the 
different context condition. However, it is again noted that this coefficient is not 
significant at the standard p<0.05 level. Further, the omnibus F-test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis that the addition of any of the independent variables has an effect over the 
intercept. In other words, the expected value of the dependent variables, the slopes, is 
constant over all independent variables, including the main effect for numeracy. 
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Table 1.3 
Regression on Respondents’ Correlations 
Variable  Coefficient (s.e.) 
Same Context  -0.004 (0.09) 
Vague Quantifier Form  -0.009 (0.09) 
Numeracy  0.06 (0.04) 
Context*Numeracy  -0.06 (0.06) 
Context*Form  -0.06 (0.13) 
Numeracy*Form  -0.08 (0.05) 
Context*Form*Numeracy  0.09 (0.09) 
Intercept  1.10* (0.06) 
 
n = 124, F = 0.55, p = 0.80, R2 = 0.03, *p < 0.05 
 
Given the lack of identified effects from the previous analyses on the two forms 
of accuracy, regression slopes and rank-order correlations, there appears to be little to no 
support for many of the hypotheses that can be tested using these measures. The only 
possible exception is that there is a marginal significance for the main effect of numeracy 
in the regression on respondents’ correlation coefficients. This marginal significance 
suggests, possibly, that numeracy leads to higher level of (relative) accuracy, giving some  
support to Hypothesis 5, that more numerate individuals will provide more accurate 
responses. 
The only remaining hypothesis that is supported is Hypothesis 13, which 
predicted a null result in terms of no interaction between context memory and vague 
quantifier response in regards to accuracy. Indeed, this null result was found. Otherwise, 
none of the potentially testable hypotheses were supported. Hypotheses 1, 4, and 8 all 
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were not supported. The remaining hypotheses include some discussion of actual 
frequency, which neither of these measures of accuracy can address.  
Therefore, to examine the effect of actual frequency and the effect of context, 
response form, and numeracy on different forms of accuracy, the absolute and signed 
differences are analyzed. These can be analyzed at the true frequency count levels; that is, 
it is possible to examine the effect of increasing the actual count on these differences. 
Examining signed differences first, Table 1.4 presents the mean signed difference at each 
level of actual frequency, i.e. 0, 2, 4, 8, 12, and 16, for each version of the response form 
and context condition combination that respondents fell under. For example, Vague-Same 
means respondents who were responded using vague quantifier responses and were 
presented the same context condition. 
 
Table 1.4 
Signed Differences at Levels of Actual Frequency, by Form and Context 
Actual Frequency Vague-Same Vague-Different Numeric-Same Numeric-Different 
0 0.34* 0.39* 0.92* 0.73* 
2 1.25* 0.76* 2.67* 1.55* 
4 0.85 0.53 2.88* 2.73* 
8 0.80* -0.94 1.36* 1.50* 
12 -1.52* -3.26* 0.05 -1.43* 
16 -3.80* -3.49* -3.14* -2.69* 
Overall -0.34 -1.08* 0.79* 0.34 
 
*p < 0.05 
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As can be seen, generally across all conditions, it appears that at lower levels of 
actual frequency there are more overestimation errors, and at higher levels of actual 
frequency, there is greater underestimation. Across all levels of actual frequency, it 
appears that there is slight underestimation for vague quantifiers and slight 
overestimation for numeric open ended responses, however, the overall signed 
differences are not significantly different from zero for the vague quantifier-same context 
combination and numeric open ended-different context response combination. Both 
response forms show a similar pattern in the direction of errors at each level of actual 
frequency, except in the middle, where actual frequency equals eight. Here, numeric open 
ended responses still are overestimated, while for vague quantifier responses in the 
different context condition the shift to underestimation has already happened. For both 
sets of numeric open ended responses, this shift to underestimation occurs at the next 
highest level of actual frequency. Also, at lower levels of actual frequency, the size of the 
error is smaller for vague quantifier responses, but at the two highest levels of actual 
frequency, numeric open ended responses show somewhat smaller error sizes. 
To further examine the effect of actual frequency, as well the effect of response 
form, word context, and numeracy, a multivariate model should be used. Given the 
structure of the data, hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), is most appropriate (Luke 
2004, Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). The respondents each gave a total of eighteen 
frequency estimation responses, three for each level of actual frequency. Thus for each 
response, there is a different actual frequency value associated with the response. These 
responses are nested within each respondent, each of whom has respondent level 
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characteristics of interest. Specifically, numeracy, response form, and presentation 
context vary at the respondent level, not at the response level.  
The model is therefore a two-level model, modeling response accuracy for each 
response, with the level-1 independent variable being actual frequency. The second level 
of the model includes random effects at the respondent level (j). The level two, i.e. 
respondent level, covariates are the aforementioned numeracy (mean centered), response 
form, and presentation context. To ensure all interactions of the effects are accounted for, 
as well as main effects, both intercepts and slopes are modeled as random and used as 
outcomes (Luke 2004). For the signed differences form of the model, the model can be 
written using the following equations. First, using the HLM notation, the model is 
presented in the following three equations: 
Level-1 Model: 
ܵܫܩܰܧܦ௜௝ ൌ ߚ଴௝ ൅ ߚଵ௝ሺܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܨݎ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿݕሻ ൅ ݎ௜௝ (1) 
Level-2 Model:   
ߚ଴௝ ൌ 	ߛ଴଴ ൅ ߛ଴ଵሺܥ݋݊ݐ݁ݔݐሻ ൅ ߛ଴ଶሺܨ݋ݎ݉ሻ ൅ ߛ଴ଷሺܰݑ݉݁ݎܽܿݕሻ ൅
ߛ଴ସሺܥ݋݊ݐ݁ݔݐ ∗ ܰݑ݉݁ݎܽܿݕሻ ൅ ߛ଴ହሺܥ݋݊ݐ݁ݔݐ ∗ ܨ݋ݎ݉ሻ ൅ ߛ଴଺ሺܨ݋ݎ݉ ∗
ܰݑ݉݁ݎܽܿݕሻ ൅ ߛ଴଻ሺܥ݋݊ݐ݁ݔݐ ∗ ܰݑ݉݁ݎܽܿݕ ∗ ܨ݋ݎ݉ሻ ൅ ݑ଴௝(2) 
ߚଵ௝ ൌ 	ߛଵ଴ ൅ ߛଵଵሺܥ݋݊ݐ݁ݔݐሻ ൅ ߛଵଶሺܨ݋ݎ݉ሻ ൅ ߛଵଷሺܰݑ݉݁ݎܽܿݕሻ ൅
ߛଵସሺܥ݋݊ݐ݁ݔݐ ∗ ܰݑ݉݁ݎܽܿݕሻ ൅ ߛଵହሺܥ݋݊ݐ݁ݔݐ ∗ ܨ݋ݎ݉ሻ ൅ ߛଵ଺ሺܨ݋ݎ݉ ∗
ܰݑ݉݁ݎܽܿݕሻ ൅ ߛଵ଻ሺܥ݋݊ݐ݁ݔݐ ∗ ܰݑ݉݁ݎܽܿݕ ∗ ܨ݋ݎ݉ሻ ൅ ݑଵ௝(3) 
Where i represent the individual level and j represents the respondent level, ߚ and ߛ are 
parameter coefficients, and r and u are error terms for the various portions of the 
equation. Rewriting these equations in the mixed model format makes clear the full 
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model and how all of the interactions are modeled, as well as the fixed and random 
portions of the model. This is done in the following equation: 
ܵܫܩܰܧܦ௜௝ ൌ ߛ଴଴ ൅ ߛ଴ଵሺܥ݋݊ݐ݁ݔݐሻ ൅ ߛ଴ଶሺܨ݋ݎ݉ሻ ൅ ߛ଴ଷሺܰݑ݉݁ݎܽܿݕሻ ൅
ߛ଴ସሺܥ݋݊ݐ݁ݔݐ ∗ ܰݑ݉݁ݎܽܿݕሻ ൅ ߛ଴ହሺܥ݋݊ݐ݁ݔݐ ∗ ܨ݋ݎ݉ሻ ൅ ߛ଴଺ሺܨ݋ݎ݉ ∗ܰݑ݉݁ݎܽܿݕሻ ൅ ߛ଴଻ሺܥ݋݊ݐ݁ݔݐ ∗ ܰݑ݉݁ݎܽܿݕ ∗ ܨ݋ݎ݉ሻ ൅ߛଵ଴ሺܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܨݎ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿݕሻ ൅ ߛଵଵሺܥ݋݊ݐ݁ݔݐ ∗ ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܨݎ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿݕሻ ൅ ߛଵଶሺܨ݋ݎ݉ ∗ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܨݎ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿݕሻ ൅ ߛଵଷሺܰݑ݉݁ݎܽܿݕ ∗ ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܨݎ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿݕሻ ൅ ߛଵସሺܥ݋݊ݐ݁ݔݐ ∗ܰݑ݉݁ݎܽܿݕ ∗ ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܨݎ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿݕሻ ൅
ߛଵହሺܥ݋݊ݐ݁ݔݐ ∗ ܨ݋ݎ݉ ∗ ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܨݎ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿݕሻ ൅ ߛଵ଺ሺܨ݋ݎ݉ ∗ ܰݑ݉݁ݎܽܿݕ ∗ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܨݎ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿݕሻ ൅
ߛଵ଻ሺܥ݋݊ݐ݁ݔݐ ∗ ܨ݋ݎ݉ ∗ ܰݑ݉݁ݎܽܿݕ ∗ ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܨݎ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿݕሻ ൅ݑଵ௝ሺܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܨݎ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿݕሻ ൅ ݑ଴௝ ൅ ݎ௜௝(4) 
 
The ݑଵ௝ሺܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܨݎ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿݕሻ ൅ ݑ଴௝ ൅ ݎ௜௝ portion of equation 4 is the random 
portion of the model; the remainder is the fixed part of the model. Before running this 
model, a random-intercept only model is run with signed differences as the dependent 
variable, in order to calculate the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC). The ICC 
measures the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable (signed differences in 
this case) accounted for by the level 2 units, i.e. respondents (Luke 2004). Formally, this 
model is written, in HLM terms, by the following equations:  
ܵܫܩܰܧܦ௜௝ ൌ ߚ଴௝ ൅ ݎ௜௝ (5) 
ߚ଴௝ ൌ 	ߛ଴଴ ൅ ݑ଴௝  (6) 
In mixed model terms the equation is as follows, which can be seen to be the same as a 
one-way random effects ANOVA model (Luke 2004): 
ܵܫܩܰܧܦ௜௝ ൌ ߛ଴଴ ൅ ݑ଴௝ ൅ ݎ௜௝ (7) 
All models are calculated using HLM 7 (Raudenbush et al. 2011).The calculated 
ICC is 0.33, suggesting that respondents account for about 33% of the variability in the 
observed signed differences. This ICC is moderately high, suggesting the potential 
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usefulness of multilevel models (Luke 2004). Given that, the full model is presented in 
Table 1.5. Robust standard errors are used, that is, standard errors that are consistent even 
when HLM assumptions are not (Raudenbush et al. 2011). Only the full model is 
presented, as it alone allows for an examination of all hypotheses simultaneously. Thus, 
no reduced models are examined.  
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Table 1.5 
Hierarchical Linear Model of Signed Differences on Response and Respondent 
Characteristics 
Variable  Coefficient (s.e.) 
For Intercept1, β0  
Intercept2, γ00  2.22* (0.37) 
Same Context, γ01  0.59 (0.63) 
Form, γ02  -1.15* (0.44) 
Numeracy, γ03  -0.60* (0.25) 
Context*Numeracy, γ04  0.88* (0.43) 
Context*Form, γ05  -0.07 (0.72) 
Form*Numeracy, γ06  0.61* (0.29) 
Context*Form*Numeracy,γ07  -0.99* (0.47) 
For Actual Frequency slope, β1  
Actual Frequency, γ10  -0.28* (0.06) 
Context*Frequency, γ11  -0.01 (0.09) 
Form*Frequency, γ12  -0.02 (0.08) 
Numeracy*Frequency, γ13  0.003 (0.04) 
Context*Numeracy*Frequency, γ14  0.05 (0.05) 
Context*Form*Frequency, γ15  0.05 (0.14) 
Form*Numeracy*Frequency, γ16  -0.05 (0.05) 
Context*Form*Numeracy*Frequency, γ17  -0.05 (0.09) 
 
n = 124, *p < 0.05 
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The results indicate a number of interesting findings. First, in regards to the 
overall mean (i.e. intercepts as the outcome) of the signed differences Table 1.6 gives 
predicted values of the mean. Given the more difficult nature of interpreting signed 
differences from a regression model, predicted values of the mean (i.e. intercept) allow 
for increased ability to interpret results. The first noticeable result from the model is that 
presentation context on its own does not appear to have an effect. However, the main 
effect of response form suggests that, when mean centered numeracy is at its mean (i.e. 
numeracy = 0) and when different presentation context is used, vague quantifiers lower 
the signed mean difference. Since the overall mean is positive, suggesting overestimation 
(intercept = 2.22), and the reduction caused by vague quantifier response is not greater 
than the mean (thus causing the mean to become negative), this reduction can be viewed 
as an overall reduction in error, with lower overestimation. When numeracy is equal to 
zero, and same context is used, the reduction in the mean error is somewhat greater, but is 
not statistically different from that of the different context condition. These findings 
suggest that, at mean levels of numeracy, vague quantifier responses reduce error by 
reducing overestimation error.  
 
Table 1.6 
Predicted Mean Signed Error by Context, Form, and Numeracy 
Numeracy Vague-Same Vague-Different Numeric-Same Numeric-Different 
0 (Mean) 1.59 1.08 2.81 2.22 
1.73 (High) 1.41 1.09 3.29 1.18 
-4.27 (Low) 2.05 1.05 1.65 4.80 
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When numeracy deviates from the mean of zero, the picture becomes more 
complicated. Since the maximum value of mean centered numeracy is 1.73 (minimum -
4.27), several conclusions can be drawn. First, for the numeric open ended response form 
and given the different context presentation, greater numeracy leads error to be reduced, 
while lower than average numeracy increases overestimation error (see Table 1.6).  As 
also seen in Tables 1.5 and 1.6, at higher levels of numeracy, vague quantifier response 
forms decrease overestimation error overall for both presentation contexts, although there 
is a bit more of a reduction in the different context condition. Similarly, for the different 
context condition, greater numeracy leads to less overestimation when using a numeric 
open ended response form. However, for the same context condition and numeric open 
ended response form, overestimation is increased at the highest levels of numeracy. 
Compared to the mean numeracy, overestimation error is decreased or within rounding 
error of three of the four instances, the lone outlier being the same context, numeric open 
ended form where higher numeracy led to greater overestimation error.  
Subjects with lower numeracy, interestingly, show higher overestimation errors 
than respondents with higher numeracy in two cases, but lower overestimation errors in 
the other two cases (see Table 1.6) Specifically, those with the lowest numeracy given the 
same context presentation and vague quantifier form had somewhat higher levels of 
overestimation error (though still smaller than the overall mean) than those with higher 
levels of numeracy. Similarly, those with the lowest numeracy given different context 
and numeric open ended response had the highest overestimation error of all 
categorizations. However, consistent with other levels of numeracy, different context and 
vague quantifier response led to the lowest levels of overestimation error. What is 
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somewhat different is that for the same context condition and use of the numeric open 
ended form, there was reduced overestimation error compared to the overall mean of 
numeracy and higher levels of numeracy. Therefore, although it appears that in most 
cases numeracy decreases overestimation error, there are a few cases where unexpectedly 
this does not occur.  
Greater clarity is at hand when examining the effect of actual frequency and the 
interactions between the respondent characteristics and actual frequency (slopes as the 
outcome). First, it is evident increases in actual frequency lead to increasing likelihood 
that there will be underestimation. This underestimation with increasing actual frequency 
is evident in Table 1.4 as well. However, none of the interactions with actual frequency 
are statistically significant. This lack of significance suggests that there is no relationship 
between respondent level and response level variables. Thus, although the effect of actual 
frequency is evident, actual frequency does not interact with any other variables to affect 
the signed differences.  
 The results of this hierarchical model provide support to some of the hypotheses 
proposed and lack of support to others. First, there is support for Hypothesis 1, in that 
generally, people were more accurate (i.e. overestimation error was reduced) when using 
vague quantifier responses rather than numeric open ended responses. In examination of 
Table 1.6, comparing response forms across similar context conditions, vague quantifier 
responses produced less overestimation error in all but one instance. Further, vague 
quantifier responses reduced error from the overall mean in every case. 
Hypothesis 3 is also somewhat supported, in that increases in actual frequency 
altered the level of accuracy such that at the highest levels of actual frequency, there was 
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greater underestimation. However, it is not as clear that at all increasing levels of actual 
frequency there are decreases in accuracy, which are due to the nature of signed 
differences (see Table 1.4). At mid-levels of actual frequency (i.e. actual frequency  = 8), 
it appears that lower levels of error may be occurring than at points lower and higher than 
8 on the actual frequency scale. This effect may be simply due to the shifting of some 
respondents to begin underestimating, as is clearer at higher levels of actual frequency, 
while others respondents are still overestimating, as with lower levels of actual 
frequency. If some are overestimating and others underestimating, the average effect may 
make it appear that there are lower levels of error. Given this shifting from over- to 
underestimating, it is not always clear that increasing the actual frequency will lead to 
reduced errors overall when examining signed differences. This issue of signed 
differences is resolved when examining absolute differences below.  
 Still, other hypotheses are more clearly supported or not supported using the 
signed differences model. Hypothesis 4, that greater context memory (i.e. different 
context presentation) on its own reduces error is not supported. The main effect for 
context memory is not significant, and given that all interactions equal zero when context 
presentation is set to different context (i.e. different context memory = 0), the main effect 
is the effect of interest. Hypothesis 5 is also not clearly supported, since although greater 
numeracy does at times appear to decrease errors, at times it appears it can increase error, 
depending on the context memory and response form. Similarly, Hypothesis 7 is not 
clearly supported, since it depends on context memory whether more numerate 
individuals are more accurate than less numerate respondents using numeric open ended 
responses. When more numerate individuals responded on the numeric open ended form, 
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this decreased error generally for different context presentation, but increased 
overestimation for same context presentation. The reverse pattern was true for lower 
numeracy respondents when using numeric open ended response forms.  
 Hypothesis 8 is somewhat supported, as more numerate individuals are more 
accurate when using numeric open ended responses, but only when given the different 
context condition. In the same context condition, higher numeracy leads to a reduction in 
overestimation error when responding to vague quantifier response form. Hypothesis 12 
is not supported, however, as there is some evidence that context memory does have an 
effect on vague quantifier response accuracy, as seen by the three way interaction 
between context, response form, and numeracy. More numerate individuals responding in 
the same condition shows less overestimation error when using vague quantifier response 
forms.  
 None of the hypotheses regarding interaction with actual frequency are supported. 
This lack of support for all of these hypotheses is evidenced by the lack of statistically 
significant interaction between actual frequency and any other effects. Therefore, 
Hypotheses 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, and 15 are not supported.  
Signed differences detect the direction of error, but are less easily interpreted in 
terms of overall error. Absolute error detects total error more clearly, and is analyzed in a 
similar manner to that of the signed differences. First, Table 1.7 presents the mean signed 
difference at each level of actual frequency, i.e. 0, 2, 4, 8, 12, and 16, for each version of 
the response form and context condition combination that respondents fell under. 
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Table 1.7 
Absolute Differences at Levels of Actual Frequency, by Form and Context 
Actual Frequency Vague-Same Vague-Different Numeric-Same Numeric-Different 
0 0.34* 0.39* 0.92* 0.73* 
2 1.99* 1.96* 3.05* 2.36* 
4 3.15* 2.61* 4.05* 3.97* 
8 4.55* 4.46* 4.23* 4.34* 
12 5.52* 5.77* 5.02* 5.75* 
16 7.02* 6.03* 6.52* 5.73* 
Overall 3.76* 3.61* 3.96* 3.88* 
 
*p < 0.05 
 
Across all conditions, as actual frequency increases error also tends to increase, 
with all absolute differences significantly greater than zero. Across all levels of actual 
frequency, it appears that there is slightly less error for vague quantifiers than numeric 
open ended responses, and slightly less error for the different context condition. Vague 
quantifiers appear to have less error at lower levels of actual frequency than numeric 
open ended responses, but a slight reversal occurs at higher levels of actual frequency, 
with numeric responses showing somewhat smaller errors.  
 In order to examine absolute differences more completely, as was done with 
signed differences, a hierarchical linear model is used. The model used is identical to that 
described in equations 1-4, with the exception of using absolute differences as the 
dependent variable instead of signed differences. Similarly, the intraclass correlation is 
calculated using the same equations as 5-7, again substituting only absolute differences  
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for signed differences. The ICC is estimated as 0.15, suggesting that respondents account 
for about 15% of the variability in the observed absolute differences. The full model is 
presented in Table 1.8, with robust standard errors, and again, only the full model is used 
in order to test all of the hypotheses simultaneously. 
As can be seen in Table 1.8, first examining the mean (intercepts as outcome), the 
main effects for different context condition, response form, and the interaction between 
these two are not found to be statistically significant. This indicates a lack of effect for 
these variables. However, the interaction of these variables with numeracy and the 
numeracy main effect are all statistically significant, indicating the importance of 
numeracy on absolute error. The coefficients suggest that for the different context 
condition when answering via numeric open ended responses, greater numeracy reduces 
error.  
It is important to note, that even though the error is larger, it does not increase the 
overall amount of error from the grand mean. Further, greater numeracy actually 
increases error in the same context condition compared to those with lower numeracy 
presented in the same context condition, when responding using numeric open ended 
responses. However, when responding on the vague quantifier form in the same context 
condition, greater numeracy reduces error and less numeracy increases error. Even with 
the increase by responding to vague quantifier forms with the same context memory, the 
less numerate still overall have lower than the mean error. That is, overall, vague 
quantifier responses tend to either reduce the level of error or maintain the level of error 
at all levels of numeracy and context memory. 
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Table 1.8  
Hierarchical Linear Model of Absolute Differences on Response and Respondent 
Characteristics 
Variable  Coefficient (s.e.) 
For Intercept1, β0  
Intercept2, γ00  1.69* (0.41) 
Same Context, γ01  0.27 (0.67) 
Form, γ02  -0.64 (0.47) 
Numeracy, γ03  -0.58* (0.27) 
Context*Numeracy, γ04  1.03* (0.44) 
Context*Form, γ05  -0.28 (0.75) 
Form*Numeracy, γ06  0.58* (0.30) 
Context*Form*Numeracy,γ07  -0.97* (0.48) 
For Actual Frequency slope, β1  
Actual Frequency, γ10  0.29* (0.04) 
Context*Frequency, γ11  -0.01 (0.06) 
Form*Frequency, γ12  -0.06 (0.05) 
Numeracy*Frequency, γ13  0.02 (0.02) 
Context*Numeracy*Frequency, γ14  -0.02 (0.03) 
Context*Form*Frequency, γ15  0.05 (0.08) 
Form*Numeracy*Frequency, γ16  -0.03 (0.03) 
Context*Form*Numeracy*Frequency, γ17  -0.01 (0.06) 
 
n = 124, *p < 0.05 
 
Table 1.9 displays these effects, presenting predicted means (intercepts) for 
various combinations of the three way interactions between different conditions and 
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levels of numeracy, as in Table 1.6 for signed differences. As indicated by the 
Context*Numeracy coefficient in Table 1.8, those with lower numeracy have smaller 
error in the same context condition. Indeed, the lowest error predicted is for those with 
the lowest numeracy in the same condition, using numeric open ended responses. 
Similarly, those with the highest levels of numeracy have higher levels of error in the 
same context condition compared to those with similarly high numeracy using the 
different context condition (within the same response form).  The highest level of 
predicted error is for those with the lowest numeracy, when given the different 
presentation context and responding to the numeric open ended response form. Although 
generally it appears that vague quantifier response form leads to lower error, which is 
indeed the direction the model coefficients indicate, it is important to note that the some 
of the model coefficients are not statistically significant. Rather, taking that into 
consideration, it shows that error is reduced or maintained at about the mean level of 
estimated error when using vague quantifier responses.   
 
Table 1.9 
Predicted Mean Absolute Error by Context, Form, and Numeracy 
Numeracy Vague-Same Vague-Different Numeric-Same Numeric-Different 
0 (Mean) 1.04 1.05 1.96 1.69 
1.73 (High) 1.14 1.04 2.73 0.68 
-4.27 (Low) 0.79 1.06 0.05 4.17 
 
Examining the slopes coefficients in Table 1.8, it is evident that actual frequency 
increases error. This increase in error is also reflected in Table 1.7. However, as with the 
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model for signed differences, none of the interactions with actual frequency is 
statistically significant. This lack of significance suggests that there is no relationship 
between respondent level (context, response form, and numeracy) and response level 
(actual frequency) variables. Thus, although the effect of actual frequency is evident, 
actual frequency does not interact with any other variables to affect absolute error.  
 These results inform whether the proposed hypotheses are supported or not. In 
regards to absolute differences error, Hypothesis 1 is only partially supported, as in 
general, people were not more accurate using vague quantifier responses than when using 
numeric open ended responses. Rather, it appears that after controlling other factors, 
there is no difference between the two response forms. This similarity is evident by the 
lack of significance of the main effect of the response form. Further, the vague quantifier 
response form only significantly affects error at different levels of numeracy, which at 
times also depends on the context condition. However, when vague quantifiers did have 
an impact on responses through these interactions, it was in the direction of reducing 
error, thus the partial support for the hypothesis.  
 Hypothesis 3 is clearly supported, as increases in actual frequency increases error, 
i.e. decreases accuracy. However, like Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 4 is not supported. The 
main effect for context is not significant, and the effect of context is only apparent at 
different levels of numeracy, and depending on the person’s numeracy, the effect of 
context differs. That is, sometimes greater context memory (i.e. different context 
condition) improves accuracy and sometimes the opposite occurs. For similar reasons, 
Hypothesis 5 is not strongly supported. Although at times greater numeracy does lead to 
lower error (e.g. under different context and numeric open ended response format 
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conditions), at other times, higher numeracy leads to greater error (e.g. under same 
context and numeric open ended response format conditions).  
 Hypothesis 7 is only partially supported, as evidenced by the coefficients in Table 
1.8. When the numeric open ended form is used, more numerate individuals display less 
error, but only under the different context condition. Under the same context condition, 
vague quantifier responses reduce error for those with higher numeracy. Hypothesis 8 is 
also partially supported, as seen by the Form*Numeracy interaction, with more numerate 
individuals having more error using the vague quantifier form, but only under the 
different context condition. For the same context condition, more numerate individuals 
display less error using the vague quantifier form. Hypothesis 12 is not supported, as 
some effect is found, as seen in the three way interaction Context*Form*Numeracy. This 
interaction suggests that context does affect error on the vague forms, at either higher or 
lower numeracy (in opposite directions).  
Like the signed differences model, for the absolute error model, none of the 
hypotheses regarding the interactions with actual frequency are supported. The absence 
of support for all of these hypotheses is seen by the lack of statistically significant 
interactions between actual frequency and the other effects. Thus, Hypotheses 9, 10, 11, 
13, 14, and 15 are not supported.  
Discussions and Conclusions 
 This study is the first that has compared the accuracy between vague quantifier 
and numeric open ended responses, as well as examining logical consistency between the 
two response forms. The examination of logical consistency and accuracy was 
accomplished by using an experimental design in which actual frequencies were known. 
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Included in this experiment was the important factor of context memory, which has been 
shown to affect accuracy (Brown 1995). Two conditions were used, the same and 
different context conditions, as was also done in Brown (1995). Further, the effect of 
numeracy was examined on validity, as has been done in Studies 2 and 3 in this 
dissertation. However, unlike those other studies, which relied on proxy measures of 
numeracy available in the data sets obtained, this study generated numeracy scores based 
on a previously used scale (Galesic and Garcia-Retamero 2010). Thus, it was possible to 
examine the interaction between context memory and response form, along with 
numeracy and the actual frequency of the event.  
 The results of this experiment provide several findings. First, individuals in this 
study are highly numerate. This high numeracy is likely due to the population selected 
from: students enrolled at a university in a psychology course. The numeracy of the 
student sample here is significantly higher than that of the national samples used by 
Galesic and Garcia-Retamero (2010). However, although there is a high level of 
numeracy overall in the sample used here, there is variation. Some respondents display 
significantly lower levels of numeracy, with as low as 3 out of 9 questions correct. 
Further, this variation allowed for detection of differences in numeracy in regards to 
accuracy (discussed below).  
 The second finding of note is that of the strong logical consistency between vague 
quantifiers and numeric translations. All respondents ordered the translations of the vague 
quantifiers in a consistent manner, with “never” consistently being the smallest value and 
“very often” consistently being the largest, with intermediate values for the other scale 
points. This ordering is also observed at the aggregate level, with each increasing scale 
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point statistically significantly larger from never to very often. Further, all but one 
participant gave “never” a translation of zero, showing strong sematic logical consistency 
as well. Given the logical consistency shown by all respondents, numeracy does not have 
an impact on this consistency, contrary to expectations.  
 Numeracy does have an impact on accuracy, however. In fact, of all of the 
possible variables affecting accuracy, numeracy consistently has the most impact. 
Numeracy, in some form, affects the relative accuracy (correlation coefficients), signed 
error, and absolute error. It only does not appear to have an effect on the size of 
individual regression slopes. How this effect occurs, however, is not consistently in one 
direction or the other. In some situations, greater numeracy is associated with decreased 
error, in others increased error. For example, for numeric open ended responses in the 
different context condition, greater numeracy is associated with a reduction in error. 
However, in the same context condition and with numeric open ended responses, greater 
numeracy is associated with greater error. 
 Regardless, results support the view that numeracy is a potentially important 
variable in survey research that to this point has not been fully explored. There have been 
no studies, except those in this dissertation, that have attempted to relate the effect of 
numeracy to validity in a survey. This study found that there is indeed an impact, albeit 
one that is not consistently in one direction. What this suggests is that survey researchers 
should account for the potential impact of numeracy in survey response, taking a measure 
of numeracy and including it as a covariate, at least when the response at issue is 
quantitative in nature.  
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 What appears to have less of an impact than numeracy is that of the level of 
context memory, as measured by the presentation context, either the same context or 
different context. Unlike Brown (1995), who found a clear effect for context in the 
direction that greater context memory (i.e. different context presentation) led to greater 
accuracy, this is not case in this experiment. Indeed, for regression slopes (bias) and 
correlation coefficients (relative accuracy) context has no apparent effect. For signed and 
absolute differences, context memory interacts mainly with numeracy (and sometimes 
response form) to have an effect. Like numeracy, however, the effect was not always in a 
consistent direction. For example, for both signed and absolute error greater numeracy is 
associated with greater error under the same context condition (using numeric open ended 
responses). However, like Brown (1995), there is a clear effect for the actual frequency of 
presentation, with greater frequency leading to increased error.  
 Although context memory is found to be important at times, depending on other 
respondent conditions, the differences between these findings and Brown (1995) may 
need to be reconciled. One potential important difference related to power is the number 
of words used in each study. Brown (1995) used twice the words used in this study, (126 
vs. 252); as such, it may be that the importance of context memory occurs at a certain 
threshold, not reached in this study. Similarly, it may also be that the lack of effect is due 
to when given fewer words to study, participants were able to estimate the frequency 
better than when more items are presented, and context memory loses its importance, as 
the participants can rely on other strategies for recall.  
Participants in Brown (1995) also were required to “think aloud” during the 
response process, explaining their thought process, in order to ascertain what recall 
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strategies were used. The current study did not require “think aloud” responses. It may 
also be that “thinking aloud” may affect recall in some way that affected the results. 
Finally, it should be noted that the instructions regarding the memory test seems to differ 
slightly between the two studies. Although both studies informed participants a memory 
test would follow the presentation of a set of words, Brown (1995) states that the type of 
memory test was not specified, whereas in this study participants were informed about 
which words they would be tested on.  The difference in instructions could affect 
differences in encoding and recall. Studies have indeed found that differences in 
instruction affect these aspects of memory (Brown 1997). Still, there is lack of evidence 
of an impact of context memory in this study suggests that perhaps context memory 
should be studied further, to see if the results of Study 1 are anomalous, or to determine if 
context memory is important only in certain conditions, such as those administered by 
Brown (1995).  
 Finally, of particular importance for this research is the effect of response form, 
either vague quantifier or numeric open ended response form. For bias (regression slopes) 
and relative accuracy (correlation coefficients), the response forms do not appear to have 
any effect on error. That is, one response form did not prove to be more effective than the 
other on accuracy. For signed error and absolute error, response form appears to have a 
more immediate impact. Vague quantifier response form generally reduces the error in 
signed differences, but has a less clear impact on absolute differences. Although the 
coefficient for the main effect of vague quantifiers was in the expected direction of 
reducing absolute error, this coefficient was not significant. Still, based on the effect of 
the interactions, vague quantifier responses either maintained or reduced absolute error 
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from the overall mean error. Thus, this study suggests that vague quantifiers are overall at 
least equally as accurate as numeric open ended responses, and at times provide more 
accurate data, with some exceptions.  
 In situations in which exceptions are observed, vague quantifiers still reduce error 
from the overall mean, but perhaps not to the same extent as numeric open ended 
responses. These exceptions occur due to interactions with numeracy and context 
memory. However, the reverse is not true; numeric open ended responses do not always 
tend to reduce or maintain error. Rather, at times, numeric open ended responses clearly 
increase overall error, as seen above.   
Based on these findings, few of the hypotheses posited are consistently supported. 
The only hypothesis clearly supported is that of Hypothesis 3, which states that as actual 
frequency increases, accuracy will decrease. Many of the other hypotheses receive partial 
support, due to the interactive nature of the model. At times error is increased in one 
condition or level of numeracy, but is decreased in a different combination that renders 
support for the hypothesis incomplete at best. Other hypotheses receive no support at all. 
Of particular importance, Hypothesis 1, that in general, vague quantifiers would be more 
accurate than numeric open ended responses received some support in two of the 
measures of accuracy, and is not contradicted.  
Although this is the first study to examine accuracy differences between response 
formats, and how this is impacted by context memory and numeracy, there are some 
limitations to this study that warrant discussion. First, is the way that logical consistency 
is measured. Logical consistency was measured by the numeric translations at the end of 
the questionnaire by all respondents using the vague quantifier scale. For each translation 
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section, the scale points were ordered from top to bottom in order from never to very 
often. Since the order was given to the respondents in this way, as well as having 
experience with the scale from answering all the frequency questions, this could 
influence responses to ensure that there was greater logical consistency than might have 
otherwise been.  
Second, although this study used a more complete measure of numeracy than 
have other studies, the responses to the numeracy scale led to a high skew, toward the 
upper end of numeracy. The overall mean was 7.27 out of 9, suggesting a highly 
numerate sample, compared to other samples (Galesic and Garcia-Retamero 2010). In 
part due to this, numeracy scores were mean centered. Even so, there is a ceiling effect in 
that numeracy scores can only reach so high (1.73) but can reach significantly lower (-
4.27). Further, given the skew in the data to the upper end, there is not a large amount of 
variation in the data. Still, even though this may seem like a limitation, numeracy effects 
are still estimable.  
Related to this skew in the numeracy are the population studied and the 
generalizability of results. Specifically, participants used in this study were selected from 
a subject pool drawn from university students taking a psychology course. As indicated 
by the numeracy scores, this population and sample is likely to be more cognitively able 
than an average person in the wider population. Given the nature of the population, 
generalizability of the results is in question. That is, it may not be possible to infer that 
the results found here would also be found in the general population.  
However, it is worth noting that vague quantifiers are thought to be cognitively 
less demanding than numeric open ended responses (Bradburn and Miles 1979). If this is 
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indeed the case, as it is also argued here that it is, then the findings in this study suggest 
that it may be vague quantifiers will perform even better in the general public. In this 
study, vague quantifiers tended to perform at least as well as numeric open ended 
responses, and at times, better. If this is true among more a cognitively able sample, then 
for a less cognitively able sample, likely to come from a general population, then the 
cognitively easier vague quantifiers could perform even better.  
This proposition has not been tested, however, and suggests an avenue for future 
research. That is, a similar kind of study should be conducted on a sample from the 
general population, where cognitive ability and numeracy would theoretically be lower 
and more similar to those samples used in other surveys. A further study could also 
restrict the population to those with the lowest cognitive ability and/or lowest numeracy 
to see what effect of the different response forms arise.  
Additionally, different areas of frequency estimation could be studied for 
differences between vague quantifier and numeric open ended responses. This study 
examined only recall of word lists. However, it may be that other kinds of recall, for 
example, number of times a doctor was visited, may lead to different results. Beyond that, 
asking about word lists is not a frequent survey question; rather survey questions are 
often about behaviors or other numeric information. This study suggests recall of numeric 
information is sometimes affected by response form, as well as context memory and 
numeracy, but whether this holds for actual behaviors is an empirical question that can be 
answered.    
Another aspect that could be studied further is the effect of context memory. 
According to Brown (1995), greater context memory increases accuracy. This study did 
99 
not find that the effect of context memory was so clear or evident. Additional studies 
could examine the role of context memory to further the knowledge of its effects, and to 
examine under what conditions context memory is important and how. For example, it 
may be that context memory may only be important as the number of items to be 
remembered increases, or is differentially affected by numeracy, as it appeared to be in 
this study.  
Study 2 
Data and Methods 
 The second data set comes from the National Survey of Student Engagement 
(NSSE). The NSSE is an annual survey that has collected data from college students from 
hundreds of participating institutions, with several thousand surveys collected annually 
(NSSE 2011).The survey collects data from randomly selected college freshman and 
seniors at the participating institutions. Although freshman and seniors were the target 
population, some respondents came from other classes. The primary purpose of the 
survey is twofold: 1) assessing the time and effort undergraduate degree-seeking students 
spend on educational activities, and 2) assessing what schools are doing to focus student 
efforts to these activities (NSSE 2011). Data from these surveys are collected via one of 
two survey modes, either by a paper or Web survey.  
The particular NSSE data for use in this research comes from 2006, when 
additional data were collected on questions using vague quantifier response options. 
Twelve questions, regarding active and collaborative learning and student-faculty 
interaction, were first asked about using vague quantifier response options. Then, at the 
end of the Web survey (these questions were repeated at the end of the Web survey only) 
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students were reminded of their earlier answers. The respondents were asked to quantify 
their response for each question by filling in a number into an open ended response space 
to indicate the number of times intended by the vague term, and to select the time frame 
thought of and that the number of times occurred in. For example, a person saying an 
event occurred “very often” was asked how many times this event occurred and if this 
number occurred either per day, week, month, academic term, or academic year. Thus, 
students entered a numeric response and selected an appropriate time frame. Figure 1 
displays an example from the Web survey showing the way this question was asked to 
respondents (from Nelson-Laird et al. 2008).  
Given the differences in the rate of occurrence selected by the respondent in the 
numeric translation of the vague quantifier response, that is, whether the number of times 
occurred per day, week, month, academic term or academic year (see Figure 1), it is 
necessary to transform numeric open ended responses to a constant time frame, such as is 
done in Nelson-Laird et al. (2008). In this case, all numeric answers were transformed to be 
on a per week time frame, through either multiplying answers by five (for those that said 
number per day) or dividing by the appropriate number for those saying per month, 
academic term or year. Specifically, time frames were adjusted by using the following 
multipliers: day = 5, week = 1, month = 0.231, academic term = 0.067, and academic year 
= 0.033. The twelve questions asked about in this manner are presented in Appendix 4.  
The twelve questions used have been used grouped together in two scales, one for 
active and collaborative learning and one for student-faculty interaction. Of the twelve 
items, seven are for the active-collaborative learning scale, with the remaining five 
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Figure 1. Example question for absolute frequency intended by vague quantifier. 
 
belonging to the student-faculty interaction scale (see Appendix 4). The responses for 
both the vague quantifier and numeric response translation response options have both 
been used for the scales (Nelson-Laird et al. 2008). For both response formats, the 
responses to each question are summated to create the scale value for each respondent. 
For the numeric translation scale, responses to each question were first transformed to a 
z-score (by taking the difference from the overall mean and dividing by the standard 
deviation). The z-scores for each question were then summed up to form the numeric 
scale.8 Unlike Study 1, which used translated numeric equivalents, for the vague 
quantifier scale, scales are summated for the vague quantifier questions by placing values 
on each of the response options, from 0 through 3 for the options ascending from 0 for 
                                                            
8 For the numeric translation scale, a simple addition of the numeric responses given was also examined in 
forming the scales. The results in terms of directionality and significance were near identical to the z-score 
transformed scales. 
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“never” to 3 for “very often”. This assignment was used for two reasons; first because 
others have summed the scale in this way (i.e. Carini et al (2006)) and second, because 
numeric translation were needed for accuracy assessments but is not needed for 
predictive validity assessments. Responses are then summed up based on the questions 
for each of the two scales for each respondent.  
Carini et al (2006) examined both the active and collaborative learning and  
student-faculty interaction for outcomes using the 2002 NSSE. Unlike the data used here, 
the 2002 NSSE data only had the vague quantifier questions available for scale 
construction and not the numeric responses as well. Using the vague quantifier version of 
these scales, Carini et al. (2006) examine the predictive validity of the scales for 
important theoretically related outcomes. Specifically the authors examine education 
outcomes, including self-reported grades in college, as “student engagement is generally 
considered among the better predictors of learning and personal achievement” (Carini et 
al 2006, p. 2). The results show small but significant positive correlations for both active 
and collaborative learning and for student-faculty interaction with grades, suggesting the 
important theoretically related relationship. However, there is no comparison, as it was 
not possible at the time, to examine the numeric scale format and which response format 
(numeric or vague) has higher levels of predictive validity.  
The authors also note the potential importance of satisfaction with the educational 
experience as an important educational outcome and construct (Carini et al. 2006). The 
authors measure satisfaction using two questions from the NSSE. The first asks, “How 
would you evaluate your entire educational experience at this institution? Poor, Fair, 
Good, Excellent”. The second satisfaction question asks, “If you could start over again, 
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would you go to the same institution you are now attending?  Definitely no, Probably no, 
Probably yes, Definitely yes” (also available in Appendix 4). Given the important nature 
of satisfaction as an educational factor, as noted by Carini et al (2006), satisfaction 
measures were considered outcomes to relate the vague quantifier and numeric response 
options to the various questions regarding active and collaborative learning and for 
student-faculty interaction.  
The survey also asked about a number of details regarding student engagement as 
well as student characteristics. Importantly, data about the student’s Scholastic Aptitude 
Test (SAT) is included. Numeracy may potentially be indicated by the student’s SAT 
math score. Initially, this score was divided into quartiles of the distribution, i.e. four 
levels of numeracy, low to high. However, additional collapsing showed that no 
differences in results, first by dividing the respondents into three divisions of numeracy, 
and then dividing students into simple low-high numeracy dichotomies. Given the lack of 
differences and large number of missing cases on the SAT math score variable (discussed 
below), the dichotomy of high-low numeracy was chosen to examine differences on this 
variable, using the split at the median level.  . 
 The data available for this survey is a twenty percent random subsample of the 
respondents, due to licensing restrictions. The data comes from the available student 
respondents to the Web survey, which represent 26,204 first-year and 36,263 senior 
students who were randomly selected from 149 institutions (Nelson-Laird et al. 2008). A 
twenty percent random subsample leads to a sample size of 10,767. Analyses of these 
respondents’ answers focus on the logical consistency between vague quantifiers and the 
associated numeric open ended responses and on the predictive validity of the different 
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responses, in regards to variables relating to the academic outcomes and perception of 
education.  
It is important to note that the data from the NSSE may be similar to a cluster 
sample for surveys (Kish 1965). This clustering would arise from the fact that 
respondents are selected within participating institutions (the clusters). Responses are 
therefore not completely independent. Lack of independence of response could occur 
because the similar environment or the underlying causes in selecting the same university 
leads to more similar responses than would be expected if the response were independent 
(Kish 1965). This potentially leads to more homogenous responses than if a simple 
random sample (SRS) was taken in conducting the same survey.  Hence, each 
observation provides less information than an observation in a simple random sample. 
As such, estimating the variance of point estimates using SRS assumptions and 
techniques may be incorrect (Kish 1965, Lohr 2010). Special techniques should be used 
that incorporate the clustering effects. In this case, that would entail controlling for the 
potential clustering of responses within universities. Failure to do so would lead to 
incorrect variance estimates; however, point estimates remain unbiased. Using the 
incorrect variance would lead to incorrect hypothesis testing and estimation of confidence 
intervals, which are based on the standard error resulting from the biased variance 
estimates using SRS assumptions.  
In order to do so, it is first necessary to examine whether there is indeed a 
clustering effect or not. To test for clustering effects, it is necessary to calculate the 
design effect (Kish 1965). The design effect (deff) is an inflationary factor of the variance 
for the cluster sample, where the cluster variance is inflated over that the variance 
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assuming SRS by the formula variance(cluster) = variance(SRS)*deff. If the design 
effects are large, then appropriate methods must be used to compensate for the clustered 
design of the data. Specifically, it is necessary to use an alternative variance estimation 
process, such as Taylor series approximation (Kish 1965), which is employed here.  
Hypotheses 
Given that Studies 2 and 3 both are similar, with Study 2 examining frequency 
estimation and Study 3 examining subjective probabilities, hypotheses 1 through 4 are the 
same for both, with the remaining hypotheses being study specific.  
H1: In general, vague quantifiers will show higher levels of predictive validity with 
theoretically related variables compared to numeric responses.  
H1a: There will be higher correlations and better model fit for variables measured by 
vague quantifiers compared to numeric open ended responses.  
H2:     When asked for a direct numeric translation of vague quantifiers, there should be a 
logical consistency between numeric and vague quantifier measures. 
H3: In general, more numerate individuals will provide responses showing greater 
predictive validity. 
H4: More numerate individuals will show greater logical consistency in numeric open 
ended and vague quantifier responses than less numerate individuals. 
H5: More numerate individuals will show greater predictive validity using numeric 
open ended responses than less numerate individuals. 
H6: However, more numerate individuals will not show greater predictive validity 
using numeric open ended responses than when using vague quantifiers.  
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Results 
Data Management 
 After transforming the numeric data to weekly rates, the distribution of these 
numeric translations were examined. Visual inspection showed that some responses were 
extreme and not plausible (e.g. an event occurring 50000 times a week). Overall, these 
extreme responses were few. The data were cut at the 99th percentile of the distribution, 
which would in all cases lead to more reasonable responses with a minimum of data cut. 
For nine of the numeric translations, the use of the 99th percentile led to cuts of 
translations greater than 10. For frequency of questions asked in class, the 99th percentile 
was 50. It was 15 for working in class with other students. For discussed ideas outside of 
class with others, the 99th percentile was 20. These cut data are used in all following 
analyses. Further, in order that the vague quantifier scales be anchored at zero, all of the 
vague quantifier responses were scaled from zero (“never”) to three (“very often”). 
 A potential problem of data missingness arises when attempting to divide the data 
along numeracy measures, i.e. SAT math scores. In particular, more than half the data has 
missing values on this variable, reducing the overall n to 4761 when using numeracy as a 
measure. Still, this provides a reasonably large sample, but results based on numeracy 
must be made with this caveat. Levels of numeracy were divided into high- and low-
based, divided along the median of 570 (mean = 565.55). Respondents with SAT math 
scores higher than 570 are considered to have high numeracy and those with lower than 
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or at 570 are considered to have low numeracy. This leads to 2211 respondents in the 
high numeracy division and 2250 respondents in the low numeracy division.9 
 The active-collaborative learning scale and student-faculty interaction scale were 
calculated for both vague quantifier and z-scored numeric responses. These calculations 
were done by summing the responses for the vague quantifier scale (with values of 0 to 3 
for each response) and separately summing the numeric responses (with values ranging 
from 0 to 10 for nine questions, 0 to15 for one question, 0 to 20 for one question, and 0 to 
50 for one question, as discussed above). Means for each scale and the standard error 
(accounting for clustering, see below) are presented in Table 2.1. Means are given for the 
total sample, as well as for high and low numeracy divisions.  
 
Table 2.1 
Active-Collaborative Learning Scale (ACLS) and Student –Faculty Interaction Scale 
(SFIS) Means 
 ACLS – Vauge 
(s.e.) 
ACLS – Numeric 
(s.e.) 
SFIS – Vauge 
(s.e.) 
SFIS Numeric 
(s.e.) 
Low Numeracy 9.82 
(0.10) 
16.76 
(0.44) 
6.71 
(0.10) 
3.51 
(0.09) 
High Numeracy 9.91 
(0.15) 
17.96 
(0.50) 
6.56 
(0.14) 
3.54 
(0.13) 
Total Sample 9.96 
(0.08) 
16.75 
(0.28) 
6.58 
(0.07) 
3.46 
(0.06) 
 
                                                            
9 The sample was also divided into four and then three levels of numeracy to test for sensitivity to the 
divisions. The divisions were made such that first a quarter of the sample and then near 33% of the sample 
belonged to each division. Dividing the sample in these ways changed none of the results and thus a 
simpler division of two groups was used, for parsimony and for increased sample sizes, given the large 
number of missing cases.  
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Effects of Clustering 
Given that there may be a clustering effect in the data, since respondents are 
selected and grouped within the 127 universities included in the survey, it is important to 
check for possible clustering effects in the data. This check is done by estimating the 
design effect (deff) for each of the main variables used in this study. The design effect is 
an inflationary factor that shows the ratio between the estimated variance controlling for 
the complex survey design (i.e. clustering) and the variance calculated assuming simple 
random sampling (SRS), which is the default variance estimation in most analyses. 
Larger design effects suggest a greater increase in the estimated variance due to the 
complex survey design (Kish 1965). However, clustering does not affect calculation of 
point estimates, such as means, correlation coefficients and regression coefficients, only 
the variance for these estimates.   
 The design effect is statistic specific, and may be different for different variables 
and statistics (Lohr 2010). To examine whether clustering is a possible issue that needs to 
be accounted for in the NSSE data, design effects were calculated for the means of the 
variables of interests. This includes the 12 vague quantifier responses to the two scales, 
the 12 numeric translations for each of these responses, and the three related variables of 
interest, grades and the two satisfaction questions, for a total of 27 design effects 
estimated. Design effects were estimated based on the Taylor series approximation 
variance estimates for the clustered survey design (Kish 1965). 
 The results show that, overall, clustering is an issue that must be accounted for in 
the NSSE. The calculated design effects ranged from 1.104 to 9.267. Only three of the 27 
estimated deff were less than 2, with the mean deff being 3.888. This mean deff suggests, 
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on average, a near four times increase in the estimated variance due to the clustered 
design compared to the simple random sampling assumptions frequently used in analyses. 
Given the evident clustering effects on the variance estimation, it would be inappropriate 
to use simple random sampling assumptions in variance estimation, and hence hypothesis 
testing, for the remaining analyses. Therefore, appropriate estimation procedures are 
employed using the SAS system (SAS 2010). Specifically, for means, PROC 
SURVEYMEANS will be used, and for regressions, PROC SURVEYLOGISTIC will be 
used. Variances will all be estimated using the Taylor series approximation.  
Logical Consistency 
 To examine the relationship between vague quantifier responses and the numeric 
translations, means translation at each level of vague quantifier response was examined 
for each of the twelve question pairs. Assuming that the vague quantifier and the numeric 
translations estimates are measuring the same construct as intended, there should be a 
level of concordance between them. This analysis is in essence similar to prior research 
examining the numeric translations to responses to vague quantifier scales (Bradburn and 
Miles 1979, Nelson-Laird et al. 2006). Tables 2.2–2.13 present the means for the numeric 
translations at each level of the responses to the vague quantifier scale. These means were 
calculated for the full sample and both divisions of numeracy, with the noted caveat that 
this leads to a large reduction in the number of cases due to the missingness in SAT 
sccores, although more than 2000 cases remain for each division.  
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Table 2.2 
Number of Times Asked Question in Class by Vague Quantifier Response 
Vague Quantifier Response Low Numeracy High Numeracy Total Sample 
Never 1.47a 
(n = 58) 
1.96a 
(n = 39) 
1.52a 
(n = 240) 
Sometimes 3.99b 
(n = 763) 
3.75b 
(n = 631) 
3.66b 
(n = 3113) 
Often 9.77c 
(n = 865) 
10.47c 
(n = 722) 
9.56c 
(n = 3620) 
Very Often 17.40d 
(n = 756) 
18.47d 
(n = 754) 
16.87d 
(n = 3405) 
 
Means are numeric translations of vague quantifier response. Different superscript letters indicate 
significant differences of means within columns at  p<0.05 level. 
 
Table 2.3 
Number of Times Made a Class Presentation by Vague Quantifier Response 
Vague Quantifier Response Low Numeracy High Numeracy Total Sample 
Never 0.16a 
(n = 160) 
0.12a 
(n = 170) 
0.16a 
(n = 755) 
Sometimes 0.39b 
(n = 1015) 
0.33b 
(n = 1027) 
0.38b 
(n = 4287) 
Often 0.72c 
(n = 817) 
0.57c 
(n = 711) 
0.65c 
(n = 3448) 
Very Often 0.99d 
(n = 407) 
0.74d 
(n = 233) 
0.93d 
(n = 1748) 
 
Means are numeric translations of vague quantifier response. Different superscript letters indicate 
significant differences of means within columns at  p<0.05 level. 
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Table 2.4 
Number of Times Worked With Other Students During Class by Vague Quantifier 
Response 
Vague Quantifier Response Low Numeracy High Numeracy Total Sample 
Never 0.23a 
(n = 245) 
0.13a 
(n = 267) 
0.21a 
(n = 1011) 
Sometimes 0.94b 
(n = 1129) 
0.80b 
(n = 1109) 
0.88b 
(n = 4783) 
Often 1.99c 
(n = 722) 
1.87c 
(n = 562) 
1.90c 
(n = 3103) 
Very Often 2.52d 
(n = 280) 
3.15d 
(n = 179) 
2.94d 
(n = 1251) 
 
Means are numeric translations of vague quantifier response. Different superscript letters indicate 
significant differences of means within columns at  p<0.05 level. 
 
Table 2.5 
Number of Times Worked With Other Students Outside Class by Vague Quantifier 
Response 
Vague Quantifier Response Low Numeracy High Numeracy Total Sample 
Never 0.14a 
(n = 177) 
0.17a 
(n = 118) 
0.13a 
(n = 789) 
Sometimes 0.73b 
(n = 963) 
0.65b 
(n = 836) 
0.68b 
(n = 3959) 
Often 1.54c 
(n = 800) 
1.66c 
(n = 716) 
1.56c 
(n = 3103) 
Very Often 2.29d 
(n = 407) 
3.01d 
(n = 420) 
2.65d 
(n = 1912) 
 
Means are numeric translations of vague quantifier response. Different superscript letters indicate 
significant differences of means within columns at  p<0.05 level. 
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Table 2.6 
Number of Times Tutored or Taught Other Students by Vague Quantifier Response 
Vague Quantifier Response Low Numeracy High Numeracy Total Sample 
Never 0.04a 
(n = 1144) 
0.02a 
(n = 791) 
0.04a 
(n = 4516) 
Sometimes 0.72b 
(n = 823) 
0.66b 
(n = 781) 
0.68b 
(n = 3580) 
Often 1.64c 
(n = 234) 
1.91c 
(n = 316) 
1.85c 
(n = 1172) 
Very Often 2.92d 
(n = 136) 
3.12d 
(n = 189) 
3.25d 
(n = 721) 
 
Means are numeric translations of vague quantifier response. Different superscript letters indicate 
significant differences of means within columns at  p<0.05 level. 
 
Table 2.7 
Number of Times Participated in a Community-Based Project by Vague Quantifier 
Response 
Vague Quantifier Response Low Numeracy High Numeracy Total Sample 
Never 0.06a 
(n = 1231) 
0.04a 
(n = 1274) 
0.05a 
(n = 5633) 
Sometimes 0.39b 
(n = 713) 
0.34b 
(n = 542) 
0.38b 
(n = 2852) 
Often 1.05c 
(n = 252) 
1.11c 
(n = 180) 
0.99c 
(n = 1014) 
Very Often 1.46c 
(n = 132) 
1.64c 
(n = 93) 
1.60d 
(n = 489) 
 
Means are numeric translations of vague quantifier response. Different superscript letters indicate 
significant differences of means within columns at  p<0.05 level. 
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Table 2.8 
Number of Times Discussed Ideas from Classes with Others Outside of Class by Vague 
Quantifier Response 
Vague Quantifier Response Low Numeracy High Numeracy Total Sample 
Never 0.20a 
(n = 127) 
0.28a 
(n = 87) 
0.20a 
(n = 471) 
Sometimes 1.37b 
(n = 800) 
1.08b 
(n = 635) 
1.23b 
(n = 3276) 
Often 3.13c 
(n = 796) 
3.22c 
(n = 794) 
3.08c 
(n = 3543) 
Very Often 5.05d 
(n = 488) 
5.64d 
(n = 475) 
5.29d 
(n = 2206) 
 
Means are numeric translations of vague quantifier response. Different superscript letters indicate 
significant differences of means within columns at  p<0.05 level. 
 
Table 2.9 
Number of Times Discussed Grades or Assignments with an Instructor by Vague 
Quantifier Response 
Vague Quantifier Response Low Numeracy High Numeracy Total Sample 
Never 0.06a 
(n = 127) 
0.12a 
(n = 139) 
0.10a 
(n = 547) 
Sometimes 0.40b 
(n = 870) 
0.37b 
(n = 905) 
0.37b 
(n = 3912) 
Often 0.89c 
(n = 758) 
0.96c 
(n = 644) 
0.90c 
(n = 3264) 
Very Often 1.25d 
(n = 552) 
1.34d 
(n = 389) 
1.36d 
(n = 2180) 
 
Means are numeric translations of vague quantifier response. Different superscript letters indicate 
significant differences of means within columns at  p<0.05 level. 
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Table 2.10 
Number of Times Talked About Career Plans with a Faculty Member or Advisor by 
Vague Quantifier Response 
Vague Quantifier Response Low Numeracy High Numeracy Total Sample 
Never 0.03a 
(n = 339) 
0.04a 
(n = 389) 
0.04a 
(n = 1775) 
Sometimes 0.25b 
(n = 1008) 
0.23b 
(n = 955) 
0.22b 
(n = 4382) 
Often 0.54c 
(n = 548) 
0.56c 
(n = 447) 
0.56c 
(n = 2335) 
Very Often 1.01d 
(n = 351) 
1.13d 
(n = 281) 
0.99d 
(n = 1392) 
 
Means are numeric translations of vague quantifier response. Different superscript letters indicate 
significant differences of means within columns at  p<0.05 level. 
 
Table 2.11 
Number of Times Received Prompt Feedback from Faculty on Academic Performance by 
Vague Quantifier Response 
Vague Quantifier Response Low Numeracy High Numeracy Total Sample 
Never 0.08a 
(n = 89) 
0.10a 
(n = 78) 
0.12a 
(n = 432) 
Sometimes 0.66b 
(n = 740) 
0.64b 
(n = 671) 
0.64b 
(n = 3223) 
Often 1.45c 
(n = 1011) 
1.51c 
(n = 947) 
1.47c 
(n = 4351) 
Very Often 1.99d 
(n = 414) 
2.19d 
(n = 338) 
2.07d 
(n = 1667) 
 
Means are numeric translations of vague quantifier response. Different superscript letters indicate 
significant differences of means within columns at  p<0.05 level. 
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Table 2.12 
Number of Times Worked with Faculty Members on Activities Other Than Coursework by 
Vague Quantifier Response 
Vague Quantifier Response Low Numeracy High Numeracy Total Sample 
Never 0.04a 
(n = 1089) 
0.02a 
(n = 865) 
0.04a 
(n = 4733) 
Sometimes 0.44b 
(n = 683) 
0.42b 
(n = 715) 
0.39b 
(n = 3029) 
Often 1.08c 
(n = 303) 
1.21c 
(n = 283) 
1.13c 
(n = 1230) 
Very Often 1.72d 
(n = 176) 
2.26d 
(n = 165) 
1.98d 
(n = 668) 
 
Means are numeric translations of vague quantifier response. Different superscript letters indicate 
significant differences of means within columns at  p<0.05 level. 
 
Table 2.13 
Number of Times Discussed Ideas from Classes with Faculty Members Outside of Class 
by Vague Quantifier Response 
Vague Quantifier Response Low Numeracy High Numeracy Total Sample 
Never 0.13a 
(n = 761) 
0.10a 
(n = 634) 
0.13a 
(n = 3209) 
Sometimes 0.73b 
(n = 4345) 
0.63b 
(n = 984) 
0.67b 
(n = 4345) 
Often 1.44c 
(n = 378) 
1.59c 
(n = 290) 
1.53c 
(n = 1473) 
Very Often 2.22d 
(n = 197) 
2.23d 
(n = 139) 
2.21d 
(n = 738) 
 
Means are numeric translations of vague quantifier response. Different superscript letters indicate 
significant differences of means within columns at  p<0.05 level. 
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Several findings are evident based on the data presented in these tables. First, 
vague quantifiers evidently mean different things in response to different questions and 
topics. For example, using the total sample, the translated meaning for the response of 
“very often” ranges from a mean of 0.93 times a week for number of times a presentation 
was made in class to a mean of 16.87 times a week for asked a question in class. 
Similarly, the translation of “never” ranged from a mean 0.04 times a week talking with 
faculty members about career plans to a mean 1.52 times a week for asked a question in 
class. These differences in meaning are found across all divisions of the sample. This 
finding is consistent with other studies, which have also found different numeric 
meanings for vague quantifiers across different behaviors (Bradburn and Miles 1979).  
 The second important finding is that, overall, there appears to be a great deal of 
logical consistency, in the total sample and in both the high and low numeracy divisions. 
For all questions and across all divisions of the sample, the mean numeric translations for 
each level of the vague quantifier are ordered in a consistent and expected manner. That 
is the translation for “never” is the smallest number of times per week, followed by 
“sometimes”, “often” and “very often”, in that order. For nearly all questions and 
divisions of the sample, the mean translations are all significantly different from one 
another, further strengthening the finding of logical consistency.  
Only two instances of means were not significantly different from one another. 
For both the low numeracy and high numeracy divisions, the mean translations for 
“often” and “very often” are not significantly different from one another for the number 
of times participated in a community-based project. This lack of significance is likely 
partly due to small numbers of respondents giving each of these responses, but other 
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questions have similar distribution of respondents with significant differences still found. 
Further, the difference just barely fails to reach statistical significance at the p<0.05 level; 
at p<.10 the means are significantly different. In both cases, the mean differences are in 
the expected direction, with “very often” larger than “often”. Overall, these two instances 
do not contradict the pattern of logical consistency between vague quantifier and numeric 
responses.  
The only possible exception to the argument of logical consistency between the 
two measures is that for all questions, the mean translation of never is significantly 
different from zero at the p<0.05 level. Although in some cases, the mean approaches 
zero, being as low as 0.04 in several instances for the total sample and those in the low 
numeracy division and as low as 0.02 for the high numeracy division in a couple of 
instances, these are still significantly different from zero. Further, for all three divisions, 
never means more than one for number of times asked a question in class (total sample = 
1.52; low numeracy  = 1.47; high numeracy  = 1.96).  
However, this result is countered by the fact that for most of the questions, the 
large majority of respondents who said “never” to the question gave a numeric translation 
of zero. The only exception is for asked a question in class, where still the plurality 
(33.75% in the total sample, 36.21% in the low numeracy division, 38.46% in the high 
numeracy division) gave zero as the numeric translation for “never”. For the remainder of 
the questions, the percentage giving zero as the translation of “never” ranged from 68.45-
93.49% for the total sample, 68.93-91.87% for the low numeracy division, and 72.28-
95.20% for the high numeracy division. This finding of large majorities for most 
questions translating “never” as zero is additional support that overall, responses to vague 
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quantifiers and numeric responses are logically consistent with one another, at least for 
this population and set of behaviors.  
These findings relate directly to two of the proposed hypotheses, one of which 
receives support and one that does not. First, with the direct translation between 
measures, there appears to be strong logical consistency, which lends support to 
Hypothesis 2. However, there is no apparent difference in this high level of logical 
consistency between measures when examining different numeracy levels, which is the 
expectation based on Hypothesis 4.  
Predictive Validity 
 Predictive validity has been shown to be an important aspect of the measurement 
properties of frequency questions in past research (Chang and Krosnick 2003, Lu et al. 
2008). This type of validity can be measured through the relationship between the 
measures of interest and theoretically related variables. In this case, the measures of 
interest are the active-collaborative learning and student-faculty interaction scales, which 
are summations of the twelve questions presented above (Carini et al. 2006, Nelson-Laird 
2008). Seven are used in the active-collaborative scale and five in the student-faculty 
interaction scale (see Appendix 4). Since the twelve questions are asked using both vague 
quantifier scales and z-scored numeric translations, four total scales are available for use; 
two for vague quantifier scales and two for z-scored numeric translations.  
 The theoretically related variables, as noted in Carini et al. (2006), are grades, 
measured on an eight-point scale, and two satisfaction questions using four point scales 
(see Appendix 4). Given the ranked ordering of the data, Spearman’s rho is the 
appropriate correlation coefficient to employ. The correlations of the two vague 
119 
quantifier and two numeric scales with these three measures are presented in Tables 2.14-
2.19, with the correlations of the theoretically related variables and the active-
collaborative learning scales presented first, followed by those with the student-faculty 
interaction scales. Along with the correlations for the total sample, the correlations found 
in the high and low numeracy divisions are also presented. In addition, correlations were 
transformed to Fisher z-scores in order to examine significant differences. Due to the 
clustering effects, this may not be the most appropriate manner for testing for significant 
differences; however, no other method is currently known, and this test gives a possible 
indication of significant differences. In any case, the point estimates for the correlation 
coefficients are not affected by the clustering, and are interpretable in terms of size and 
direction.   
 The results presented in these tables point in a single direction, being that vague 
quantifier responses have higher levels of predictive validity than when using numeric 
open ended responses. In every case except one, for every theoretically related variable 
for each of the divisions of the sample (high and low numeracy, total sample) the point 
estimates for the correlations are larger for vague quantifier responses than for numeric 
responses. The one exception occurred in the high numeracy division for the ACLS 
correlation with same college preference, where the numeric scale was slightly larger at 
the third place after the decimal, 0.164 to 0.163. Further, for the total sample, every one 
of these differences are statistically significant at the p<.05 level using the Fisher z-score 
transformation. Although the correlations as whole are not large, the importance follows 
from the comparison between the two different measures. In addition, similarly small 
correlations were found in Carini et al (2006), so these small correlations are expected.  
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Table 2.14 
Correlation of Active-Collaborative Learning Scales with Grades 
 Low Numeracy High Numeracy Total Sample 
ACLS – Vague 0.18a 0.14a 0.18a 
ACLS – Numeric 0.12a 0.06b 0.10b 
 
ACLS = Active-Collaborative Learning Scale 
Different superscript letters indicate significant differences of correlations within columns at  p<0.05  level. 
 
Table 2.15 
Correlation of Active-Collaborative Learning Scales with College Experience Rating 
 Low Numeracy High Numeracy Total Sample 
ACLS – Vague 0.26a 0.23a 0.23a 
ACLS – Numeric 0.15b 0.17b 0.17b 
 
ACLS = Active-Collaborative Learning Scale 
Different superscript letters indicate significant differences of correlations within columns at  p<0.05  level. 
 
Table 2.16 
Correlation of Active-Collaborative Learning Scales with Same College Preference 
 Low Numeracy High Numeracy Total Sample 
ACLS – Vague 0.19a 0.16a 0.16a 
ACLS – Numeric 0.15a 0.16a 0.13b 
 
ACLS = Active-Collaborative Learning Scale 
Different superscript letters indicate significant differences of correlations within columns at  p<0.05  level. 
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Table 2.17 
Correlation of Student-Faculty Interaction Scales with Grades 
 Low Numeracy High Numeracy Total Sample 
SFIS – Vague 0.16a 0.15a 0.14a 
SFIS – Numeric 0.11a 0.11a 0.10b 
 
SFIS = Student Faculty Interaction Scale 
Different superscript letters indicate significant differences of correlations within columns at p < 0.05 level. 
 
Table 2.18 
Correlation of Student-Faculty Interaction Scales with College Experience Rating 
 Low Numeracy High Numeracy Total Sample 
SFIS – Vague 0.28a 0.29a 0.27a 
SFIS – Numeric 0.18b 0.19b 0.19b 
 
SFIS = Student Faculty Interaction Scale 
Different superscript letters indicate significant differences of correlations within columns at p < 0.05 level. 
 
Table 2.19 
Correlation of Student-Faculty Interaction with Same College Preference 
 Low Numeracy High Numeracy Total Sample 
SFIS – Vague 0.19a 0.21a 0.19a 
SFIS – Numeric 0.17a 0.16a 0.15b 
 
SFIS = Student Faculty Interaction Scale 
Different superscript letters indicate significant differences of correlations within columns at p < 0.05 level. 
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In regards to the divisions of high and low numeracy, the pattern is similar to that 
of the total sample, with the correlation estimates, while overall being relatively small, all 
being higher in both divisions for vague quantifier responses in every comparison. 
However, not every difference is significant at the p<0.05 level using the Fisher z-score 
transformation. This lack of significance occurred between the active-collaborative 
learning scales correlations with grades and student-faculty interaction scales correlations 
with grades and same college preference for the low numeracy division. For the high 
numeracy division, there were no significant differences for active-collaborative learning 
scales correlations with same college preference and student-faculty interaction scales 
correlations with grades and same college preference for the low numeracy division.  
Beyond these findings, there are no discernible differences between high and low 
numeracy divisions. In some cases, the correlations are higher among those with high 
numeracy; in others the correlations are higher among those with lower numeracy. The 
lack of difference between the two divisions holds when looking at either scale 
difference. In only one instance was there a significant difference across divisions, with 
the correlation for the active collaborative learning scale using numeric response being 
higher in the low numeracy division than the higher numeracy division. It appears that 
numeracy, like for logical consistency, did not generally have an impact on predictive 
validity, at least using correlation coefficients as a measure.  
 More support is evident for the proposed hypotheses on predictive validity than is 
evident for the tests for logical consistency. First, Hypothesis 1 (and 1a) was clearly 
supported. Scales using vague quantifiers showed higher levels of predictive validity, 
with higher correlations in every case and every division between all theoretically related 
123 
variables and vague quantifier scales compared to scales using numeric responses. 
Similarly, Hypothesis 6 is supported by the correlations in the above tables. Like the total 
sample and low numeracy division, high numeracy individuals also showed higher levels 
of predictive validity when using vague quantifier responses than when using numeric 
responses.  
 However, some hypotheses were not supported. Those with high numeracy did 
not show higher levels of predictive validity compared to those with lower numeracy, 
counter to Hypothesis 3. In fact, the one case where there was a significant difference 
between the two divisions, there was a higher correlation among the lower numeracy 
division. Hypothesis 5 is also not supported, as the higher numeracy division did not have 
higher correlations when using numeric responses than those in the lower numeracy 
division. Again, the one instance of a significant difference was in the opposite direction 
of the prediction, with the lower numeracy division having a higher correlation using 
numeric responses. The overall picture shows little difference between high and low 
numeracy divisions, contrary to these two hypotheses.  
 Another way to test the predictive validity of the vague quantifier and numeric 
responses scales is to use regressions predicting the theoretically related variables, while 
including important control variables. Since the purpose is to compare models in regards 
to which scale best predicts the theoretically related variables in order to further assess 
the predictive validity, not all possible control variables predicting these outcomes are 
required. The control variables selected, based on those used in Nelson-Laird et al. 
(2008), are class standing (i.e. freshman, senior, or other), gender, full-time attendance 
status, and age (categorized as 19 and younger, 20-23, 24-29 and 30 and older).  
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The purpose of these regression models is to identify which scales increase model 
fit and predictive capability. Since all of the outcome variables (grades and two 
satisfaction questions) are ordinal-level variables, ordered logistic regressions were used 
to take into account the clustering effect of respondents within universities. Therefore, 
separate models for each of the scales predicting each of the three related variables are 
compared using the criterion of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC) (Agresti 2002). Since the AIC and BIC are related to the 
sample size, all models are restricted to include only cases where data is available for all 
risk measures to ensure comparability. Another useful indicator for model fit, the area 
under the Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curve, a measure of diagnostic 
accuracy, could not be estimated since this requires binary outcomes. A base model was 
also estimated for each of the three outcome variables, including only the demographic 
variables to show improvement in the models based on the inclusion of the various 
scales. The AIC and BIC for each of the three outcome variables, for each of the three 
divisions of the sample (low numeracy, high numeracy, and total sample) are presented in 
Tables 2.20-2.25. 
 The results mirror those of the correlation analyses, with the models employing 
the vague quantifier versions of the scales performing better than either the base model or 
the model using the numeric versions of the scales, as indicated by the lower AIC and 
BIC scores. These findings hold true in all cases for both the active-collaborative learning 
scale and for the student-faculty learning scale and when examining the AIC and BIC. 
The models are restricted to the same sample and include all of the same control 
variables, only differing in which version of the scale (numeric or vague quantifier 
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version) are used. Therefore, the differences in the AIC and BIC can be solely attributed 
to the differential predictive validity for each version of the scales. As such, it appears 
that vague quantifiers have higher levels of predictive validity than numeric scales. This 
finding holds across all levels of numeracy, as those with both higher and lower levels of 
numeracy show higher levels of predictive validity using vague quantifier scales than 
when using numeric scales. Again, this is true for all outcome variables, for both the 
active-collaborative learning scale and for the student-faculty learning scale, and when 
using either the AIC or BIC. 
Table 2.20 
Logistic Regression Indicators of ACLS on Grades 
 Low Numeracy 
(n = 2133) 
High Numeracy 
(n = 1915) 
Total Sample 
(n = 9119) 
 AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC 
Base 7840.73 7920.04 6532.96 6610.76 32665.89 32765.54 
ACLS – Vague 7788.05 7873.03 6510.69 6594.05 32432.30 32539.07 
ACLS – Numeric 7827.24 7912.22 6531.06 6614.42 32623.00 32729.78 
 
Table 2.21 
Logistic Regression Indicators of ACLS on College Experience Rating 
 Low Numeracy 
(n = 2136) 
High Numeracy 
(n = 1915) 
Total Sample 
(n = 9124) 
 AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC 
Base 4318.85 4375.52 3795.91 3851.48 18402.35 18473.53 
ACLS – Vague 4191.79 4254.13 3662.75 3723.88 17836.73 17915.04 
ACLS – Numeric 4286.22 4348.56 3772.62 3833.75 18244.01 18322.32 
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Table 2.22 
Logistic Regression Indicators of ACLS on Same College Preference 
 Low Numeracy 
(n = 2136) 
High Numeracy 
(n = 1914) 
Total Sample 
(n = 9123) 
 AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC 
Base 5026.31 5082.98 4319.69 4375.26 20689.32 20760.51 
ACLS – Vague 4953.59 5015.92 4243.79 4304.91 20404.25 20483.25 
ACLS – Numeric 4992.60 5054.93 4294.22 4355.35 20590.64 20668.95 
 
Table 2.23 
Logistic Regression Indicators of SFIS on Grades 
 Low Numeracy 
(n = 2199) 
High Numeracy 
(n = 1986) 
Total Sample 
(n = 9439) 
 AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC 
Base 8092.80 8172.54 6751.94 6830.26 33711.35 33811.48 
SFIS – Vague 8052.60 8136.04 6720.71 6804.62 33548.39 33655.68 
SFIS – Numeric 8068.59 8154.03 6744.54 6828.45 33664.79 33722.08 
 
Table 2.24 
Logistic Regression Indicators of SFIS on College Experience Rating 
 Low Numeracy 
(n = 2203) 
High Numeracy 
(n = 1987) 
Total Sample 
(n = 9474) 
 AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC 
Base 4453.07 4510.05 3956.48 4012.43 19056.29 19127.82 
SFIS – Vague 4295.67 4415.15 3761.60 3823.14 18321.07 18399.76 
SFIS – Numeric 4417.89 4480.56 3929.97 3991.50 18888.83 18967.51 
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Table 2.25 
Logistic Regression Indicators of SFIS on Same College Preference 
 Low Numeracy 
(n = 2203) 
High Numeracy 
(n = 1986) 
Total Sample 
(n = 9474) 
 AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC 
Base 5166.31 5223.29 4491.82 4547.76 21380.83 21452.37 
SFIS – Vague 5092.11 5154.79 4377.42 4438.96 20988.55 21067.23 
SFIS – Numeric 5132.47 5195.14 4461.42 4522.96 21260.15 21338.72 
 
 Like the correlation analyses, these results also lend support to some of the 
hypotheses, while not supporting others. First, these results support Hypothesis 1 (and 1a) 
in that vague quantifier scales show higher level of predictive validity than numeric 
scales. Given that this higher level of predictive validity is found across all divisions of 
the sample, for all models using the different scales, for all measures of model fit, this 
hypothesis is strongly supported. In conjunction with the correlations above, it is 
suggested that this hypothesis may be confirmed.  
 In addition, Hypothesis 6 is also supported, as it is in the correlation analyses. 
Specifically, even among those with higher levels of numeracy, vague quantifier scales 
outperformed its numeric counterparts in terms of predictive validity. Like with the total 
sample and those with lower numeracy, those with higher numeracy show higher levels 
of predictive validity using vague quantifier scales than with numeric scales for all 
models, scales, and criteria.  
 Hypotheses 3 and 5 are not directly testable using the AIC and BIC. The AIC and 
BIC are sample specific, and therefore only comparable within, not across, samples. Still, 
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the results are suggestive. Similar patterns emerge for both numeracy divisions across all 
models and scales, for both the AIC and BIC. This similarity is suggestive of similar 
predictive validity for each numeracy division. This is bolstered by the findings of the 
correlation analysis which more directly show no differences between the two divisions 
in terms of predictive validity. In combination, this further strengthens the claim that 
Hypotheses 3 and 5 are not supported, i.e. that there are no differences between high and 
low numeracy divisions in terms of predictive validity.  
 Finally, the estimated coefficients and odds ratios for the different scales in 
predicting the three dependent variables controlling for demographics are presented in 
Tables 2.26-2.31. The standard errors reported reflect the clustered sample design using 
the Taylor series approximation. As in other tables, the divisions for low and high 
numeracy are presented along with that of the total sample.  
 All of the coefficients are significant, and all coefficients are in the expected 
direction, with increases in the scale being associated with increases in the three 
dependent variables. That is, increases in both the active-collaborative learning scale and 
student-faculty interaction scale, regardless of scale type (vague or numeric), leads to 
increases in the predicted grades, satisfaction with college experience and the stated 
preference for the same college.  
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Table 2.26 
Scale Coefficients and Odds Ratios of ACLS on Grades 
 Low Numeracy 
(n = 2133) 
High Numeracy 
(n = 1915) 
Total Sample 
(n = 9119) 
 Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio 
ACLS - Vague 0.085* 
(0.011) 
1.089 0.064* 
(0.017) 
1.066 0.087* 
(0.007) 
1.091 
ACLS – Numeric 0.045* 
(0.011) 
1.045 0.026* 
(0.016) 
1.026 0.037* 
(0.006) 
1.038 
 
*p < 0.05 
 
Table 2.27 
Scale Coefficients and Odds Ratios of ACLS on College Experience Rating 
 Low Numeracy 
(n = 2136) 
High Numeracy 
(n = 1915) 
Total Sample 
(n = 9124) 
 Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio 
ACLS - Vague 0.148* 
(0.013) 
1.159 0.167* 
(0.014) 
1.181 0.151* 
(0.006) 
1.163 
ACLS – Numeric 0.073* 
(0.010) 
1.075 0.072* 
(0.013) 
1.074 0.078* 
(0.007) 
1.081 
 
*p < 0.05 
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Table 2.28 
Scale Coefficients and Odds Ratios of ACLS on Same College Preference 
 Low Numeracy 
(n = 2136) 
High Numeracy 
(n = 1914) 
Total Sample 
(n = 9123) 
 Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio 
ACLS - Vague 0.107* 
(0.011) 
1.113 0.121* 
(0.014) 
1.129 0.103* 
(0.007) 
1.109 
ACLS – Numeric 0.071* 
(0.012) 
1.073 0.072* 
(0.014) 
1.017 0.060* 
(0.007) 
1.061 
 
*p < 0.05 
 
 
Table 2.29 
Scale Coefficients and Odds Ratios of SFIS on Grades 
 Low Numeracy 
(n = 2199) 
High Numeracy 
(n = 1986) 
Total Sample 
(n = 9439) 
 Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio 
SFIS - Vague 0.079* 
(0.011) 
1.082 0.077* 
(0.014) 
1.080 0.077* 
(0.006) 
1.080 
SFIS – Numeric 0.064* 
(0.014) 
1.066 0.039* 
(0.013) 
1.040 0.041* 
(0.006) 
1.042 
 
*p < 0.05 
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Table 2.30 
Scale Coefficients and Odds Ratios of SFIS on College Experience Rating 
 Low Numeracy 
(n = 2203) 
High Numeracy 
(n = 1987) 
Total Sample 
(n = 9474) 
 Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio 
SFIS - Vague 0.173* 
(0.014) 
1.189 0.216* 
(0.014) 
1.241 0.186* 
(0.008) 
1.224 
SFIS – Numeric 0.081* 
(0.017) 
1.085 0.078* 
(0.018) 
1.081 0.075* 
(0.007) 
1.094 
 
*p < 0.05 
 
Table 2.31 
Scale Coefficients and Odds Ratios of SFIS on Same College Preference 
 Low Numeracy 
(n = 2203) 
High Numeracy 
(n = 1986) 
Total Sample 
(n = 9474) 
 Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio 
SFIS - Vague 0.114* 
(0.014) 
1.121 0.158* 
(0.013) 
1.171 0.131* 
(0.008) 
1.158 
SFIS – Numeric 0.079* 
(0.015) 
1.082 0.082* 
(0.018) 
1.086 0.087* 
(0.009) 
1.091 
 
*p < 0.05 
 
 In addition, all of the coefficients and odds ratios are larger for the vague 
quantifier versions of the scales than the numeric versions in every comparison. The 
larger estimates are also reflected in larger standardized coefficients (not shown) for the 
vague quantifier version of the scales in every comparison. Taken together, this 
difference in effect size suggests that changes along the vague quantifier scales have 
more influence in the predicted outcomes of grades, satisfaction with college experience, 
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and the stated preference for the same college than do numeric versions of the same 
scales. This finding further supports the position that vague quantifiers display higher 
levels of predictive validity than numeric responses. However, there are no discernible 
differences across division in the sample suggestive of differential effects of numeracy.  
Discussions and conclusions 
 This study examined vague quantifier and numeric open-ended responses in terms 
of the logical consistency between the two responses and in terms of the comparative 
predictive validity of the two measures. Overall, the results show that respondents were 
logically consistent between vague quantifier and numeric open ended responses. Values 
for numeric responses increased along increases in the vague quantifier scale, with each 
scale point producing statistically significant larger numeric translations.  
Further, although none of the means for “never” on the vague quantifier scale 
equaled zero, the plurality (and frequently majority) of respondents translated “never” to 
mean zero in every case as well, further indicating strong logical consistency, being 
consistent semantically as well as in ordering. There were no important differences 
between numeracy divisions, suggesting that in this case, numeracy did not have an 
impact on logical consistency.  
This study also examined the comparative predictive validity, which is important 
in determining which measure has better measurement properties (Chang and Krosnick 
2003). No study to date has examined the comparative predictive validity of these two 
types of measures for frequency estimation. The closest to examining this was Lu et al 
(2008) which compared vague quantifier and numeric scales, finding little differences 
between the two. Unlike that study, this research finds significant differences between 
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response formats. Specifically, scales using vague quantifier responses displayed higher 
levels of predictive validity than those using numeric open ended responses.  
This higher level of predictive validity held regardless of which scale was being 
inspected (i.e. active-collaborative learning scale or student-faculty interaction scale). It 
also did not matter which outcome variable (i.e. grades, satisfaction with college 
experience, stated preference to for the same college) these scales were correlated with or 
predicting. Numeracy level also had no impact; for both low and high numeracy 
divisions, vague quantifier versions of the scales also performed better in every instance. 
Again, this suggests, that at least in this sample, numeracy does not impact whether 
vague quantifier or numeric responses perform better in terms of predictive validity. For 
all divisions of the sample, it appears that vague quantifiers have better measurement 
properties.  
As indicated by the findings of no differences between levels of numeracy, 
several of the hypotheses were not confirmed. Specifically those hypotheses regarding 
differential effects for logical consistency and predictive validity across numeracy levels 
were not supported. However, the most important hypothesis overall was supported. 
Using different measures, such as correlations and regressions, the results suggest that the 
vague quantifier measure outperforms numeric open ended measures in terms of 
predictive validity for frequency estimation (Hypotheses 1 and 1a). The higher predictive 
validity is also indicative of potentially lower measurement error for the vague quantifier 
scale. Also, there was the expected logical consistency between vague quantifiers and the 
direct numeric translations (Hypothesis 2). Based on these results, it is suggested that 
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greater use of vague quantifiers are used in frequency estimation surveys, especially if the 
goal is to increase the predictive validity of responses.  
Another important finding of this study, although not necessarily related to the 
use of vague quantifier of numeric responses, is the clustering effects found. There were 
generally large clustering effects (design effects) found for all of the twenty-seven 
questions of main interest used in this study. Overall, the mean design effect approached 
4 (mean = 3.888), indicating a near four-fold increase in variance due to clustering 
compared to the usual simple random sampling assumptions. To find clustering was 
somewhat unexpected, for several reasons. First, the data received is a 20 percent random 
subsample of the entire data set, which was expected to reduce any observed clustering. 
Second, a university is not necessarily a homogenous place. Although it may be more 
homogenous than an entire city, it is generally expected that there is diversity in many 
colleges, which should limit the possible clustering.  
Finally, and most unexpectedly, is that the survey is conducted via the web. 
Although clustering effects can occur in web surveys, clustering effects are most 
frequently thought of occurring in face to face surveys (Lohr 2010). The expectation for 
greater clustering in face to face surveys is in part due to the effect of the interviewer, 
which is absent in web surveys. The finding of this study of large design effects in a web 
survey indicates the importance of examining for possible clustering in surveys 
regardless of the mode used or the presence or absence of interviewers. This finding also 
suggests that other analyses that have used the NSSE data that have not used analyses to 
account for clustering may have found results that are not actually supported by the data, 
if correct analyses were employed.  
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Although this study took appropriate steps to estimate variances correctly, there 
are some possible limitations to this research. First is the measure used for numeracy, 
SAT Math scores. This measure had a large number of missing cases, dropping the 
overall number of respondents by more than half when examining numeracy. Further, it 
may be that SAT Math scores are not reflective of numeracy in a direct way. Different 
divisions of SAT Math scores into various levels of numeracy did not alter results, which 
eventually led to the simple two divisions used in the current study. In all division of the 
sample (two, three, or four ways) the results were the same: there were no substantive 
differences between levels of numeracy in regards to logical consistency or predictive 
validity. Although this may be due to a real lack of differential effect of numeracy, an 
alternative explanation could be that the lack of differences is because SAT Math scores 
are not directly reflective of numeracy.  
Another limitation is the use of Fisher’s z-score transformation to test for 
statistical differences for correlations. As noted, special techniques are needed to 
correctly estimate variances for point estimates for use in hypothesis testing when using 
clustered data. However, at the moment, it is not clear how to transform correlations to z-
scores to test for differences taking into account clustered data. Therefore, the choices 
were to not use any hypothesis tests or use one with some limitation. The latter was 
selected as an attempt to examine differences statistically with the acknowledgement of 
the limitation.  
A final limitation worth noting is the limited population examined in this study. 
All respondents were college students, meaning that, for the most part, the respondents 
were of a certain age range. The use of this population limits the potential generalizability 
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somewhat. It may be that college respondents are different than the remainder of the 
population in key regards in use of numeric and vague quantifier responses. For example, 
the higher level of education compared to other portions of the population may lead to 
increased logical consistency. It may also be that college students, for whatever reason, 
are more likely to think in terms of vague quantifiers than others in the population. Even 
if this is unlikely, it is impossible to tell given this dataset.  
Further research on this topic is warranted. First, steps should be taken to 
overcome the limitations discussed above. Better measures of numeracy could be used to 
examine differences (see Study 1). A method to transform correlations to z-scores taking 
into account the complex survey design should be studied. Finally, this type study could 
be conducted on a larger cross-section of the population to increase generalizability and 
examine potentially important differences in the population, such as age differences (see 
Study 3).  
In addition to these three, further research could focus on other areas. Besides 
predictive validity, other aspects of the measurement properties could be examined, such 
as accuracy (e.g. Study 1). Although different studies have examined these various 
aspects of measurement properties and measurement error, it is possible to examine them 
all in one study in a unified manner. Current limitations in data do not allow for 
examination of all measurement properties at once, and further data collection may create 
a study so this is possible. Additionally, this study only examined the predictive validity 
in the domain of frequency estimation. It is possible that there are different response 
option effects when examining different topic areas, such as subjective probabilities (see 
Study 3).  
137 
Finally it may be worthwhile to examine mode differences in regards to logical 
consistency and predictive validity. This survey was conducted on the web, but different 
responses may occur in different modes. Although it is not clear that this would be the 
case, it may be worth examining. Related to the possible difference in response across 
modes, more studies should examine the possible clustering that may occur in web (or 
mail) surveys, and when this clustering may occur. For example, it may only occur with 
specialized samples conducted within institutions, such as was the case with the current 
survey. However, as of now, this appears to be an open question.  
Study 3 
Data and Methods 
Data for the third study, regarding measurement of subjective probabilities, comes 
from the Annenberg Perceptions of Tobacco Risk 2 surveys.  The Annenberg Perceptions 
of Tobacco Risk 2 surveys were conducted in the fall of 1999 and winter of 2000 using 
two national samples in the United States selected through random digit dialing (RDD). 
The first sample consisted of youths ages 14 – 22, with the second consisting of adults 
ages 23 and older. After households were selected at random, a screener at initial contact 
ascertained if at least one household member fell in the age range for the active sample. 
Parental notification and acceptance were required for minor respondents under the age 
of 16. The survey instruments were nearly identical for each sample; the differences 
between the surveys consisted of a few additional questions for minors not relevant for 
the adult sample (e.g. “Do you live with your parents?”).  The final sample size for the 
youth sample is 2002, while the sample size for adults is 1504 (for a combined sample 
size of 3506). The response rate is reported to be 51% (Jamieson and Romer 2001).  
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Several questions were asked regarding the perceived risk of smoking. These 
questions were asked near the beginning of the survey, following short sections on 
demographic information, a think aloud item about smoking and health, and questions 
about smoking history. Respondents were then asked a quantitative risk assessment in the 
standard format: “Now I would like you to imagine 100 cigarette smokers, both men and 
women, who smoked cigarettes for their entire adult lives. How many of these 100 people 
do you think will die from lung cancer?” (A complete list of questions used in for this 
study can be found in Appendix 5). Although this question asks about how many will die 
from lung cancer as opposed to how many will develop lung cancer, findings suggest 
respondents perceive that developing lung cancer is nearly synonymous to dying (Viscusi 
2002).  That is, there is not a fine discrimination by respondents between asking about 
“die from lung cancer” and “get lung cancer”. This is supported by the fact that the five-
year survival rate for lung cancer is only 15% (Jemal et al. 2009). This measure is 
considered the absolute risk measure for smokers.  
This question was followed by a similar one except instead of asking about 
smokers, it queried about non-smokers. Responses were for how many non-smokers out 
of 100 would die from lung cancer. This item is the absolute measure for non-smokers. 
This question is structured in the same manner as the standard subjective probability 
question on smoking risk, and therefore likely activates similar cognitive processes. 
Further, this question allows for computation of the risk difference and the relative risk 
estimates. Asking the respondent for the risk difference or relative risk between smokers 
and non-smokers directly would likely be too cognitively difficult (Krosnick 2001). 
Decomposing the question allows for more cognitively simple tasks in each question 
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which can be combined later to obtain the desired measures. This method has been found 
effective in previous research (Krosnick 2001).  
The risk difference measure used is calculated as the difference between the 
absolute risk measure for smokers and the absolute risk measure for non-smokers. The 
relative risk measure is estimated by dividing the absolute risk measure of smokers by the 
absolute risk measure for non-smokers. A problem that arises is for those respondents 
that respond with a zero to the absolute risk measure for non-smokers. To overcome the 
potential for a zero in the denominator of the estimate a small amount is added (0.5) to 
these responses to allow for estimable relative risks, consistent with practices in similar 
research (Krosnick 2001).  
The question asking for perceived risk of smoking using a vague quantifier 
response scale followed shortly after the numeric scale questions. This question was 
phrased as follows: “In your opinion, would smoking everyday be very risky for your 
health, somewhat risky, a little risky or not at all risky for your health?” Unlike Studies 1 
and 2, there was not a direct numeric translation of the vague quantifier question. As 
such, it may be that there will be less logical consistency between the two measures than 
was observed in those studies. This expectation is due to the fact that since respondents 
were not directly asked to translate the vague quantity, the link between the two is not 
explicit, and therefore consistency may not materialize in a manner similar to prior 
studies. Since the respondent was not asked about and did not have to think about what 
the vague quantity meant in numeric terms, consistency may be lessened.   
However, the central research question is which of the above four measures 
capture perceived risk best: absolute risk to smokers, risk difference between smokers 
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and non-smokers, relative risk between smokers and non-smokers, or risk on a vague 
quantifier scale. Therefore, techniques for examining the measurement properties and 
potential validity of these questions are employed. Since the concern is relative 
performance in measuring risk perceptions and the ability of these measures to predict 
outcome behaviors (i.e., smoking), the goal is not to necessarily ascertain whether 
smoking risks are over- or underestimated or the causes of risk perception. Previous 
research has indicated that youth and adults may perceive risk differently, with youth 
seeing risk more objectively and adults in a vaguer, intuitive sense (Reyna and Farley 
2006). However, adults can be expected to have greater numeric ability compared to 
youths. As such, analyses examine not only the combined data but also the data for the 
adult and youth samples separately. In addition, as a proxy for numeracy, level of 
education is used, which is a variable collected in the survey. Although education may 
not be a direct measure of numeracy such as numeracy tests or standardized tests scores 
in mathematics, education is related to numeracy, with lower levels of education related 
to lower levels of numeracy (Galesic and Garcia-Retamero 2010). Given the lack of other 
measures of numeracy, education appears to be the most appropriate proxy measure. As 
in Galesic and Garcia-Retamero (2010), high education is defined as having at least some 
college education, with low education being defined as having a high school degree or 
less education.  
 The theoretically related variable of interest for use in assessing predictive 
validity is smoking status, that is, whether the respondent is a smoker or non-smoker. 
Being a smoker is defined as those responding that they smoked one or more cigarettes 
per day, otherwise respondents are defined as non-smokers. Generally, risk beliefs should 
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be related to risk behaviors (Slovic 1987, Diefenbach et al. 1993). Those with higher 
levels of risk perceived are generally less likely to partake in that behavior. Regarding 
smoking risk perceptions specifically, other research has related numeric measures of 
perceived risk to smoking status (Viscusi 1990, 2002, Krosnick 2002). Like other risk 
research, the findings suggest that higher levels of perceived risks of smoking are related 
to lower smoking incidence.  
Hypotheses 
Given that Studies 2 and 3 both are similar, with Study 2 examining frequency 
estimation and Study 3 examining subjective probabilities, hypotheses 1 through 4 are the 
same for both, with the remaining hypotheses being study specific.  
H1: In general, vague quantifiers will show higher levels of predictive validity with 
theoretically related variables compared to numeric open ended responses.  
H1a: There will be higher correlations and better model fit for when using variables 
measured by vague quantifiers compared to numeric open ended responses.  
H2:     When there is an indirect numeric translation of vague quantifiers, there should not 
be a logical consistency between numeric and vague quantifier measures. 
H3: In general, more numerate individuals will provide responses showing greater 
predictive validity. 
H4: More numerate individuals will show greater logical consistency in numeric open 
ended and vague quantifier responses than less numerate individuals. 
H5: Younger respondents will show lower levels of predictive validity than adults. 
H6: Younger respondents will show lower levels of logical consistency than adults. 
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H7: More educated (numerate) individuals will show greater predictive validity using 
numeric open ended responses than less numerate individuals. 
H8: However, more educated (numerate) individuals will not show greater predictive 
validity using numeric open ended responses than when using vague quantifiers. 
H9: Younger respondents will show higher levels of predictive validity when 
responding with numeric open ended responses than adults using numeric open 
ended responses. 
H10: Younger respondents will show higher levels of predictive validity when 
responding with numeric open ended responses than when responding with vague 
quantifier responses.  
Results 
Measures of Risk 
The estimates of central tendency for the risk measures for the adult, youth, and 
combined samples are included in Table 3.1. The means and standard errors are presented 
for the numeric measures and the proportion of those saying that smoking everyday 
would be “very risky” on the vague quantifier scale. The means for the three of the 
numeric risk estimates of absolute risk to smokers, risk difference, and relative risk, if 
taken at face value, indicate overestimation of risk. Like previous findings, for all 
samples, the perceived absolute risk of smoking is significantly larger than the actual risk 
of 6 - 13 in 100 (Viscusi 2002; Viscusi and Hakes 2008). Using this same criterion, the 
risk difference also suggests overestimation of the risks of smoking, although for youths 
the mean difference is significantly greater than for adults, and significantly greater for 
lower educated than higher educated.  According to data from the 1989 United States’ 
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Surgeon General’s report on smoking and health, the actual relative risk of smokers to 
non-smokers for lung cancer is about 13:1 (Krosnick 2001). The relative risk mean for 
adults is nearly exactly this estimate, with higher educated having close to this estimate. 
For the youths and those with lower education, however, the relative risk is 
overestimated.10 This overestimation inflates the mean of the combined sample. The 
means of the absolute risk of lung cancer for non-smokers is actually the most 
overestimated (relatively), as the lung cancer death rate in non-smokers is less than 0.02 
per 100 (Thun et al. 2006). The proportion saying that smoking is “very risky” is quite 
high for all samples, with over 80% of the samples responding this way. This response, 
too, suggests that perceived risk in smoking is great. 
Table 3.1 
Risk Measure Tendencies 
 Absolute Risk 
(Smokers) 
Absolute Risk
(Non-smokers) 
Risk 
Difference Relative Risk 
Saying 
“Very Risky” 
Youth (14-22) 
(s.e.) 
60.39 
(0.56) 
13.45 
(0.40) 
46.84 
(0.64) 
30.43 
(1.21) 
0.81 
Adult (23+) 
(s.e.) 
48.47 
(0.73) 
15.18 
(0.43) 
33.21 
(0.72) 
13.10 
(0.86) 
0.83 
Low Educ. 
(s.e.) 
58.19 
(0.59) 
14.59 
(0.41) 
43.50 
(0.66) 
28.89 
(1.19) 
0.82 
High Educ. 
(s.e.) 
51.09 
(0.72) 
13.51 
(0.41) 
37.56 
(0.71) 
14.32 
(0.89) 
0.82 
Combined 
(s.e.) 
55.42 
(0.46) 
14.17 
(0.29) 
41.19 
(0.49) 
23.25 
(0.81) 
0.82 
                                                            
10 Relative risk estimates are larger than would seem by the means for absolute risk to smokers and 
nonsmokers due to the large skew in the data, with a large number of respondents who gave zero to 
absolute risk to nonsmokers also giving large estimates to absolute risks to smokers. For example, for the 
total sample, 446 respondents gave zero responses to the absolute risk to nonsmokers question, but had a 
mean of 63.41 for absolute risk to smokers.  
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Logical Consistency 
To ascertain the relationship between the vague quantifiers and the numeric 
values, means were calculated for each of the numeric risk values at each level of the 
vague quantifier scale. Assuming that the vague quantifier and the numeric risk estimates 
are measuring the same construct, there should be a level of concordance between them. 
Table 3.2 presents the means for the standard absolute risk to smokers measure at each 
level of the responses to the vague quantifier scale for each of the samples.11 Absolute 
risk for smokers is the numeric measure most often used in risk perception studies, so this 
is the comparison of central concern. This analysis is similar to research attempting to 
identify the numeric values of vague quantifiers (Budescu and Wallsten 1985, Clarke et 
al. 1992, Lichtenstein and Newman 1967). However, unlike those studies, there was not 
an explicit request for a numerical translation of the vague quantifier selected by the 
respondent. As expected, the highest means for all samples are among those saying 
smoking is “very risky”. All means are significantly greater than those at each of the next 
two levels down the scale at the p<.05 level. However, among adults and across both 
education levels, the mean for those saying smoking is “very risky” is not significantly 
different from those saying smoking is “not at all risky”. Further, for adults, the cell mean 
for “not at all risky” is significantly larger than those giving either of the next two higher 
risk responses on the quantifier scale. For those with higher education, the cell mean for 
                                                            
11 Since means are based on cases where both measures are not missing, the total means are based on 
somewhat smaller numbers than those in Table 1, resulting in minor differences in means across 
tables. 
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“not at all risky” is significantly larger than the mean for those saying “a little risky” and 
not significantly different from those “somewhat risky”. Finally, for both the youth and  
lower educated, as well as the combined sample, the cell means of the lower three 
responses on the scale are not significantly different from one another in any instance. As 
an additional test, in order to ensure that small cell size did not affect results, the final 
two categories of the vague quantifier scale were combined and all analyses conducted on 
the full scale were also conducted on the collapsed scale. No substantive findings 
changed by using the collapsed scale. 
 
Table 3.2 
Absolute Risk Means by Vague Quantifier Response 
Vague 
Quantifier 
Response 
Youth 
(14-22) 
Adult 
(23+) Low Educ. High Educ. Combined 
Very Risky 61.86a 
(n = 1637) 
51.52a 
(n = 1153) 
60.38a 
(n = 1662) 
53.29a 
(n = 1093) 
57.58a 
(n = 2790) 
Somewhat 
Risky 
54.42b 
(n = 252) 
35.00b 
(n = 194) 
48.46b 
(n = 260) 
42.19b 
(n = 182) 
45.97b 
(n = 446) 
A Little Risky 49.81b 
(n = 59) 
28.24b 
(n = 45) 
45.22b 
(n = 76) 
26.78c 
(n = 27) 
40.48b 
(n = 104) 
Not At All 
Risky 
52.08b  
(n = 26) 
42.79a 
(n = 19) 
53.00a,b 
(n = 28) 
42.69a, b 
(n = 16) 
48.16b 
(n = 45) 
Total 60.42 
(n = 1974) 
48.39 
(n = 1411) 
58.19 
(n = 2042) 
51.09 
(n = 1318) 
55.41 
(n = 3385) 
 
Means are estimated lung cancer fatalities out of 100 smokers. Different superscript letters indicate 
significant differences of means within columns at  p<0.05 level. 
 
In all samples, it appears that a large inconsistency occurs among those saying 
that smoking is “not at all risky”. For the first three points on the scale, there appears to 
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be a decreasing estimate of absolute risk, even if this decrease is not significant. At the 
last response level, however, the mean increases for every division of the sample. This is 
at least partly due to the small number of people selecting this response on the vague 
quantifier scale. Smaller number of responses for the middle two categories (“somewhat 
risky” and “a little risky”) may also help explain the lack of significant differences 
between them, as the absolute risk measure displays high levels of variance. Still, there is 
a significant decline between the middle two categories for those with higher education. 
Similar patterns of linear decline in the means of the risk difference and relative risk was 
found across the first three response categories of the vague quantifier scale, with the last 
response option showing higher means (not shown).  
These patterns of the means of the absolute risk measure across the responses to 
the vague quantifier scale lack the consistency desired to suggest that both are measuring 
risk perceptions in an equivalent manner. First, as indicated, the means do not always 
fluctuate in the expected manner. Further, and of potentially more importance, is that if 
one accepted the numeric values as accurate, then at all response levels, the risk of 
smoking is greatly overestimated. Those saying that smoking is only “a little risky” or 
“not at all risky” still vastly overestimate the risks, as do people saying smoking is “very 
risky”. Semantically, this does not seem consistent. To say smoking is only “a little 
risky” or “not at all risky”, and that the risk is numerically similar to those saying “very 
risky”, with all having vast numeric overestimates of risk suggests problems in 
understanding of the scales. This inconsistency occurs across all sample divisions, 
suggesting that all respondents have difficulty with one or both of the response options. 
Given the lack of numeracy among the general population (e.g. Peters et al. 2007) and the 
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wide use and expressed preference for responding with vague quantifiers, it seems 
possible the absolute risk measure is problematic.  
 To that end, it is important to examine the pattern for those with lower and higher 
levels of education, which are proxies for numeracy. Of all the sample divisions, only the 
division of higher educated respondents show statistically significant declines over the 
first three response options, with other divisions showing no difference between the 
middle response options. This finding suggests that, at least in some small way, increased 
numeracy does increase the logical consistency between vague quantifier and numeric 
absolute risk measures. However, it should be noted that as with other divisions in the 
sample, the cell mean for final response option for “not at all risky” is not significantly 
different or greater than other response options indicating greater risk. Additionally, as 
with all other divisions of the sample, higher educated respondents also give absolute risk 
estimates suggesting vast overestimation of the risk at all levels of response on the vague 
quantifier scale, further indicating discordance in responses.  
Based on Table 3.1, the above results indicate that overall there appears to be a 
logical discordance between vague quantifier and absolute risk responses. The fact that 
there is discordance between the two suggest support for Hypothesis 2, stating that there 
should be discordance when the translation from vague quantifiers to numeric responses 
is not done directly. However, this discordance may also be due to the way the questions 
were also asked. The numeric question asked about anyone’s risk for lung cancer, 
whereas the vague quantifier scale asked about health risk to oneself.   Hence, not only 
were the apparent objectives of the questions different with regard to the persons who are 
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susceptible to risks, but also with regard to whether risk is targeted to a specific health 
condition or to health more broadly. 
Not all of the hypotheses regarding logical discordance between vague quantifier 
and numeric absolute risk measures are supported, however. Given the pattern of cell 
means, lower and higher educated respondents show similar problems. For both, the cell 
mean for final response option for “not at all risky” is significantly not different or 
greater than other response options indicating greater risk. Further, both sets of 
respondents also give absolute risk estimates suggesting vast overestimation of the risk at 
all levels of response on the vague quantifier scale, further indicating discordance in 
responses. However, higher educated respondents did show significant declines over the 
first three response options, with lower educated showing no difference between the 
middle response options. This suggests partial support for Hypothesis 4, as more 
educated respondents may be showing some level of greater concordance in responses 
than lower educated, but overall, there is still a high level of discordance even for higher 
educated respondents.  
Finally, there is little support for Hypothesis 6. Both youth and adult samples 
show a similar pattern. The only difference is that, among adults, those saying “not at all 
risky” are significantly greater than the middle response but not different from the “very 
risky” response. Conversely, for youth, the last response is not statistically different from 
the middle responses and is significantly smaller than the “very risky” response. Further, 
adults give smaller absolute risk estimates at each level of the vague quantifier response 
than youth, but both still show levels of overestimation at each level of response. Given 
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the similar pattern and overall level of discordance in both youth and adults, it is not 
possible to say that either show less logical discordance than the other.  
Predictive Validity 
Past research suggests that the efficacy of these measures is indicated by the 
relationship to an outcome behavior of interest (Diefenbach, Weinstein, and O’Reilly 
1993; Windschitl and Wells 1996). In this case the behavioral outcome of interest is 
smoking, with higher risk perceptions observed with lower incidence of smoking. 
Smoking is defined in the current context as those respondents saying they smoke at least 
one cigarette a day. Using this definition, the proportion of smokers in the youth sample 
is 0.191 and 0.184 in the adult sample. For the low education division, the proportion of 
smokers is 0.199 and for the high education division it is 0.171. Overall, for the full 
sample the proportion of daily smokers is 0.188. In order to further assess the utility of 
these varying numeric (measured on the 0-100 open format) and vague quantifier 
(measured on a 1-4 ordinal scale) measures, each measure was correlated with smoking 
status, dichotomized as smoker/non-smoker (smoker  = 1). Point bi-serial correlations 
were estimated using the numeric risk estimates and a rank bi-serial correlation was 
estimated between the vague quantifier scale and smoking status. Correlations were 
transformed to their Fisher Z-scores in order to test for significant differences. Results are 
presented in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3 
Correlation of Risk Measures with Smoking Status 
 Youth 
(14-22) 
Adult 
(23+) Low Educ. High Educ. Combined 
Absolute Risk -0.08a -0.17a -0.15a -0.08a -0.12a 
Risk 
Difference 
-0.09a -0.22a -0.15a -0.11b -0.14a 
Relative Risk -0.08a -0.04#,b -0.10a 0.004#,a -0.07b 
Vague 
Quantifier 
-0.19b -0.35c -0.21b -0.23c -0.27c 
 
Different superscripts indicate significant differences of correlations within columns at  p<0.05  level. 
#indicates correlation not significantly different from zero at p<0.05 level 
 
Nearly all correlations are in the expected direction, with higher scores on a 
measure related to lower smoking incidence. The one exception is for the correlation of 
smoking status and relative risk in the higher educated sample, and this is not 
significantly different from zero. Overall, the adult sample’s correlations between the risk 
measures and smoking status are higher than for the youths. Only the relative risk  
measure in the adult sample has a correlation with smoking status not significantly 
different from zero. Similarly, the correlations tend to be somewhat higher for low 
education than for high education, excepting the correlation with the vague quantifier 
measure. Importantly, although all the measures generally show a relationship to the 
behavior of interest, the relationship is significantly stronger for the vague quantifier 
scale in every division of the sample. This finding is consistent with prior research 
(Windschitl and Wells 1996). This consistency with previous studies further indicates 
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that the vague quantifier scale may have better predictive validity and preferred in 
measuring smoking risk perceptions. 
 The findings in Table 3.3 provide support for some of the proposed hypotheses 
and against others. First, the data provide strong support for Hypotheses 1 and 1a. The 
correlations for all divisions of the sample are stronger for vague quantifier measures 
than for any of the numeric measures. These stronger correlations suggests greater 
predictive validity for vague quantifier measures compared to numeric open ended 
responses. However, Hypothesis 3 is not supported. Contrary to the expectation, the more 
numerate sample did not show higher levels of predictive validity. Rather, those in the 
higher educated sample tended to have smaller correlations with smoking status than did 
those in the lower education division. Still, only one of the differences is statistically 
significant, with the correlation between smoking and the relative risk measure 
significantly greater in the lower educated sample (p<0.05). Regardless, the pattern is 
contrary to Hypothesis 3.  
 Similarly, Hypothesis 7 is not supported. More educated respondents did not 
show higher levels of predictive validity when using numeric measures than less 
numerate individuals. In fact, the trend tends to be somewhat opposite this expectation, as 
noted above. Hypothesis 8 is supported based on the data in Table 3.3, however. More 
numerate individuals did not show higher correlations (predictive validity) using numeric 
measures than vague quantifiers. Like all other divisions, more educated respondents 
showed higher correlations using vague quantifier measures compared to numeric open 
ended measures.  
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 Hypothesis 5 is also generally supported by the correlations in Table 3.3. Younger 
respondents did provide lower correlations in all instances, except between smoking and 
the relative risk measure. For this correlation with relative risk, the difference between 
youth and adult samples was not significant (p = 0.20). For the remaining correlations, all 
of the correlations were larger for the adult sample than the youth sample at the p<.05 
level. These findings all suggest greater predictive validity generally among the adult 
sample compared to the youth sample. 
The remaining hypotheses concerning the predictive validity in the youth and 
adults samples are not supported. The youth sample did not display higher correlations 
than adults when responding using numeric open ended measures (Hypothesis 9), as 
might be expected by the argument by Reyna and Farley (2006) that youths perceive risk 
in terms of the objective measures as opposed to adults, who are argued to see risks in a 
vague, fuzzy gist manner. Rather, higher correlations were generally found for the 
numeric measures in the adult sample, with two of the three larger at statistically 
significant levels. The lone remaining measure, for relative risk, was not significantly 
different in the two samples. Finally, Hypothesis 10 is not supported. Contrary to this 
hypothesis, the youth sample, like all other divisions, had higher correlations for the 
vague quantifier measure than for the other numeric measures.  
As another test to further gauge the predictive validity of the various risk 
perception measures, logistic regressions were conducted predicting smoking status, 
including several important control variables. Since the purpose is to compare models to 
ascertain which risk perception measure is best in modelling smoking behavior in order 
to further assess the predictive validities, not all possible control variables predicting 
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smoking are required. The variables used are race, age, and education. Specifically, white 
respondents were compared to all others, as whites have been found to hold distinctive 
perceptions of risks compared to other races (Finucane et al. 2000). Education was 
measured as six increasing categories of educational achievement, beginning with eighth-
grade education and ending with completion of a college degree or higher. For 
comparisons across low and high educated samples, only race and age are used as control 
variables, as it does not make sense to include an education variable.  
Since the purpose is to identify which measure of risk perception increases model 
fit and predictive capability, separate models for each of the risk measures are compared 
using the criterion of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) (Agresti 2002). Since the AIC and BIC are influenced by the sample size, 
all models are restricted to include only cases where data is available for all risk measures 
to increase comparability. In addition, the AIC and BIC both penalize for model 
complexity, as more included variables increase AIC and BIC values. Given the skewed 
nature of the vague quantifier scale, indicators were created for each of the response 
options, leaving the indicator for “not at all risky” out of the model as the baseline 
category. By including dichotomous indicators for three of the response categories on the 
vague quantifier scale, there are two more parameters in the vague quantifier scale 
models than those models with numeric measures, giving a slight initial edge to the 
numeric risk perception models in terms of calculation of the AIC and BIC.  Lower AIC 
and BIC are considered to be better model fits. As an additional indicator for model fit, 
the area under the Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curve, a measure of diagnostic 
accuracy, was estimated. Higher ROC is indicative of better model fit. A base model was 
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also estimated, which includes only the demographic variables to show improvement 
based on the measures of risk perception. The AIC, BIC, and area under the ROC curve 
are presented in Tables 3.4-3.6. 
 
Table 3.4 
Logistic Regression Models Fit Indicators by Age 
 Youth (n = 1923) Adult (n = 1366) 
 
AIC BIC 
Area Under ROC 
Curve  (s.e.) AIC BIC 
Area Under ROC 
Curve  (s.e.) 
Base 1666.81 1689.05 0.726 
(0.015) 
1274.93 1220.24 0.683 
(0.019) 
Absolute Risk 1662.76 1690.57 0.728 
(0.015) 
1149.26 1175.36 0.725 
(0.018) 
Risk Difference 1660.88 1688.69 0.729 
(0.015) 
1135.63 1161.73 0.739 
(0.018) 
Relative Risk 1666.48 1694.29 0.728 
(0.015) 
1197.46 1223.56 0.686 
(0.019) 
Vague Quantifier 1615.92 1654.86 0.756 
(0.014) 
1102.02 1138.56 0.758 
(0.017) 
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Table 3.5 
Logistic Regression Models Fit Indicators by Education (Numeracy) 
 Low Educ. (n = 1994) High Educ. (n = 1295) 
 
AIC BIC 
Area Under ROC 
Curve  (s.e.) AIC BIC 
Area Under ROC 
Curve  (s.e.) 
Base 1938.14 1954.93 0.644 
(0.016) 
1130.10 1145.60 0.614 
(0.020) 
Absolute Risk 1902.53 1924.92 0.630 
(0.016) 
1118.30 1138.96 0.633 
(0.020) 
Risk Difference 1892.53 1914.92 0.665 
(0.016) 
1106.60 1127.26 0.650 
(0.020) 
Relative Risk 1923.12 1945.51 0.623 
(0.015) 
1132.01 1152.67 0.616 
(0.020) 
Vague Quantifier 1831.53 1865.11 0.704 
(0.015) 
1073.31 1104.30 0.694 
(0.020) 
 
Table 3.6 
Logistic Regression Models Fit Indicators by Total Sample 
 Combined Total (n = 3289) 
 AIC BIC Area Under ROC Curve  (s.e.) 
Base 3092.64 3117.03 0.548 
(0.012) 
Absolute Risk 3042.95 3073.44 0.623 
(0.012) 
Risk Difference 3017.10 3047.60 0.644 
(0.012) 
Relative Risk 3078.75 3109.24 0.586 
(0.012) 
Vague Quantifier 2922.50 2965.19 0.657 
(0.013) 
 
156 
 
The results are consistent and clear across all samples. By all criteria, the models 
using the vague quantifier scale fit better than those using numeric risk estimates. Even 
with the penalty for the additional parameters, the AIC and BIC are smallest for models 
using the vague quantifier scale. Further, although the area under the ROC curves for the 
various models are similar, it is always greatest for the model using the vague quantifier 
scale. This confirms the findings from the correlation analysis while including controls 
related to risk perception. For almost all samples, relative risk performed worst on all 
criteria, with higher BIC than the base model in adult and youth samples, as well for the 
higher educated sample. Risk difference performed slightly better than did the absolute 
risk measure, especially in the youth sample, where the BIC for the absolute risk model is 
larger than the base model. It appears that while the standard measure of absolute risk is 
related to smoking status, the vague quantifier and risk difference measures model the 
smoking decision better.  
 These results also provide additional evidence regarding the hypotheses about 
predictive validity in combination with the correlation results. Again, most clearly, 
Hypotheses 1 and 1a are supported by the results of the logistic regression models, with 
all model diagnostics suggesting greater predictive validity for the vague quantifier 
measure compared to all of the numeric open ended response formats, regardless of the 
sample division. Based on the AIC, BIC, and ROC, it is also clear that Hypothesis 8 is 
supported, as numeric measures did not display more predictive validity than the vague 
quantifier measure for more educated respondents. Further, Hypothesis 10 is not 
supported based on all of the model diagnostics. Like all other sample divisions, youth 
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responses using the vague quantifier scale shows higher predictive validity compared to 
numeric measures, contrary to expectations. These findings all conform to the findings of 
the correlation analyses presented above.  
 For hypotheses comparing differences across samples, it is not possible to use the 
AIC and BIC as these assume that the models all come from the exact same sample for 
comparative usage. However, the ROC does provide some evidence in regards to these 
hypotheses. There is little support for Hypothesis 3, as the area under the ROC is not 
consistently greater for low or high educated respondent models, and no difference is 
significant at the p<.05 standard. Similarly, Hypothesis 7 is not supported, as the area 
under the ROC curve is not always higher for numeric measures among more educated 
respondents compared to less educated, and there are no significant differences. In 
combination with the results from the correlation analyses, the results suggest little 
support for Hypotheses 3 or 7, and more educated (numerate) respondents did not display 
higher predictive validity in any of their responses.  
There is also little support for Hypothesis 5 based on the ROC from these models. 
The ROC is similar between the adult and youth samples, sometimes higher for one, 
sometimes for the other, but never significantly different. Still, Hypothesis 5 is supported 
based on the findings in Table 3.3, and given the nonsignificant differences in the ROC 
analyses for the logistic models, it suggested that there is general support for this 
hypothesis. Based on these models, there is some support for Hypothesis 9. For two of 
the three numeric measures, youth responses led to models with higher areas under the 
ROC curve. However, these differences were not significant, and for the third numeric 
measure, risk difference, it was higher for adults. In combination with the lack of support 
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in the correlation analyses, it suggests that youth do not give responses with higher 
predictive validity using numeric measures than do adults.  
The estimated coefficients and odds ratios for the risk measures controlling for 
demographics are presented in Tables 3.7-3.9. Among the numeric risk measures, the risk 
difference measure produced a greater effect than either than the absolute risk or relative 
risk measures (which was also reflected in the standardized coefficients, not shown). 
Looking across samples at each measure shows that the youth sample has smaller 
estimated coefficients and odds ratios closer to one than the adult sample. This attenuates 
the effects found in full sample data, leading to effects in between the youth and adult 
samples. For the vague quantifier measure, none of the included category coefficients 
included in the youth model are significant. However, chi-square tests for the joint effect 
of all three indicators are highly significant in all five samples (for youth, 65.542  , 
for adults, 65.1042  , for lower educated sample, 07.1182   , for higher educated 
sample, 78.662  for combined sample, 90.1852  , all df = 3, p<.0001). This  
significance, in addition to the greater fit statistics for this model compared to others, 
suggests the efficacy of the vague quantifier scale. 
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Table 3.7 
Estimated Coefficients of Risk Measures in Logistic Regression Models Predicting 
Smoking by Age 
 Youth (n = 1923) Adult (n = 1366) 
 Coefficient     (s.e.) Odds Ratio Coefficient     (s.e.) Odds Ratio 
Absolute Risk  -0.006* (0.002) 0.994  -0.021* (0.003) 0.980 
Risk Difference  -0.006 (0.002) 0.994  -0.025* (0.003) 0.976 
Relative Risk  -0.002 (0.001) 0.998  -0.005 (0.003) 0.995 
Vague Quantifier     
Very Risky  -0.113 (0.593) 0.893  -1.379* (0.537) 0.252 
Somewhat Risky  1.042 (0.606) 2.835  0.133 (0.551) 1.142 
A Little Risky  0.965 (0.661) 2.625  0.955 (0.620) 2.599 
 
*p < 0.05 
 
Table 3.8 
Estimated Coefficients of Risk Measures in Logistic Regression Models Predicting 
Smoking By Education (Numeracy) 
 Low Educ. (n = 1994) High Educ. (n = 1295) 
 Coefficient     (s.e.) Odds Ratio Coefficient      (s.e.) Odds Ratio 
Absolute Risk  -0.012* (0.002) 0.988  -0.013* (0.003) 0.987 
Risk Difference  -0.013* (0.002) 0.987  -0.016* (0.003) 0.984 
Relative Risk  -0.005 (0.001) 0.995  -0.001 (0.002) 0.999 
Vague Quantifier     
Very Risky  -0.216 (0.562) 0.806  -1.493* (0.543) 0.225 
Somewhat Risky  1.108 (0.573) 3.028  -0.209 (0.560) 0.811 
A Little Risky  1.386* (0.609) 3.998  0.329 (0.668) 1.389 
 
*p < 0.05 
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Table 3.9 
Estimated Coefficients of Risk Measures in Logistic Regression Models Predicting 
Smoking By Education (Numeracy) 
 Combined Total (n = 3289) 
 Coefficient     (s.e.) Odds Ratio 
Absolute Risk  -0.013* (0.002) 0.987 
Risk Difference  -0.015* (0.002 0.985 
Relative Risk  -0.005* (0.001) 0.998 
Vague Quantifier   
Very Risky  -0.749* (0.371) 0.473 
Somewhat Risky  0.614 (0.380) 1.848 
A Little Risky  0.962* (0.420) 2.618 
 
*p < 0.05 
 
 
Finally, models were tested adding each of the numeric measures of risk 
perception to the vague quantifier model (not shown). Although vague quantifiers better 
predict smoking status, it may be that numeric risk may still be important in decision 
making in addition to that of vaguely quantified risk. Using the AIC and BIC as criteria 
for model improvement, adding the numeric measures consistently improved model fit 
for absolute and risk difference measures in the adult sample, for risk difference in the 
higher educated division, and for all numeric risk measures for the lower educated sample 
(not shown). By adding these to the vague quantifier model, both the AIC and BIC 
decreased. In these models, the numeric risk estimate is significant and in the expected 
direction (greater perceived risk decreasing smoking likelihood), while not changing the 
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direction or significance of the other indicators in Table 3.5. These findings suggests the 
possible efficacy of asking both numeric and vague quantifier measures for many 
respondents, including, contrary to expectation, lower educated samples.  Also somewhat 
contrary to expectation, for the youth samples, adding any numeric risk measure to the 
vague quantifier model led to increases in the AIC and BIC. The lone exception was 
when the risk difference measure was added, which decreased the AIC from 1615.92 to 
1614.63. The BIC for this model, however, increased from 1654.86 to 1659.12.  
Discussion and conclusions 
How perceptions are measured is important in risk evaluation and for survey 
methodology generally. The differences in potential risk perception measures have been 
largely overlooked. One measure is often selected for a survey without tests of 
comparative validity. In the case of smoking risk perceptions, research has long been 
divided on how well people understand the hazards from smoking. These divisions have 
frequently focused on the results of the standard question asking for a numeric estimate 
of absolute risk of smoking. However, using national surveys of youths and adults, the 
current research shows that the standard question of absolute risk does not perform as 
well as other risk measures. Given the potential issues with this question, such as the 
numeracy of respondents and individuals’ potentially representing risk in a “fuzzy” 
manner (e.g. Reyna 2004), this may not be surprising. Similarly, other numeric measures 
did not relate to smoking behavior as well as more qualitative estimates. The means of 
these numeric measures of risk did not conform to a pattern expected given the verbal 
representations of risk respondents gave in other parts of the survey. To say smoking is 
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“not at all risky” on one measure, yet apparently vastly overestimate the risk on the 
standard absolute risk measure does not seem coherent.  
Since people naturally speak in vague quantifiers and often prefer to express 
themselves in this way, it may not be surprising that the vague quantifier measure 
performed better than numeric measures. Indeed, higher predictive validity was found for 
a measure using a vague quantifier scale, consistent with other findings (Windschitl and 
Wells 1996). The vague quantifier scale was more highly correlated with smoking 
behavior and led to better fitting predictive models; this was true for all divisions of the 
sample. This finding suggests that all age groups report risks in similar ways, possibly 
contrary to prior theory (e.g. Reyna and Farley 2006). Like adults, youth smoking 
behavior shows a greater relationship with vague, rather than numeric, risk estimates. 
Understanding how youth perceive smoking risk is of particular importance given that 
many smokers begin at young ages (Escobedo et al. 1990).  Additionally, higher 
correlations and better model fit were similarly found for the vague quantifier scale in 
both higher and lower education groups. This suggests, contrary to expectations, that 
numeracy did not have a substantive impact on measurement of subjective probabilities, 
at least in terms of impact on numeric and vague quantifier measures.  
The results of the current study also mirror those found by Kahneman et al. 
(1993) in a study of contingent valuation. Like that study, this study found that qualitative 
measures of attitude were psychometrically superior to numeric estimates, at least in 
predicting decisions. Further, both studies suggest that numeric estimates may be 
expressions of similar attitudes as those on the qualitative scale. Rather than being 
considered true values of numeric risk (or willingness to pay), these numeric estimates 
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may be simply expressions of attitude on an arbitrary scale (similar to the suggestion of 
Borland (1997)).  
Although several of the hypotheses were not confirmed regarding the effects of 
age or numeracy, the most clearly important hypothesis in terms of its importance for 
survey methodology was supported. That is, by all measures and tests, the results suggest 
that the vague quantifier measure outperforms numeric open ended measures for 
subjective probabilities (Hypotheses 1 and 1a). These results therefore are suggestive of 
lower measurement error, an important component of Total Survey Error (Groves 1989), 
for the vague quantifier scale. As such, the current results point to greater use of vague 
quantifier scales compared to numeric open ended response options in designing surveys, 
at least when asking questions about subjective probabilities and decision making studies. 
 There are several limitations to the current research. The first is the use of 
education as a measure of numeracy. Although correlated with numeracy, as indicated in 
Galesic and Garcia-Retamero (2010), education is not a direct measure of numeracy. The 
fact that this is not a direct measure may contribute to the lack of findings of differences 
across these divisions. Although other studies have also found no difference between 
levels of numeracy in regards to logical consistency and predictive validity using 
different measures of numeracy, it is possible that different results may have occurred 
with a different numeracy measure.  
 A second limitation is different wording for the numeric and vague quantifier 
questions. Unlike other studies, which use direct translation of vague quantifier to 
numeric meaning, this study used two related questions using the two scale formats. 
However, the question wordings were different between the two, and different question 
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wording may have an impact on how people respond, even if the target opinion is the 
same (Schuman and Presser 1981). Importantly, in this case the targets asked about in the 
question are also different, which may increase the chances of non-comparability. In the 
numeric questions, the question is asking about a hypothetical 100 smokers, whereas the 
vague quantifier question is asking about the respondent. The effect of the difference 
between asking about self or others has been found previously (Schwarz and Bienias 
1990). Further, one question asked about lung cancer risk and the other asked about 
health generally. The differences in questions used in this study may explain the 
difference in logical consistency and predictive validity. It must be stated that these 
differences make the potential for comparison between the two measures somewhat 
limited. However, for predictive validity at least, similar results were found when using 
the same question, with respondents simply translating vague quantifiers into numeric 
responses (Study 2). This similarity in results suggests that the differences in questions 
may not have a large effect in the current findings, however, the difference must be 
noted.  
These findings indicate areas for further research. First, research should examine 
what impact data collection mode has on responses to perceived risk measures. The 
current data were collected using telephone surveys, and as indicated by the trend of 
absolute risk measures, differences may be observed using other modes, such as face-to-
face or self-administered questionnaires. Second, although vague quantifiers are more 
related to smoking behavior than numeric measures, the best formulation of the vague 
quantifier scale should be identified in terms of wording and number of scale options. 
Not only may the question change, but also the number of categories. The current 
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research uses a scale with four response options. More options, either even or odd 
numbered, may be preferable. Third, it is important to see if these findings hold for other 
areas of risk perception. This study focused on smoking, but this may not hold for other 
types of risks. Finally, it  should be examined whether it is possible to analyze responses 
to vague quantifier scales to better discriminate individuals’ level of perceived of risk, 
possibly using latent models. Regardless, numeric estimates of risk from surveys, at least 
in the case of smoking, should be used with the understanding that these do not predict 
behaviors of interest as well as qualitative scales. The fact that this holds among youth 
samples is additionally important as most smoking decisions are made in younger years.  
Summary 
When asking about quantitative information in surveys, there are a number of 
ways to provide response options to respondents. Three main response options have been 
developed and used in requesting quantitative information from respondents:  numeric 
open ended, numeric scales, or vague quantifier scales (Tourangeau et al. 2000). This 
dissertation has focused on two of these, numeric open ended and vague quantifier scale 
responses. Numeric scales were not examined because these have been shown to have 
potentially biasing properties (Schwarz et al. 1985).  
 Vague quantifier scales are often argued against by many survey researchers, 
suggesting instead that numeric open ended responses be used (Beyth-Marom 1982, 
Schaeffer 1991, Tourangeau et al. 2000). This suggestion for avoidance is for several 
reasons. First, these scales provide response options that are, as the name suggests, 
inherently vague. Due to this, there is often a large variation in the numeric translation 
assigned to vague quantifiers (e.g. Wallsten et al. 1985). Further, the scales also have 
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relative meaning, such as where on the scale a respondent believes they are in 
comparison to similar others (Schaeffer 1991). Additionally, vague quantifiers have 
different meanings for different targets (Windschitl and Wells 1996). For example, “a 
lot” of risk from smoking may be different from “a lot” of risk from arsenic.  
 However, although many have argued against the use of vague quantifiers, there 
are also reasons that these scales may be preferable to numeric open ended responses. 
First, it is not clear that respondents are able to think about quantitative information in an 
appropriate manner. Studies have shown that overall there is a lack of numeracy (numeric 
literacy) in the population (e.g. Galesic and Garcia-Retamero 2010). Second, theories 
such as “fuzzy-trace” and other dual-process theories suggest that people frequently rely 
on vague, intuitive representations of numeric information rather than on verbatim 
representation of the numbers (Reyna and Brainerd 2008). Third, other research has 
shown that the relationship between subjective beliefs and behaviors are stronger when 
using vague quantifier scales than numeric responses (Windschitl and Wells 1996). 
Finally, and of particular importance, is that it has been argued that it is more cognitively 
burdensome to ask about numeric information than vague quantifiers (Bradburn and 
Miles 1979).  
 Even though there are arguments that have been put forth for and (mainly) against 
the use of vague quantifiers, there is a lack of studies that have compared the validity of 
numeric open ended and vague quantifier responses. This dissertation aimed to fill these 
gaps with the main objective being examination of which response format has better 
measurement properties for questions requesting numeric data, specifically, which has the 
least measurement error. This main objective was achieved through a set of four refined 
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objectives. First, was to assess the accuracy of the different response formats and 
compare this accuracy to see which, if either, performed better. Second, and similarly, 
was to assess and compare the predictive validity of the different response formats. Third, 
was to examine the logical consistency between the measures, numeric open ended and 
vague quantifiers, which is related to the face validity of the measures. Fourth, and 
finally, was to study under what circumstances these measures differed on these aspects 
of accuracy, predictive validity, and logical consistency. 
 These objectives were achieved through three studies, each of which examined 
different aspects of these objectives. The first of these studies (Study 1) used a new and 
unique data set, created using an experimental method. This experiment produced data 
that allowed for the examination of accuracy of the different response forms, numeric 
open ended and vague quantifiers. This data was generated as the actual frequency of 
events was controlled and known by the experimenter, and respondents were then asked 
about how frequently the event (word appearance) occurred by either numeric open 
ended or vague quantifier responses. This data addresses the first objective on differential 
accuracy.  
 Respondents who answered the frequency questions using vague quantifiers also 
had to provide translations of the scale at the end of the experiment. That is, for each of 
the six scale points, a numeric translation of meaning was given. Not only did this allow 
for examination of accuracy of the responses by placing a value for each of the vague 
quantifier scale points, this translation also allowed for the examination of logical 
consistency of numeric and vague quantifier meanings, i.e. the third objective.  
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In addition, the experiment presented respondents word lists along with a context 
word. This context word allowed for the examination of differences in context memory 
and its effect on response accuracy, in conjunction with response form. In one of the 
experimental conditions, each target word was presented with the same context word at 
each presentation; for the other condition, a different context word was presented with 
each target word.  The manipulating of context memory replicated the experiment 
conducted by Brown (1995). Further, this experiment collected data on numeracy from 
all respondents, using a scale previously used (Galesic and Garcia-Retamero 2010). By 
including the manipulation of context memory and the measure of numeracy, the fourth 
objective was also satisfied, whereby it was possible to examine the circumstances that 
the two response forms of interest differed in regards to accuracy. The numeracy measure 
also allowed for examination of any effect on logical consistency, again part of the fourth 
objective. 
Studies 2 and 3 both examined the predictive validity of the different response 
measures as the main outcome, that is, the second objective. Examination of predictive 
validity requires relating the measure(s) of interest to a theoretically related variable. 
Both used preexisting data sets that contained both numeric open ended and vague 
quantifier responses on the same or related questions. This also allowed for examination 
of logical consistency (objective three) between the two measures. Both data sets also 
contained theoretically related variables that had been studied previously, although not in 
a comparative manner as done here. The difference between these two studies is the 
domain of the question asked; Study 2 examined the area of behavioral frequency, while 
Study 3 examined the area of subjective probabilities. 
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Additionally, both Studies 2 and 3 estimated the effect of numeracy on predictive 
validity, although the measures used were not as direct as that used in Study 1. Study 2 
used SAT Math scores, while Study 3 used education as a proxy (Galesic and Garcia-
Retamero 2010). Study 3 also examined the effect of age on predictive validity of the 
different response forms, numeric open ended and vague quantifiers. Theory such as 
fuzzy-trace theory suggests that youth and adults perceive risks in different ways, which 
may affect the validity of the different response forms (Reyna and Farley 2006) across 
age groups. Specifically, youth perceive risk in a more objective, numerical manner, with 
adults perceiving risk in a fuzzy, vague way.  By examining the differences in numeracy 
in Studies 2 and 3 and age in Study 3, the fourth objective was also met.  
 Overall, the findings from these studies provide a generally consistent view that 
vague quantifiers should not be avoided, contrary to many practitioners’ warnings. Study 
1 showed that in general, vague quantifiers perform as well as, and in some cases, better 
than numeric open ended responses in regards to accuracy. Studies 2 and 3 are more 
definitive; by all analyses vague quantifiers outperform numeric open ended responses, 
with higher levels of predictive validity in all instances. That is, all three studies find that 
vague quantifiers are not worse than numeric open ended responses, and in many cases, 
clearly provide higher levels of validity, which is a goal of any survey question.  
 Further, Studies 1 and 2 show that there is a high level of logical consistency 
between numeric open ended and vague quantifier responses. This logical consistency 
suggests that respondents use both response forms in a coherent way. Studies 1 and 2 
therefore show potential face validity for both measures. This concordance was expected 
given that there was a direct translation between numeric and vague quantifier measures. 
170 
However, Study 3 found discordance between the two response forms. This discordance 
may be due to the fact that unlike in other studies, a direct translation of vague quantifiers 
to numeric responses was not requested. Rather, the means of numeric open ended 
responses were examined at the corresponding level of a separate vague quantifier 
response question. 
 Finally these studies examined the circumstances where these findings may differ. 
In regards to accuracy, there tended to be an effect for numeracy, but the effect was not 
always in a consistent direction. Numeracy sometimes increased accuracy, depending on 
response form and context memory, and others, decreased accuracy in a relative manner. 
For example, for numeric open ended responses and different context, greater numeracy 
tends to reduce error. However, for the same context and numeric open ended responses, 
greater numeracy appears to be related to greater error. Although generally, vague 
quantifier responses were as accurate as or more accurate than numeric open ended 
responses, numeracy at times affected this level of relative accuracy. Similarly, context 
memory sometimes affected vague quantifier responses in a similarly inconsistent way, 
with the end result being the same or greater accuracy generally, with some exceptions, 
but there was no consistent effect observed. Indeed, the overall effect of context memory 
found in Brown (1995) was not replicated here, suggesting potential revisiting of the 
effect of context memory.  
 In regards to predictive validity and logical consistency, however, there was no 
such variation across different conditions. Regardless of level of numeracy, in both 
Studies 2 and 3, predictive validity was higher for vague quantifier responses in every 
analysis. Similarly, in Study 3, there was no difference across ages, with predictive 
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validity higher for vague quantifier responses again. Results were also the same for 
logical consistency, with the findings of all studies replicated across all levels of 
numeracy, and in Study 3, age.  
 Given that in many of the analyses results were consistent across levels of 
numeracy and other factors, such as age, suggest that vague quantifiers are more suitable 
for all respondents than numeric open ended responses. At least this statement is clearly 
true if the desire is to increase predictive validity. Although numeracy had an impact on 
accuracy, vague quantifier responses generally performed at least as well, if not better, 
than numeric open ended responses. Context memory appeared to have less of an impact 
on accuracy, although context did impact accuracy through interactions with response 
form and numeracy. Again, these findings suggests that while conditions do exists that 
may differentially effect the relative accuracy of the different response forms, in almost 
all conditions vague quantifiers perform as well or better than numeric open ended 
responses. In combination with the findings on lack of effect of conditions on predictive 
validity, findings suggest the use of vague quantifiers for all respondents.  
 These findings and the relative cognitive ease of response using vague quantifiers 
suggest that there should be more usage of these in surveys. One way to accomplish this, 
while achieving more “precise” data many researchers desire,  is to adopt the methods 
used in Study 1 and advocated by Bradburn and Miles (1979). A series of questions can 
be asked using vague quantifier responses, and at the end of the survey, respondents can 
be asked for their numeric translations of each of the scale points. Therefore, numeric 
information is provided, shown here to be done in a logically consistent manner, but only 
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had to be done once. The cognitive burden is reduced, and the benefits of using vague 
quantifiers found in this dissertation are maintained.  
Finally, consideration is merited as to why the common view for avoidance of 
vague quantifiers has arisen and numeric estimates preferred. First are all of the issues 
that were pointed out previously that have been found in studies. These issues include 
that vague quantifiers are inherently vague, have large variation in the numeric 
translation assigned to vague quantifiers, and that there is relative meaning, both relative 
to similar other people and relative to other target events.  
Another possible explanation is that of researcher influence (Windschitl and 
Wells 1996). First, researchers tend to be relatively numerate individuals, able to think 
about and understand numbers better than the general public. Second, researchers may 
prefer numeric data. Numeric data is thought to be more accurate than vague quantities, is 
more amenable to the types of analyses that researchers prefer, and can be presented with 
more certainty of meaning than vague quantifiers, e.g. whether people over- or 
underestimate risks. Finally, specifically in the case of smoking risk perceptions, one 
explanation for this preference is the establishment of the absolute risk measure over 
time. This question was first used by industry research as far back as 1964 and asked 
several times thereafter (see Table 1). Industry data were then used in published risk 
perception literature, further establishing it as the standard measure (e.g. Viscusi 1990).   
However, none of these reasons actually mean that people have accurate 
representations of numeric information or that this is the best way to measure beliefs in 
surveys. Instead, this dissertation shows that more accurate and valid representations can 
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be conveyed through more qualitative response options. That is, vague quantifier 
response options can successfully be used in surveys asking about a variety of topics.  
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Questions about Smoking Risks Used in Literature Review 
 
Gallup Poll, November 1949 (n = 1500):  
 Do you think smoking is harmful or not? Yes: 60%, No: 33%, No Opinion: 7% 
 
Gallup Poll Jan. 1954 (n = 1500):   
 Have you heard or read anything recently that cigarette smoking may be a cause of 
cancer of the lung? Yes, have heard or read: 83%, No, have not: 17% 
 What is your own opinion—do you think cigarette smoking is one of the causes of 
lung cancer, or not? Yes: 41%, No: 31%, No opinion: 28% 
 
Gallup Poll Jun. 1954 (n = 1435):  
 Have you heard or read anything recently to the effect that cigarette smoking may be 
a cause of cancer of the lung? Yes, have heard or read: 90%, No, have not: 10% 
 What is your own opinion—do you think cigarette smoking is one of the causes of 
lung cancer, or not? Yes: 42% No: 30%, No opinion: 28% 
 
Gallup Poll Jun. 1981 (n = 1535): 
 Do you think that cigarette smoking is or is not one of the causes of lung cancer? Is: 
83%, Is not: 10%, Don’t Know: 7% 
 
Risk Perception Measures used in Table 1: 
Roper, 1964: 
 According to the report, a person who smokes a pack or more a day has about ten 
times as great a chance of getting lung cancer as a non-smoker, but what does that 
mean to you in terms of the likelihood of the pack a day smoker getting lung cancer? 
Out of 100 pack a day smokers how many would you say would get lung cancer – 5 
out of 100, 25 out of 100, 50, 75, 95 out of 100, or how many? 
 
Roper, 1977, 1980:  
 Out of every one hundred people who have been cigarette smokers, how many would 
you estimate get lung cancer at some time in their lives? 
 
Viscusi, 1985:  
 Among 100 smokers, how many of them do you think will get lung cancer because 
they smoke? 
 
Viscusi, 1991: 
 Among 100 smokers, how many of them do you think will die from lung cancer 
because they smoke? 
 
Sutton, 1995:  
 On average, out of 1000 20 year olds in Britain who smoke cigarettes regularly and 
who carry on smoking,..how many do you think will be killed by smoking before the 
age of 70? 
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Viscusi, 1997:  
 Among 100 smokers, how many of them do you think will develop lung cancer 
because they smoke? 
 
Viscusi, 1998:  
 Out of 100 smokers, how many do you think will die from lung cancer because they 
smoke? 
 
Annenberg 2, 1999:  
 Now I would like you to imagine 100 cigarette smokers, both men and women, who 
smoked cigarettes for their entire adult lives. How many of these 100 people do you 
think will die from lung cancer? 
 
Krosnick, 2000:  
 Next, I'd like to turn to a different topic: what you personally think about the effect of 
cigarette smoking on people's health. I'm going to read these next two questions very 
slowly to let you think about each part of them, and I can repeat each question as 
many times as you like before you answer, so you can be sure they are clear to you. 
First, if we were to randomly choose one thousand American adults who never 
smoked cigarettes at all during their lives, how many of those one thousand people do 
you think would get lung cancer sometime during their lives? 
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Target words and Exemplars for use in Study 1 
1. Weapon  
     1) Gun  
     2) Knife  
     3) Sword 
     4) Bat 
     5) Bomb 
     6) Fist 
      7) Rifle 
      8) Arrow 
      9)  Rope 
      10) Mace  
      11) Ax  
      12) Grenade  
      13) Missile 
      14) Club  
      15) Spear 
      16) Bazooka 
2. Fruit  
1) Apple 
2) Orange 
3) Banana 
4) Grape 
5) Pear 
6) Strawberry 
7) Peach 
8) Kiwi 
9) Pineapple 
10) Watermelon 
11) Raspberry 
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12) Plum 
13) Grapefruit 
14) Mango 
15) Lemon 
16) Cherry 
3. City 
1) New York 
2) Los Angeles 
3) Denver 
4) Miami 
5) Paris 
6) London 
7) Toronto 
8) Moscow 
9) Charlotte 
10) Dallas 
11) Orlando 
12) Houston 
13) Seattle 
14) Boston 
15) Chicago 
16) Baltimore 
4. State 
1) Oregon 
2) California 
3) Kansas 
4) Ohio 
5) Texas 
6) Maryland 
7) Utah 
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8) Iowa 
9) Missouri 
10) Oklahoma 
11) Michigan 
12) Georgia 
13) Florida 
14) Colorado 
15) Idaho 
16) Nevada 
5. Country  
1) United States 
2) Canada 
3) Mexico 
4) France 
5) Russia 
6) Germany 
7) Iraq 
8) Chile 
9) Japan 
10) China 
11) Spain 
12) Italy 
13) Brazil 
14) Iran 
15) India 
16) Peru 
6. Instrument 
1) Drum 
2) Guitar 
3) Flute 
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4) Piano 
5) Trumpet 
6) Clarinet 
7) Saxophone 
8) Violin 
9) Trombone 
10) Tuba 
11) Oboe 
12) Harp 
13) Cello 
14) Organ 
15) Cymbal 
16) Banjo 
7. Job 
1) Doctor 
2) Teacher 
3) Lawyer 
4) Nurse 
5) Fireman 
6) Professor 
7) Accountant  
8) Dentist 
9) Psychologist 
10) Secretary 
11) Manager 
12) Cook 
13) Policeman 
14) Banker 
15) Engineer 
16) Scientist 
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8. Sport 
1) Football 
2) Basketball 
3) Soccer 
4) Baseball 
5) Hockey 
6) Tennis 
7) Swimming 
8) Golf 
9) Volleyball 
10) Rugby 
11) Lacrosse 
12) Running 
13) Polo 
14) Wrestling 
15) Bowling 
16) Skiing 
9. Clothing 
1) Shirt 
2) Pants 
3) Socks 
4) Dress 
5) Coat 
6) Jeans 
7) Gloves 
8) Sweatshirt 
9) Blouse 
10) Undershirt 
11) Scarf 
12) Underpants 
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13) Shorts 
14) Bra 
15) Skirt 
16) Jacket 
10. Tool 
1) Hammer 
2) Nail 
3) Saw 
4) Screwdriver 
5) Drill 
6) Wrench 
7) Screw 
8) Ruler 
9) Level 
10) Pliers 
11) Hoe 
12) Shovel 
13) Chisel 
14) Rake 
15) Spade  
16) Trowel 
11. Bird 
1) Eagle 
2) Robin 
3) Bluejay 
4) Parrot 
5) Hawk 
6) Cardinal 
7) Crow 
8) Sparrow 
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9) Hummingbird 
10) Falcon 
11) Owl 
12) Dove 
13) Pigeon 
14) Parakeet 
15) Duck 
16) Chicken 
12. Insect 
1) Fly 
2) Ant 
3) Caterpillar 
4) Bee 
5) Mosquito 
6) Beetle 
7) Ladybug 
8) Grasshopper 
9) Butterfly 
10) Wasp 
11) Roach 
12) Moth 
13) Gnat 
14) Flea 
15) Cricket 
16) Hornet 
13. Animal 
1) Dog  
2) Cat 
3) Lion 
4) Horse 
201 
5) Bear 
6) Tiger 
7) Elephant 
8) Cow 
9) Deer 
10) Mouse 
11) Pig 
12) Giraffe 
13) Rat 
14) Rabbit 
15) Goat 
16) Donkey 
14. Fish 
1) Salmon 
2) Trout 
3) Goldfish 
4) Bass 
5) Catfish 
6) Tuna 
7) Shark 
8) Flounder 
9) Swordfish 
10) Herring 
11) Carp 
12) Cod 
13) Marlin 
14) Piranha 
15) Halibut 
16) Minnow 
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15. Drug 
1) Marijuana 
2) Cocaine 
3) Heroin 
4) Ecstasy 
5) Alcohol 
6) LSD 
7) Crack 
8) Acid 
9) Mushrooms 
10) Speed 
11) Nicotine 
12) Caffeine 
13) Opium 
14) Morphine 
15) Tylenol 
16) Aspirin 
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Numeracy Test from Galesic and Garcia-Retamero (2010) 
 
1. Imagine that we flip a fair coin 1000 times. What is your best guess about how 
many times the coin will come up heads in 1000 flips? 
____________ times out of 1000 
 
2. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize are 1%. 
What is your best guess about how many people would win a $10.00 prize if 
1,000 people each buy a single ticket to BIG BUCKS?  
____________ person(s) out of 1000 
 
3. In the Daily Times Sweepstakes, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 1,000. What 
percent of tickets to Daily Times Sweepstakes win a car?  
____________ % of tickets 
 
4. Imagine that we rolled a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how 
many times do you think the die would come up even (2, 4, or 6)?  
____________ times out of 1000 
 
5. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease?  
1 in 100   1 in 1000  1 in 10 
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6. Which of the following represents the biggest risk of getting a disease?  
1%   10%   5%   
 
7. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to 
get the disease out of 1000? 
____________ person(s) out of 1000 
 
8. If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this is the same as having what 
percentage chance of getting the disease?  
____________ % chance 
 
9. If person A’s chance of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in 10 years and person B’s 
risk is double that, what is B’s risk?  
____________  
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Questions used from the NSSE 
Vague quantifier/translation questions (Questions asked in a list, grouped under one 
question stem. Question stem appears as it did in the Web survey with those under it 
included in that grouping on one page. Not all questions used in translations that were 
asked this way. All questions given the response options, in order they appeared on the 
page, going left to right: Very Often, Often, Sometimes, Never. See example Web page 
below in Figure 2.) 
 
Active and Collaborative Learning Scale  
In your experience at your institution during the current school year, about how often 
have you… 
 Asked questions in class or contributed to class discussions 
 Made a class presentation 
 Worked with other students on projects during class 
 Worked with classmates outside of class to prepare class assignments 
 Tutored or taught other students (paid or voluntary) 
 Participated in a community-based project (e.g., service learning) as part of a 
regular course 
 Discussed ideas from your readings or classes with others outside of class (students, 
family members, co-workers, etc.) 
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Student-Faculty Interaction Scale 
In your experience at your institution during the current school year, about how often 
have you… 
 Discussed grades or assignments with an instructor 
 Talked about career plans with a faculty member or advisor 
 Received prompt written or oral feedback from faculty on your academic 
performance 
 Worked with faculty members on activities other than coursework (committees, 
orientation, student life activities, etc.) 
 Discussed ideas from your readings or classes with faculty members outside of 
class 
 
Figure 2. Example Screen of How Vague Quantifier Questions Asked. 
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Theoretically Related Variables of Interest  
How would you evaluate your entire educational experience at this institution?  
Poor 
Fair 
Good 
Excellent 
 
If you could start over again, would you go to the same institution you are now 
attending?   
 Definitely no 
 Probably no 
 Probably yes 
 Definitely yes 
 
What have most of your grades been up to now at this institution? 
C- or lower 
C 
C+ 
B- 
B 
B+ 
A- 
A 
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Questions used from Annenberg 2 Surveys. 
Risk Perception Measures 
 Now I would like you to imagine 100 cigarette smokers, both men and women, who 
smoked cigarettes for their entire adult lives. How many of these 100 people do you 
think will die from lung cancer? 
 I just asked you about smokers.  Now I would like you to imagine 100 non-smokers, 
both men and women, who never smoked and don’t live with smokers.  How many 
do you think will die from lung cancer? 
 In your opinion, would smoking everyday be very risky for your health, somewhat 
risky, a little risky or not at all risky for your health? 
Theoretically Related Variables of Interest  
How frequently did you smoke cigarettes in the past 30 days?  Just tell me when I get to 
the right amount.  (Read responses 1-7:)  
1 Less than one cigarette a day 
2 One to five a day 
3 Six to ten a day 
4 Eleven to fourteen a day 
5 Fifteen to nineteen a day 
6 Twenty a day 
7 More than twenty a day 
8 (Don’t know) 
9 (Refused) 
The above variable will be recoded to be such that anyone smoking one or more 
cigarettes a day is considered a smoker.  
	
